



CMSN REPORTS

A Canadian Naval Strategy Reader

Richard Gimblett | September 2026

In response to a rapidly evolving global security environment, the Royal Canadian Navy is moving toward more regular review and renewal of its strategic guidance. This reader is intended to support that process by providing an overview of naval strategy and the evolution of Canadian strategic thought.



A Canadian Naval Strategy Reader

Concepts and Capstone Documents

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September 2026

Cover image: Commander Nicole Robichaud, CO HMCS Margaret Brooke, displays the replenishment at sea approaches during Exercise TRADEWINDS off the coast of Barbados (photo: Corporal Connor Bennett, CAF).

Acknowledgements

The preparation of this review has benefited from the assistance of many colleagues over many decades. A quarter century ago, Peter Haydon (Commander RCN ret'd, and then a fellow with the Dalhousie Centre for Foreign Policy Studies / CFPS) helped me compile the original list of documents that should be examined and graciously provided copies of the several that he had obtained through federal Access to Information requests. He has remained a steadfast friend and mentor, and this Reader is dedicated to him.

Also from CFPS since that time is Dan Middlemiss, who has helped me obtain copies of some of the other documents and provided important comments. Roger Sarty, long ago the senior naval historian at the Directorate of History and Heritage, and the present incumbent Isabel Campbell, both the ablest of colleagues, similarly pointed me to important documents and provided invaluable observations. Other contributors include Nigel Brodeur (Vice-Admiral RCN ret'd, another mentor over the years, and recently deceased and unable to see these latest fruits of my labours); Paul Mitchell (Director of Studies at the Canadian Forces College Toronto); Chris Perry (my successor as RCN Command Historian); and Ian Yeates (RMC '79 classmate and fellow member of the Canadian Nautical Research Society).

The final catalyst to undertaking this long-deferred enterprise was the invitation to present vaguely on the subject of "Canadian naval strategy" to the Kingston Consortium on International Security (KCIS 2025), and this monograph is an extensively revised and expanded version of the article that will appear in the proceedings of that conference. Importantly, it was the interest in my presentation shown by the RCN's Director of Naval Strategy, Captain (RCN) Rob Watt, and his staff that encouraged me finally to put fingers on the keyboard to record it all. I humbly hope it will be of some use in their present endeavour to shape Canada's naval strategy for the coming tumultuous decades.

Richard Gimblett

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Introduction

A number of factors have combined recently to suggest the time is opportune to embark upon the development of a refreshed Canadian naval strategy. The *Leadmark* series of documents¹ that constitute the present guidance for the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) trace their evolution back a quarter century to the turn of the millennium, and while large elements of their prescriptions remain relevant, some others have become less so over the past decade. Indeed, as will be discussed later in this paper, the last pair of those documents failed to achieve departmental – let alone governmental – sign-off authorizing their promulgation beyond internal use. High among the factors contributing to their declining relevance was the hollowing out, through the 2010s, of core capability elements of the task group concept that was at the heart of the *Leadmark* series, specifically the paying-off (decommissioning) without assured replacement of the *Iroquois*-class destroyers (with their area air defence and command and control capabilities) and the original *Protecteur*-class replenishment ships (providing sustained afloat logistics), and the concurrent failure to achieve a reliable operational status for either the *Victoria*-class attack submarines or the CH-148 Cyclone maritime helicopters.²

The immediate catalyst for a strategic reassessment is the disruption emanating from the United States to the rules-based international order, which is imperilling the structures of allied cooperation upon which the *Leadmark* series was also premised. Another consideration is that, although “interoperability” with the United States Navy (USN) appears to continue effectively at the working level, future “coalitions of the willing” that form in response to a crisis situation are likely to be far more politically transactional and manifest in differing combinations, not necessarily centred around American leadership (this is not a new phenomenon, the experience of Libya in 2011 being an early example).³ Coinciding with this has been the increased presence of potentially hostile actors in the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans in the form, respectively, of Chinese and Russian forces – and, most worryingly, their increasing naval and commercial activity in the Arctic. The foreboding return to a geopolitical era of great power competition is unlikely to fade in the coming decade and must be factored into Canada’s calculations, even if its ramifications are largely out of our control. Where these themes of rupture and offshore challenges intersect is in the simple fact of our geography: “Canada is the northern half of a continental island,”⁴ and some sort of continued relationship with the United States for the shared defence of North America will remain a fundamental planning factor. But what form that relationship might take is open to speculation. As one eminent defence analyst recently observed, “In historical terms, roughly the same piece of continental geography has at times made the adjoining states either enemies, near adversaries, or allies.”⁵

Against all this, several positive factors have developed that are within the Navy’s power to manage, which also recommend the conduct of a strategy update:

- indications by the new Liberal ministry of a pragmatic approach to foreign and defence policy, with an associated willingness to greatly increase defence spending;
- the revival of interest in the notion of Canada as a “middle power” begs reflection on the Navy’s self-ascribed status as a “Rank 3 Medium Global Force Projection Navy”;⁶
- the amalgamation of the ships and aircraft of the Canadian Coast Guard (CCG) and the Department of Transport (DoT) into the Department of National Defence (DND) for employment in concert with the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) generally and specifically the RCN; and,
- perhaps most importantly, the impressive increased capabilities anticipated to be delivered with the platform acquisition programs presently in progress – guided-missile destroyers, under-ice-capable submarines, continental defence corvettes, underway replenishment vessels, and maritime patrol aircraft – promise the development of a fleet capable, once again, of sustained independent national task group operations (that is, to enable “strategic autonomy,” to borrow a phrase from Prime Minister Carney in his Davos speech referenced above).

Rationalizing the purposeful acquisition of these forces, and sanctioning their operational employment subject to government ambitions, will require strategic guidance beyond doctrine. Measured with this must be the appreciation that the broad outlines of a naval strategy will be largely shaped by the already-defined capabilities of the various platforms and the capacity to put those into effect regarding availability in numbers for deployment. Then the long lead times for new building projects must be considered – for example, the programs identified in the final bullet above will only begin to enter service over the next 5-15 years, with full numbers potentially not reached for a quarter century to come. In essence, any “new” strategy already has been shaped by the requirements determined over the past quarter century. In this regard, the RCN looks to be well situated, with what promises to be a balanced fleet structure placing a broad range of capabilities at the command of government.

It is not the intent of this monograph to suggest what a renewed Canadian naval strategy should look like or include. Rather, it aims to provide a framework for discussions surrounding any efforts to explore the issue. This motivation springs from a number of premises informed by the author’s own experience.⁷ To begin, Canadians generally – but including even military and civilian members of DND/CAF and academics in defence studies faculties – have a poor understanding of naval strategy as it has applied to national circumstances, historically and in the present. Then there is the tendency of all these groups to overlook past endeavours, either from a lack of awareness of the literature or to cater to the perceived need of successive admirals desiring documents promulgated under their own signatures.

The objective of this *Canadian Naval Strategy Reader*, therefore, is the compilation of a monograph that might serve as an educational instrument, establishing a shared foundation upon which staffs, politicians, academics, and the interested public can develop and assess any fresh strategy document. In this vein, it is not meant to be a definitive examination of the various aspects of the topic, but it instead aims to describe themes and point to sources to guide further research and analysis. The monograph is structured as a covering introductory essay presenting select readings listed in a fuller bibliography and pertinent historical Canadian documents reproduced as appendices. The essay itself is in three parts. It opens (Part 1) with a short discourse on the general nature of strategy. This is followed (Part 2) by a summary review of the foundational strategic concepts pertinent to navies and naval warfare, styled here as “the naval strategy canon.” In addition to the obvious personalities of Mahan and Corbett and their inspiration respectively from Jomini and Clausewitz, this includes disparate early theories such as those developed by *la Jeune École*, Mackinder, and Wegener that also guided many fleets through to the end of the Second World War. It then examines variations adapted to the nuclear age, ranging from Gorshkov in the Soviet Navy to the United States Navy’s Maritime Strategy, and culminates with the considerations that have shaped thinking in “the new world order” since the end of the Cold War. Notably, this part is not conceived as a complete examination of naval strategies past and present but rather a summary exposition of general principles with emphasis as to how they have pertained to the Canadian condition. This stems from a further premise that will be developed through the Reader: that the classical naval strategies of Mahan, Corbett, and others have not been central to Canadian deliberations, other than the extent to which they have governed the actions of the great power of the day from whose protection Canada has benefited (those being, in succession, France, Britain, and the United States). The point, then, is that there has been a limited need for Canadians to be familiar with their tenets – only to the extent required to act as a contributor to the accepted allied strategy. Conversely, knowledge of the strategies pursued by the enemy of the day should inform our understanding of their intentions. In this sense, it is useful to note that both Admirals von Tirpitz and Liu Huaqing (the “fathers,” respectively, of the Imperial German High Seas Fleet and the modern Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy) were well-versed in Mahan.

The remaining bulk of the introductory essay (Part 3) is given over to a detailed study of naval strategic thinking as it has progressed in Canada over the centuries, and it therefore includes discussions of the context and details of the various documents cited and reproduced in separate appendices. The literature has come to employ the term “capstone documents” to describe these sorts of snapshot high-

level records, and that term will be used as such here.⁸ Several general observations unfold from this survey. The first is that many of these documents cannot rightfully be classed as “strategies,” but more often are better described as policy or force development documents; however, they contain sufficient “strategic assessment” content to provide useful signposts tracing the evolutionary path of Canadian thinking. From that, the second general observation is that only on three occasions of major shifts in global geopolitics has a genuine “Canadian naval strategy” been developed: firstly, in April 1909, in the immediate wake of the Dreadnought Crisis, in response to Parliament’s direction for the “speedy construction of a Canadian naval service” (Appendix C); next, in consequence of the pan-government post-hostilities planning work undertaken from 1943, to define how the RCN might best contribute to postwar structures (Appendix I); and finally, at the turn of the millennium, to account for the “new world order” that followed the end of the Cold War, with *Leadmark 2020* (Appendix U). A final general observation is that, for much of the rest of the time, it is possible to conclude that Canada has been content to pursue a course following in the wake of its senior allies; in effect, to paraphrase RCN historian Chris Perry, “Canada has outsourced its maritime strategy.”⁹

Another of the several themes running through the Reader is that a major impediment to the development of a Canadian naval strategy too often has been the absence of an overarching national grand strategy.¹⁰ That has not prevented naval professionals from attempting the feat, but the consequence has been their need, first, to divine the wishes of government and then, in pursuing the aim, their inevitable deferment – as fallible humans – to the biases of their own aspirations. Often enough, this has proven to be somewhat prescient, leading to great innovation in concepts and technology; however, just as regularly, the result was overreach that was counterproductive to long-term naval objectives in alignment with evolving national objectives. A better understanding of the win-and-lose cycles that emerge here could more sufficiently prepare future efforts to avoid similar pitfalls.

A final opening note is that this Reader endeavours to keep the discussion on the level of strategy, as distinguished from the lower levels codified as doctrine and tactics. A simple ordering has it that strategy is the “why and what” statement of a long-term plan and tactics are the “how” specifying standardized actions to execute that plan, with doctrine being the “principles” bridging the two with amplifying operational guidance.¹¹

Having set the scene, with the world apparently now in the throes of yet the latest major shift in global geopolitics – and with Prime Minister Carney’s Davos speech providing the outline of what could develop into a national grand strategy¹² – let the renewed exploration of a Canadian naval strategy begin with this offering of an informed baseline framework for discussion.

Part 1: Defining Strategy

It has become commonplace that all cutting-edge organizations should have a strategy to lead their efforts, but far too often the prospective drafters fail to ask (let alone answer) a fundamental question: “What do we mean by ‘strategy’?” In 2005, the respected British historian Hew Strachan made an observation that generally has been overlooked (and rarely addressed) in the intervening two decades:¹³

... lately the word ‘strategy’ has been used with such imprecision that its meaning has been significantly weakened if not lost altogether ... it has acquired a universality which has robbed it of its meaning and left it only with banalities.

A decade later, another eminent British scholar, Lawrence Freedman, made much the same reflection as the opening statement to his magisterial *Strategy: A History*, quoted here at length for the several points that are pertinent to the development of a new Canadian naval strategy:¹⁴

Everyone needs a strategy. Leaders of armies, major corporations, and political parties have long been expected to have strategies, but now no serious organization could imagine being without one. Despite the problems of finding ways through the uncertainty and confusion of human affairs, a strategic approach is still considered to be preferable to one that is merely tactical, let alone random. Having a strategy suggests an ability to look up from the short term and the trivial to view the long term and the essential, to address causes rather than symptoms, to see woods rather than trees. Without a strategy, facing up to any problem or striving for any objective would be considered negligent. Certainly no military campaign, company investment, or government initiative is likely to [receive] backing unless there is a strategy to evaluate.

Freedman's eight-page preface, with its sweeping examination of the nature and purposes of strategies, is recommended for reading in full. For those desiring a shorter read, Freedman condensed his thoughts as the introduction to a survey collection of strategic concepts, in which he admits:¹⁵

[T]here has never been an agreed upon definition, and this has been regularly lamented, especially by those offering their own for consideration, yet broad shifts in meaning have been recognized and generally understood.... Strategy remains hard to pin down.... Those sufficiently confident in their theories of causation have described strategy as a science, while those who have doubted the certainty, but relished the opportunities for creativity, have insisted it is an art. But then the terms "science" and "art" have also not had settled and consistent meanings.

A very different discourse on the nature, purpose, and conduct of strategy is offered by Charles Oliviero, a Canadian soldier-scholar with a solid international reputation. He suggests that strategy does not exist in a realm of its own but must be understood as part of "a complex matrix ... [that] comprised the interconnectivity of philosophies, theories, and strategies as well as tactics, doctrine, warfare, and culture. When taken together, all these parts comprise the Matrix of Military Theory."¹⁶ His volume is a deeply thoughtful investigation that readily admits its failure to determine "a theory of everything," while instead encouraging would-be strategists to delve beyond selective quotes from the classic theorists (in his naval case being Mahan, Corbett, and Richmond, discussed in Part 3 below) to reach an appreciation of national and cultural influences within the greater realm of military theory.

Although the requirement for a "strategy" has become a habit in the corporate world since the 1970s, it only became established in the Canadian Armed Forces with the publication in 1999 of *Shaping the Future of Canadian Defence: A Strategy for 2020* (short title *Strategy 2020*).¹⁷ At the risk of getting ahead of the detailed analysis of this period in Part 3 below, *Strategy 2020* was driven by the government's imperative to rein in the spiralling debt crisis of the 1990s by turning to the notion that departments should be run like corporations, resulting in their adoption of many of the premises of the business world. Without any previous military modelling to rely upon (and in the absence of an overarching national grand strategy), however, *Strategy 2020* was peppered with the imprecision and banalities to which Strachan referred. This became, in turn, the language with which cascading service strategies strove to align, as witnessed by the below excerpt from the Navy's *Leadmark 2020*, which gives a nod to the then-popular notion of "mission-values-vision" as the driver behind the strategy's production:¹⁸

Canada's military, like those elsewhere in the Western world, has profited in recent years from the adoption of the modern business practices currently in use in the private sector.... One expression of the corporate decision-making environment illustrates the relationships among mission, vision, values and strategy by posing a series of questions, as described below:

- Mission – speaks to the institution's *raison d'être*. It is a general statement of why it exists: what is our long-term purpose?

- Values – are also long-term and general in nature, and describe how the institution is to be run. The emphasis is on beliefs and behaviours: what do we stand for in our everyday behaviour?
- Vision – focuses on the specific features of a desirable future state for the institution, providing a reasonably specific and tangible aim, or destination, for the people in the institution to strive to achieve: where do we want the institution to be in ten to thirty years?
- Strategy – is the articulation, or the path to realisation, of the vision: how do we intend to fulfil our mission and vision, while reinforcing our values?

The drafters of *Leadmark 2020* struggled to rise above the “imprecision and banalities” of expressing fealty to the mission-vision-values statements required to align with the higher departmental “guidance,” while also developing what they felt would be a meaningful actual strategy. As will be discussed in Part 3, this contradiction inevitably led to structural problems in maintaining the thrust of the final document. But it was rewarded with departmental endorsement.

While the “mission-values-vision” methodology remained the guiding model for CAF strategic development into the 2010s, an alternate model from a more directly military perspective had been postulated in the late 1980s by a senior instructor at the United States Army War College. As graduates of Carlisle rose in the ranks of the American and Canadian militaries, this language gained a foothold. According to its author, Colonel Arthur F. Lykke, Jr.:¹⁹

National security, our most vital interest, is supported on a three-legged stool titled “Military Strategy.” The three legs of the stool are labeled “Objectives,” “Concepts” and “Resources.” This simple analogy leads one to the observation that the legs must be balanced or national security may be in jeopardy. If military resources are not compatible with strategic concepts, or commitments are not matched by military capabilities, we may be in trouble.

... military strategy [therefore] consists of the establishment of military objectives, the formulation of military strategic concepts to accomplish the objectives, and the use of military resources to implement the concepts.

Shortened further to the three-legged catchphrase “ends-ways-means,” this model has lately come to permeate the literature.²⁰

Lykke was content to allow that “this conceptual approach is applicable to all three levels of war [strategic, operational, and tactical] ... in that it also reveals the fundamental similarities among national military strategy, operational art and tactics.”²¹ However, over the decades, practitioners have come to accept that there is a need to distinguish the differing documentary codification for the three levels, separating strategic guidance from doctrine and tactical procedures.

Would-be Canadian naval strategists have the benefit of further thought on all this, courtesy of their counterparts in the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF), for whom defence scientist Brad Gladman prepared a primer on military strategy. Entitled *Good Strategy and Bad*,²² it is an incisive study of the subject and should be read in full, although it is instructive to underscore some key points for the purposes of this monograph. To begin, the quote attributed to Hew Strachan at the beginning of this part is drawn from Gladman’s own opening section on “Misuse of the term ‘Strategy,’” in which he (Gladman) also notes that “at the national level the term ‘strategy’ has recently been conflated with ‘policy’ and both have lost some of their unique characteristics. Strategy has been used as a noun, verb, adjective, and an adverb, normally to emphasise something’s importance.”²³ He underscores the need as well to distinguish an “institutional” or service strategy from other types that may be encountered within the department.²⁴

It must be said from the outset that a service strategy is neither a war fighting strategy, nor is it a national military strategy. Each of these three types of strategies have very different purposes, and thus will look quite different. A service strategy is not about specific capabilities, or how those capabilities will be employed, but rather is a clearly defined target or vision for [the future service] that will describe its main features and the concerted actions in the near and longer-terms needed to realise the vision....

Unlike a strategy of force employment, [a service strategy will] translate a senior leader's vision for their organization into direction for the future force while meeting today's commitments, consistent with their responsibilities and authorities.... However, this service vision is also a means to present the [Government of Canada] with a view of the kind of [service] needed to meet both policy goals and the challenges of an uncertain and evolving security environment.

Gladman goes on to provide an important discourse on considerations as to the audience for the resulting strategy, as well as timelines for its development, and a recommended broad structure for any such document.²⁵ His concluding statement makes an important allusion to Lykke's ends-ways-means definition:²⁶

What should be remembered is that strategy is about choices, and effective strategies clearly define the target for the strategy [ends] - phrased in clear and feasible terms vice vaporous desires. They then diagnose the current problems facing the institution as it strives to move towards the target, identifying the key obstacles and proposing ways to overcome them [ways]. Finally, effective strategies give clear guidance and propose a series of coherent and coordinated actions to transform the [service] of today into that future vision [means].

With all of that, however, we are left without an actual definition of "strategy." Appreciating, as we shall see in the next two parts, that the meaning and intended use of the term have evolved over time, something more appropriate to a layperson's colloquial understanding has been adopted for the purposes of this monograph:²⁷

Strategy is a set of principles to guide the purpose of a force (in our case the fleet) [ends], from which is determined its employment and consequent force structure development [ways], and the measures to achieve those [means].

Part 2: The Naval Strategy Canon

While the study of military strategy has a long pedigree, as witnessed most comprehensively in Freedman's aforementioned *Strategy: A History*, naval strategy only began to be studied and codified comparatively recently, from the mid-19th century - and to nowhere near the same level of curiosity. To illustrate the point, out of Freedman's more than 600 pages of text, only five are devoted to purely naval subjects - exclusively Mahan and Corbett, and even they are referenced primarily as examples in a chapter on differing applications of the theories of Jomini and Clausewitz entitled "Annihilation or Exhaustion" (to Freedman's credit, as will be noted below, it is an insightful exposition of their concepts).²⁸ Another lamentable example is the influential *Makers of Modern Strategy* series, where the original edition, subtitled *Military Thought from Machiavelli to Hitler* (ed. Edward Mead Earle, 1943), had a full section on "Sea and Air War," with chapters on Mahan, continental doctrines of sea power, and Japanese naval strategy. This was succeeded by a second edition, *From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age* (ed. Peter Paret, 1986), which made space to extend the narrative forward in time by reducing naval

coverage to only a single chapter on Mahan (admittedly, a very good update of it, although dropping even the two passing references to Corbett from the earlier edition).²⁹ The third edition, *The New Makers of Modern Strategy: From the Ancient World to the Digital Age* (ed. Hal Brands, 2023), while still very good in its overall thrust, offers only limited progress in naval aspects, with the obligatory update on Mahan (see further discussion in the endnote) buttressed with the return of an important chapter on Japanese strategy in the Second World War, and the marginal increase of a half-dozen listings for Corbett in the index.³⁰ More encouragingly, in his recent primer on theory and strategy, Charles Oliviero complements a review chapter of the classic military theorists with full chapter-length surveys of naval as well as air power (a commendable foray, even if not covering the full canon of either environment).³¹ All of this underscores that it is an egregious oversight by the global naval analyst community that no comprehensive single-volume study of the codification of naval strategy has been attempted since Donald Schurman's long-out-of-print *Education of a Navy* published in 1965.³²

It is neither the place nor the ambition of this Reader to fill that void. Rather, this part of the monograph endeavours simply to introduce what might be called "the naval strategy canon." It advances from the standpoint that a knowledgeable familiarity with the major tenets of the different philosophies presented across the body of naval strategic thought is fundamental to a working understanding of the range of possibilities available to Canadian naval professionals in responding to the challenges they have confronted.³³ At the same time, this Reader does not pretend to be definitive and list every naval strategy that has ever been recorded, but, proceeding in generally chronological order of their appearance, it seeks to focus primarily on those that have had some influence on or reference to Canadian thinking.³⁴ With that objective, this monograph will attempt to synthesize discussion to typically only a summary paragraph for each subject and to be selective in its offerings for further study. For example, where it is not hard to find any number of volumes on Alfred Thayer Mahan, readers will be directed to only a handful of pertinent studies. And confessing in advance that such selections will reflect the biases of this author, priority will be given, wherever possible, to creditable studies by Canadian authors or authors known to have insight into the Canadian condition. A final author note is that this part was the last section of the monograph to be developed, having been delayed by a prolonged illness. To make up for lost time while still recovering (and as an experiment in the methodology), artificial intelligence was engaged in its production, solely to the extent of synthesizing the main points of each theorist; an important caveat on resorting to such assistance is that much material pertaining to this field has not been posted to the internet, was therefore not available to AI investigation, and had to be validated against the author's broad knowledge of the field. In the end, the narrative sweep and any analytical interpretations remain those of the author. Finally, noting that the nature of AI synthesization makes it difficult to accredit original sources, the author begs the indulgence of readers for anything that may seem to be lengthy quotes without full attribution, and requests they bear in mind that the intent of this monograph is to stimulate the reader's awareness as to the range of writings in the field. There is no desire to deny the work of others, and to the fullest extent possible, the main sources are identified somewhere in the notes and bibliography.

The reasons why theorists were so late to begin the study of naval strategy have never been properly explored and would be a logical starting point in any setting down of the canon. Lawrence notes that the dominant concept of command of the sea can be traced back to Thucydides, as "essentially [meaning] being able to move men and materiel wherever you wished without interference while being able to prevent the enemy's attempt to do the same,"³⁵ but he leaves the point at that. Most scholars who have considered the matter even briefly attribute it to naval warfare from antiquity through the late medieval period being not much more than an extension of fighting ashore, an assumption that is acceptable for the scope of this monograph. The conditions for a broadening of perspectives began to be laid, however, from the age of European expansion after the 15th century, what with the professionalizing of seafarers and formal establishment of "navies" featuring multi-decked ships armed with extended-range cannons and capable of roaming far from home waters. Certainly, by the 18th century, as will be described below, a "British way of war" contingent upon maritime supremacy had been intuited by that nation's leadership, just as there also had appeared the French response of *guerre*

de course, although neither had been set down as such at the time. Schurman notes that “[u]ntil 1867, [British] naval history, other than a record of battles, could hardly be said to have existed,” but that over the next half century it changed, “from a patriotic antiquarian pastime into a serious academic occupation, with rules, standards, and techniques of its own.”³⁶ This new analytical approach inevitably led to the parallel appearance of discourses on naval strategy, quite literally the result of that same new generation of historians attempting to explain how British naval supremacy came about. He credits this change occurring suddenly in the mid-19th century to two factors: firstly, the birth at about this same time of the modern historical method (with its rules, standards, and techniques); and secondly, that this emerged coincident with the era of rapid technological change in warship design, that state of flux making it futile to differentiate among ship functions by class and instead encouraging a focus on “the problem of what national purpose all the proposed ships were to serve.”³⁷ The editors of a more recent volume on maritime strategy noted as well that “[w]riting about maritime strategy was catalysed by ... the explosive growth of global seaborne trade in the second half of the nineteenth century, which created new strategic imperatives.”³⁸

Sir John Colomb

The pioneer naval strategist was Captain Sir John Colomb, a former Royal Marine who revolutionized Victorian-era military thought by arguing that the true linchpin of British security was the Royal Navy, as opposed to a large standing army or localized coastal fortifications.³⁹ He is acknowledged as the originator of the Blue Water School of strategy – the notion that a nation’s security, prosperity, and global power depend upon maintaining offensive control of the open ocean.⁴⁰ However, he did not write from a purely naval perspective, and his more immediate impact was in laying out the basis for a theory of imperial defence (that is, the integrated protection of the home islands, overseas colonies, and strategic interests of the British Empire). This was a subject only then beginning to challenge the British imagination, and Sir John deserves much of the credit for laying its intellectual basis. He first set out his ideas in 1867, in a small volume entitled *The Protection of our Commerce and Distribution of our Naval Forces Considered*, which immediately established him as a leading figure in the imperialist movement. The essence was the notion that Britain’s worldwide dominance stemmed from her paramount position as a trading nation, which in turn was contingent upon three interdependent factors: global trade protection (that the sea lanes were vital communications arteries that must be actively secured to prevent economic strangulation during a war); imperial interdependence (that the colonies and the home country shared a singular, unified defence problem solved only through collective maritime power); and that the security of the homeland was best ensured through offensive sea control (rather than maintaining passive defensive coastal installations). Refined over the next decade, they were a major impetus to the establishment of the Carnarvon Commission (1879–1882),⁴¹ which, among other things, would shape Canadian attitudes to defence through the 1880s, and then the debates leading to the passing of the crucial Naval Defence Act of 1889.

La Jeune École

The challenge of accounting strategically for all this rapid technological innovation was compounded in France by severe budget constraints following the humiliating defeat of the Franco-Prussian War of 1870–1871, in which the navy’s traditional battleship fleet played no significant part. Accepting that any future “war of revenge” against Germany would be fought primarily on land, French naval leaders saw their *raison d’être* in maintaining focus on the traditional enemy of Britain. One group of young intellectuals, hence styling themselves *la Jeune École*, accepted that France could not afford to build a force as large as the Royal Navy, and discerned a radical solution in the disruptive new technologies. Most frequently associated with Théophile Aube, who rose to become the French Minister of Marine (Navy) in the mid-1880s, theirs was a two-prong strategy: a fleet of fast commerce-raiding cruisers would precipitate Britain’s economic collapse by attacking its international supply chains at critical points, widely separated to frustrate attempts at counter-concentration; while vast flotillas of cheap, agile torpedo boats and submarines would thwart any attack on the French coast.⁴² Derided by its opponents

as a “strategy of the weak,” it found additional adherents in the similarly financially constrained Imperial Russian Navy, while vulnerable reaches of the empire such as Canada and Australia saw it as both a threat (from the raiding cruisers) and inspiration (for coastal defence flotillas) (see the discussion in Part 3 of Andrew Gordon’s 1888 plan). Still, it predicted the future of modern maritime attrition warfare, as would be practiced, for example, by Germany in the two world wars, and it has resonance to the present day among smaller navies, especially in the Third World.⁴³

Alfred Thayer Mahan

Countering the “strategy of the weak” of *la Jeune École* was one of the primary objectives of Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan, USN, when in 1890 he published *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783* (that is, the era of the Anglo-French great power struggle for mastery of the seas, culminating with the achievement of American independence; the book’s commercial success encouraged follow-on volumes covering the French revolutionary wars after 1789 and the War of 1812). Mahan saw the heretical French theories as nothing more than a refinement of the unsuccessful commerce-raiding strategy pursued by the Confederacy in the recent Civil War, but which still held some attraction in the post-bellum American navy. Instead, he subscribed to the belief that the destiny of the United States, having reached the limits of continental expansion, was to become a global power, and that the navy was the vehicle to achieve that.⁴⁴ Mahan did not embark upon his *Influence* series as a strategist, initially setting down his principles only as an afterthought on the insistence of his publisher, who was blatantly seeking a marketing ploy to capitalize on the contemporary debate over naval construction. Clearly, these ideas struck a chord, and consolidated later in a separate volume patently titled *Naval Strategy*,⁴⁵ they came to dominate naval thinking thence forward through to the present day. His premise was that national greatness and global economic dominance depend upon controlling the seas, by maintaining a powerful blue-water navy for the purposes of protecting a strong merchant fleet and securing strategic global locations, such as coaling stations, choke points, and canals. Importantly, victory would be achieved through concentration of force allowing decisive fleet-on-fleet battles, rather than splitting forces for minor commerce raiding. In some detail, Mahan argued that sea power sprang from six conditions that just happened to pertain to the United States at that moment:

- *Geographical position*: access to oceans allowing easy entry and exit to global trade routes;
- *Physical conformation*: a seaboard with deep, natural harbours to foster maritime activity;
- *Extent of territory*: land size appropriate for sustaining national defence and economic production;
- *Population size*: a large enough populace to man commercial shipping and naval fleets;
- *National character*: a society inclined toward commercial enterprise, trade, and the sea; and,
- *Government policy*: leadership that actively builds and maintains strong naval infrastructure.

Mahan has mistakenly been taken as a model for any ambitious navy, but he truly only pertains to rising powers seeking greatness, and for whom all six conditions apply – hence his avid followers in Britain (the success of the Royal Navy being the thrust of the original history books), Imperial Germany before the First World War, Imperial Japan through the Second World War, and present-day totalitarian China. Smaller nations, however, should be wary in adopting his mantra, specifically Canada, which fails on at least the last three criteria (population size, national character, and government policy – and arguably extent of territory, ours being too broad for efficient sustenance).

Sir Julian Corbett

The British naval historian Sir Julian Corbett was a contemporary of Mahan’s, studying roughly the same period that witnessed the rise of British naval supremacy, but arriving at somewhat different conclusions.⁴⁶ Unlike Mahan, Corbett argued that sea power is fundamentally an instrument of comprehensive national policy rather than an end in itself, and that the primary goal of naval warfare (pace Freedman on Thucydides) is to control sea lines of communication for one’s own use while denying

them to the enemy. As such, rather than focusing on decisive battle, he formalized the concept of limited maritime war, where naval power is a tool for supporting land campaigns (he was a champion of amphibious warfare), and by which blockades and strategic defence could exhaust an opponent's economic resources and political will without requiring massive continental bloodletting. Again unlike Mahan, Corbett codified his *Some Principles of Maritime Strategy* not at the outset of his writing career but rather after two decades of deep academic study, and then only at the request of and with the endorsement of the Admiralty, which was seeking a textbook for the Captain's War Course at Greenwich.⁴⁷ Andrew Lambert observes that Corbett worked from the notion that the "practical application [of principles of strategy] was necessarily a unique cultural construction,"⁴⁸ expounding for his national audience what Lambert has since labelled "a British way of war." In this lies a warning for Canadian students and others seeking answers in Corbett, to be alert to the mental gymnastics required to adapt his prognostications to address our unique circumstances.

It is not only Lawrence Freedman, as noted in the opening paragraph to this Part, who attributes the differing perspectives developed by Mahan and Corbett to their intellectual roots respectively in the strategic precepts of Jomini and Clausewitz: all of Schurman, Hattendorf, Lambert, and Sumida, among most others, have taken this as a given.⁴⁹ But it is a point worth emphasizing again here, for at least two reasons. First is that it tends to be glossed over that the two major frameworks for naval strategy arose from the application of land-centric theories to the oceans – this should be an object for exploration in a fuller work on the naval strategy canon. Second is to refresh memories of the nature of those frameworks. Jomini viewed war as a scientific problem governed by timeless, geometric rules, with an emphasis on lines of operation, geographic choke points, and the absolute necessity of concentrating force at a decisive point, leading Mahan to seek universal "laws" of sea power. In contrast, Clausewitz viewed war as a political phenomenon defined by complexity, friction, and human psychology, his famous phrase "war is the continuation of politics by other means" leading Corbett to recognize that naval strategy must bend to match the nation's political goals. Lawrence synthesizes this effectively in the competing concepts of "Annihilation or Exhaustion," and his chapter by that title merits a close read.⁵⁰

Sir Halford Mackinder

Another contemporary of Mahan and Corbett was the British geographer Sir Halford Mackinder.⁵¹ He came to yet a third assessment: that new modes of transportation such as railroads and motorized transport would allow a land power to more fully develop its interior; and having become less vulnerable to sea-based blockade, it could then mobilize its resources to build a navy larger than that of any maritime nation. First presented in 1904, then expanded in a 1919 book, and reconfirmed in a 1943 article, Mackinder styled this the "Heartland Theory," dividing the globe into a core "World-Island" of Eurasia-Africa and an "Outer Island Periphery" including Britain, Japan, the Americas, Australia, and Oceania.⁵² Mackinder was not anti-navy, but rather he was concerned as to how Britain (and later the United States) could maintain its global dominance. His strategy dictated that maritime powers must use amphibious forces and alliances constantly intervening along the "Inner or Marginal Crescent" (the coastal fringes of Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia) to prevent the Heartland from reaching the open ocean. Colin Gray and Torbjorn Knutson have observed how this was reflected, first in the developing strategies of Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia, and then in the Cold War Western counterstrategy of containment against the latter.⁵³

Maritime Commerce Warfare

A concept given short shrift by Mahan and Corbett was that of "maritime commerce warfare." To be fair, both saw the disruption of seaborne trade as the essence of naval struggle; they just did not make it a central feature of their respective naval strategies suitable for a great power. This could be forgiven perhaps because they were writing in an era of increasing regulation of the laws of armed combat, specifically such as the Declaration of Paris in 1856, which had outlawed the practice of privateering and established the immunity of neutral commerce, and then the various Hague Conventions being adopted

as they were engaged with their writing. (We have seen as well that Mahan was dismissive of such a "strategy of the weak," while Corbett thought its possibilities had been made redundant by technology and legal constraints; their corollary downplaying of the continued viability of convoys would have near-disastrous consequences only a short while later in the First World War.) However, *la guerre de course* (as it had popularly become known over the centuries) was the de facto recourse for many navies, not least being a core tenet of *la Jeune École*. Although it never came to be codified at the time in a fashion to which this monograph might direct readers, modern scholarship provides a pair of excellent resources on commerce warfare in the forms of a full-length study by Canadian researcher Nicholas Tracy and a more recent précis article in the *Naval War College Review*.⁵⁴ Of special relevance to Canadians, Tracy used economic warfare as the premise for his astute if provocative study of Canadian naval history, *A Two-Edged Sword*.⁵⁵

Wolfgang Wegener

The first half-century of RCN history was occupied largely with the struggle against the German navy in the two world wars, the strategy of the latter being a complex mix of principles devolving from both the blue water and commerce warfare schools. Tirpitz made no secret he was influenced by Mahan in the development of his *Risikogedanke* ("Risk Theory"), which argued that the Imperial German Navy did not need to beat the Royal Navy outright to defeat it, but rather it only needed to build a fleet large enough to threaten Britain's global dominance if a battle occurred.⁵⁶ But the *Admiralstab* (Admiralty Staff) was established separate from Tirpitz's control, to report independently and directly to the Kaiser, and recent scholarship has demonstrated it "consistently saw value in economic warfare, or as they termed it, *Handelskrieg*."⁵⁷ This strategy of commerce-raiding cruiser operations on the open oceans promised multiple benefits: diverting British assets away from the principal theatre of the North Sea, with the disruption to British trade inducing psychological distress over potential food and material shortages, and precipitating a flight of shipping to neutral flags, with a consequent financial cost. Indeed, all three of these features came to pass in Germany's naval conduct of the Great War, from the opening overseas cruiser operations, through the North Sea fleet actions culminating in the Battle of Jutland, to the unrestricted submarine warfare campaign. From his contemporary observation of the relative successes and failures of each of these, Wolfgang Wegener developed the one indigenous German naval strategy to date, published in 1929 as *Die Seestrategie des Weltkrieges*, translated as *The Naval Strategy of the World War*.⁵⁸ His thrust was that any future war (ostensibly against Britain) needed to be a more aggressive global war on commerce (a invigorated *Handelskrieg*) by fast surface raiders and submarines, contingent upon Germany bettering its geographic position with the seizure of Denmark, Norway, and France to allow unfettered access to the Atlantic, but without provoking a decisive fleet engagement that Germany was unlikely to win. This largely was the strategy followed in the Second World War by Admiral Erich Raeder (chief of the Weimar Republic Navy from 1928 and thence of the *Kriegsmarine* until his resignation in 1943), with important variations as detailed by Canadian sailor-scholar Ken Hansen.⁵⁹

Raoul Castex

The mixed results of the war of 1914-1918 at sea inspired reviews of national naval strategy elsewhere as well. The leading theorist in France was Admiral Raoul Castex. He had joined the *Marine* in 1896, as the influence of *la Jeune École* was waning and being replaced by the so-called *École Française* ("French School"), which tempered Mahan's teachings to rationalize a return to the building of capital ships but as a moderate-sized force, accepting that the navy in France would not need to challenge the Royal Navy and always would take second place to continental military requirements, the fleet consequently being required for patrolling France's overseas trade and empire. Castex turned his mind to naval strategy only in 1926, when he was assigned to teach a course on the subject at *l'École de Guerre Navale*. Captivated by the subject, he set down five volumes of "*Théories stratégiques*" over the period 1929-1935, the object of which was to explain how a land power might deal with a superior naval force. Curiously, he did not see Britain as the future enemy but rather Italy initially, soon joined by Hitler's Germany and Soviet Russia, acting in the roles of "*perturbateurs*" aspiring to hegemony. In conceiving a strategy

tailored for non-hegemony, he hit upon a middle ground between the fleet action theories of Mahan and *la Jeune École*, with an emphasis on operational manoeuvre to create favourable tactical situations.⁶⁰

Sir Herbert Richmond

The most consequential British naval strategist of the interwar period was Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond.⁶¹ Although his biographers (Schurman and Hunt – see note) focus on Richmond's importance as an educator, he engaged in reflections on strategic policy from early in his professional career, being one of the main instigators in establishing *The Naval Review* in 1912 as a forum for the free expression of comment on naval matters, no matter how critical or radical they might be (it remains such to the present day).⁶² He turned to in-depth strategic analysis coincident with his appointment as Commandant of the Imperial Defence College in 1928 and into his retirement from 1931. His perspective was a synthesis of Mahan and Corbett, parting with the former in critiquing a focus on battle as the main measure of sea control, while extending the latter's model for trade protection and limited conflicts to one of managing the challenges of projecting power across multiple hemispheres simultaneously.⁶³

Akiyama Saneyuki

In that "other" hemisphere, the Imperial Japanese Navy was an early adherent to Mahan's philosophies. *Akiyama Saneyuki* is considered the father of modern Japanese naval strategy, mostly for the series of pamphlets he authored while as an instructor at the Japanese Naval War College in 1902-1903, adapting Mahan's premises to the concept of "decisive battle" (*Kantai Kessen*). Alas, they were not translated, and copies do not seem to have survived. Subsequent Japanese strategic thinking was not openly recorded, having been written down in highly classified documents, most of which were purposely destroyed after the Japanese surrender to prevent their falling into Allied hands in 1945.⁶⁴ Nonetheless, it is possible to discern the devolution away from decisive battle through the 1930s, especially coincident with the rise of Isoroku Yamamoto. An early advocate of naval aviation, he predicted that aircraft carriers would eclipse the battleship, rejecting the decisive battle notion of waiting for the American fleet to cross the Pacific and arguing instead that Japan's only strategic hope in the event of war was to strike first with a blow so devastating that American morale would collapse – the path ultimately pursued into the war.⁶⁵

Bernard Brodie

In the United States, continuing acceptance of Mahan's prescriptions ordained no major adjustments in naval strategic thought until the appearance early in 1941 of Bernard Brodie's *Sea Power in the Machine Age*, quickly re-cast in August 1942 as *A Layman's Guide to Naval Strategy* for marketing upon America's entry into the Second World War as an accessible, immediate primer on the operational and strategic principles of naval warfare.⁶⁶ Reflecting in 2018 on Brodie's legacy as a strategist, Hew Strachan categorized his early intellectual framework as a synthesis of Mahanian and Corbettian principles, accommodated to technological advancements through the lens that while tactics change with every new invention, the foundational principles of maritime strategy are enduring. Brodie thus took the grand strategic ambitions of Mahan and the operational flexibility of Corbett, stripped away their 19th-century biases, and applied them to a world of steel, torpedoes, and aviation fuel.⁶⁷ Through the course of the war, *A Layman's Guide* went through two major revisions (in March 1943 and August 1944) to account for further revolutionary technological innovations such as the primacy of the aircraft carrier, without change to his basic premise (for example, Brodie did not see the airplane as an existential threat to sea power, but rather as a highly efficient new instrument for achieving or denying sea control). A new edition appeared in 1958, again substantially revised to acknowledge developments due to the Atomic Age and from the Korean War, specifically as a textbook for the Naval War College.⁶⁸ Notably, Brodie already had responded to the postwar age by shifting his focus to become a premier architect of nuclear strategy, with the publication in 1946 of *The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order* and, more famously, in 1959 of *Strategy in the Missile Age* (both published through Princeton University).

Samuel Huntington

Joel Sokolsky has observed that “[t]he dawn of the Cold War seemed to bring at once a Mahanian dream and a nightmare. On the one hand, the United States and its allies held unquestioned ‘command of the seas’.... On the other hand, this superior sea power was not merely taken for granted by some, its very relevance was doubted.”⁶⁹ Brodie, as noted above, in reissuing the fourth edition of his classic volume in 1958, was comfortable that nuclear weapons, nuclear-powered vessels, and even the concept of massive retaliation could be accommodated to the fundamental principles of maritime strategy. Samuel Huntington (famous later for *Soldier and the State* and *Clash of Civilizations*) made his mark as a young scholar with a powerful essay, “National Policy and the Transoceanic Navy,” in the May 1954 issue of *Proceedings*, from which he is remembered mostly for the phrase that has become a staple for naval apologists ever since: “What function do you perform which obligates society to assume responsibility for your maintenance?”⁷⁰ From that question, however, arose another: as he saw it, the postwar problem was “[h]ow could the Navy play a role in applying American power to the Eurasian continent?” He postulated the answer as the development of a “transoceanic” navy: “that is, a navy oriented away from oceans and toward the land masses on their far side.” (Notably, he backed his proposal with specific references to Mahan but, alas, neither Mackinder nor Corbett, notwithstanding multiple mentions of the “Heartland” and “amphibious” operations.) Although no extended formal naval strategy came to be promulgated from that plea, the three “forms” he outlined that “make it possible to project naval power far inland” subsequently became the triad upon which the US Navy has been aligned ever since: “carrier-based naval air power,” “fleet-based amphibious power,” and “naval artillery” (guided cruise and ballistic missiles).

The same “dream-nightmare” problem that Sokolsky noted above extended also to NATO.⁷¹ As manifest in its name, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was established in 1949 very much as a maritime alliance. The massive Soviet army presence on the Central Front, however, and the fact that the seaward threat posed by its submarine fleet did not initially differ much from that of the recently defeated *Kriegsmarine*, did not encourage any change in allied naval strategy. Hence, although the first formal strategic concept promulgated by NATO in January 1950, DC 6/1, noted the importance of securing the transatlantic sea lanes and the waters adjacent to NATO nations, it did not delve into detail.⁷² The first fully developed strategy, MC 14/2, issued in May 1957, prescribed “Massive Retaliation,” presuming immediate escalation to an all-out nuclear exchange, and sidelined the importance of traditional naval concepts such as convoy protection for transatlantic resupply. This diminished role left many naval staffs unsettled and (perhaps with Huntington’s admonition to mind) led to the quest to rationalize naval forces – not least in Canada, where it provoked the RCN investigations of the Naval Warfare Study Group (1956–1958) and the Brock Report of 1961 (see discussions in Part 3). Soon enough, the dawning of détente through the 1960s and the formal promulgation of MC 14/3 for “Flexible Response” would provide the institutional opportunity for renewed naval strategizing.⁷³

Sergei Gorshkov

What really grabbed the attention of NATO naval commanders at this time was the buildup of the Soviet fleet and its expanded global presence under the leadership of Admiral Sergei Gorshkov. Immediately on becoming Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy in January 1956, Gorshkov embarked upon its rapid transformation from an offshore coastal defence force into a global blue-water navy explicitly to challenge Western maritime hegemony. His thoughts were collected for public consumption initially as a series of pamphlets in the early 1970s, subsequently condensed and translated into English for publication in 1979 as *The Sea Power of the State* (the 1976 Russian-language edition already had been obtained by the US Navy, and comments on it were promulgated in the spring 1977 editions of both *Proceedings* and the *Naval War College Review*).⁷⁴ Being framed in the prose of the Marxist dialectical method, it is not an effortless read, although the core tenets are easily discerned. He argued that the state’s maritime strength is an integrated system composed of the military navy (a balanced fleet matching the state’s global geopolitical interests), the merchant fleet (ocean-going transport vessels to

bolster economic self-reliance), the fishing fleet (capable of harvesting food resources globally), and a scientific research fleet (for hydrographic research and space support), with the latter three ostensibly civilian commercial fleets tasked as logistical auxiliaries and intelligence-gathering assets for the navy. Although Gorshkov maintained that the navy required a balanced mix of surface, sub-surface, and aerial assets, the backbone was the nuclear-powered submarine fleets tasked with sea denial (SSNs armed with cruise missiles and torpedoes to attack American carrier strike groups) and nuclear deterrence (ballistic missile-firing SSBNs positioned in heavily defended "bastions" in the Barents Sea and Sea of Okhotsk). To put it in the language of Western strategies, we can discern that he optimized the Soviet fleet for Corbettian "fleet against shore" operations involving striking targets on land with ballistic and cruise missiles, over a Mahanian "fleet against fleet" focus (noting that the implementation of the strategy relied on overwhelming NATO defences through coordinated, high-speed, massed missile salvos launched simultaneously from submarines, surface cruisers, and long-range bomber aircraft).

NATO Concept of Maritime Operations

Through the 1970s, successive Supreme Allied Commanders Atlantic (SACLANTs) developed the appreciation that the concurrent drawdown of naval forces by all member states had left the alliance vulnerable at sea to the expanding Soviet presence. As a result, in 1977 the Defence Planning Committee ordered SACLANT "to draw up a new ... statement of principles as to how maritime forces might contribute to deterrence, forward defence and flexible response."⁷⁵ Promulgated in 1980, the "Concept of Maritime Operations" (CONMAROPS) shifted the alliance's maritime posture from the existing generally reactive protection of the transatlantic sea lanes of communication to a forward-leaning presence intent on preventing the exit of the various Soviet fleets out of the Norwegian, Baltic, and Black Seas. Regrettably for our purposes, the actual document remains inaccessible due to NATO's impenetrable classification process; however, some privileged researchers have gleaned its broad strokes, albeit regrettably again in limited-edition publications.⁷⁶ The essence was that NATO's maritime strategy was to be conducted on three basic principles:

Containment: offensive action to prevent Warsaw Pact forces deploying into open waters;

Defence in depth: putting the enemy at risk wherever they operate, not only in forward areas but throughout the NATO area; and

Keeping the Initiative: positioning forces early in crisis and handling them in war so that the enemy responds as much as possible to NATO moves rather than vice versa.

From that, it postulated six major campaigns: (1) the Norwegian Sea; (2) the Eastern Mediterranean; (3) the Battle of the Atlantic; (4) the Battle of the Shallow Seas; (5) the Battle of the Mediterranean Lifelines; and (6) the Campaign of the Southern Oceans. The thrust and linkages of these campaigns were that:⁷⁷

The Norwegian Sea and eastern Mediterranean campaigns are aimed at affecting forces from the Kola and Crimean complexes respectively. If NATO loses the Norwegian Sea, the defence of Northern Norway cannot be sustained; Soviet control of North Norwegian airfields prejudices the defence of the Norwegian Sea and requires a vast increase in forces to win the Battle of the Atlantic, which concerns reinforcement and resupply. The Mediterranean campaigns are similarly linked. The Battle of the Shallow Seas concerns keeping the Baltic and North Seas free for NATO use. The necessity to be prepared for a Campaign of the Southern Oceans concerns the changing pattern of economic shipping from being mainly North America-Europe oriented to world-wide.... The Soviets will find our weakest point and exploit it [if] NATO confines its operations to the North Atlantic and Mediterranean, ignoring its vital interests in farther seas.

Disseminated without much public fanfare, CONMAROPS has been overshadowed by the more familiar Maritime Strategy of the United States Navy (discussed in detail in the next paragraph). Sokolsky notes

the correlation between the two: "With its emphasis upon containing the Soviet Navy in the forward areas and in gaining and maintaining the initiative, CONMAROPS can also be viewed as a prelude to the United States Navy's much heralded and much maligned 'maritime strategy' of the 1980s."⁷⁸ Grove is more nuanced in assigning precedence by allowing, "This Alliance effort to some extent pre-dated the United States' own reassessment of its maritime strategy: it certainly paralleled and interacted with that reassessment in a two way process."⁷⁹ It is especially regrettable for the purposes of this monograph that CONMAROPS has escaped rigorous analysis in contrast to the Maritime Strategy, because the international working team in SACLANT that produced CONMAROPS was composed largely of American and Canadian officers led by Rear-Admiral Daniel Mainguy, the Canadian flag officer serving as Deputy Chief of Staff Operations in the Norfolk headquarters.

US Navy Maritime Strategy

Under concurrent development but not formally presented until 1984, the Maritime Strategy attracted attention immediately upon being unveiled.⁸⁰ Essentially, it globalized and invigorated the NATO maritime campaign, most controversially through the muscular commitment of carrier battle groups moving forward to contest the Soviets in all their near-offshores, including SSBN "bastions" (Sokolsky allows that "[i]t would have been difficult at best to get allied governments formally to go along with this";⁸¹ in a separate article written soon after the public unveiling of the Maritime Strategy, he provides an important contemporary analysis of it from the Canadian perspective⁸²). It was a pivotal framework that, in a throwback to Huntington, reshaped naval operations for the critical last decade of the Cold War, and arguably it remains influential to the present. It is a massive set of documents, which an AI-generated summary breaks into six core concepts:

- (1) *Global Offensive Posture*: it emphasized projecting power worldwide, especially to threaten the Soviet Navy and its operational flanks, reducing its freedom to manoeuvre in both open oceans and littoral regions;
- (2) *Multi-Phase Operational Approach*: it articulated three overlapping phases integrating peacetime, crisis, and wartime roles, underscoring forward presence, ready-response capabilities, and flexible task forces capable of offensive operations;
- (3) *Sea Control and Power Projection*: building upon the traditional primary objective of sea control, it elevated power projection ashore as equally critical, that is striking Soviet bases, missile submarine bastions, and logistics chains;
- (4) *Integration with National Defence Goals*: it aligned with President Ronald Reagan's defence buildup, which advocated a 600-ship Navy with funding priorities including expanding the build rate of *Nimitz*-class carriers and the submarine forces, recommissioning *Iowa*-class battleships, and introducing advanced weapon systems such as Tomahawk cruise missiles and Aegis combat systems;
- (5) *Emphasis on Deterrence and Crisis Management*: an element typically overlooked by its critics is that the strategy was not purely offensive and recognized the value of the Navy as a tool for deterrence, crisis response, and signalling US resolve in hot spots around the world, through exercises with allied navies, forward deployments, and naval diplomacy to shape adversary behaviour before conflicts escalated; and,
- (6) *Institutional Innovation*: the strategy emerged from extensive institutional deliberation, incorporating input from strategic planners, intelligence offices, fleet commands, and specialized groups (see the discussion of CANAUKUS contributions in Part 3), from which its formulation included both classified and unclassified publications, ensuring both operational secrecy and public strategic messaging.

Maritime Strategy for Medium Powers

The changing maritime environment of the late Cold War that sparked the development of CONMAROPS and the Maritime Strategy heralded also a line of pursuit that has proven of particular

relevance to Canada: the codification of naval strategy for medium-power navies. The intellectual guide for this movement was Rear-Admiral Richard Hill, who soon after retirement from the Royal Navy in 1983 published his seminal *Maritime Strategy for Medium Powers*.⁸³ His premise was to move naval thinking away from a binary superpower-versus-small-nation mindset, to create a blueprint for countries with limited budgets but vital regional interests. His interest clearly was for Britain, to accommodate the declining standing of his former service, but his prescriptions found resonance elsewhere, particularly in the Commonwealth sister countries of Canada and Australia, although his core tenets are applicable more generally. They include:

Defining Medium Power: as a nation-state possessing enough economic and military leverage to protect its core interests and influence events yet lacking the resource pool to match or independently defeat a global superpower.

Interest-Based Self-Reliance: a nation must clearly define its vital areas of interest and build a force capable of robustly contesting those specific spaces independently, rather than trying to build a globally dominant navy.

The Concepts of Reach and Levels of Conflict: medium powers must tailor their equipment, organization, and deployment around zones of operational “reach”. Forces should be optimized to handle low-to-medium local crises on their own while keeping in mind the capacity to contribute to higher-level conflicts.

The Crucial Role of Alliances: because medium powers operate with limited resources, combining in alliances is an essential tool. However, a medium power cannot rely solely on allies, which may have differing vital interests; it must field a capable force that can buy time and prove to potential partners that it is serious enough to robustly contest an opponent.

Localized Sea Control: instead of pursuing permanent global dominance, medium powers should focus on establishing temporary, localized control or sea denial around specific assets, such as a particular task group, convoy, or deployment.

Hill’s seeds fell upon fertile ground, and a sub-industry in the field has flourished from his foundational work. Notable contributors include fellow Britons Geoffrey Till and Eric Grove, as well as Canadian Peter Haydon (all of whom were essential to the framing of the RCN’s *Leadmark 2020*; see discussion in Part 3).⁸⁴ Hill himself was commissioned by the Australian Sea Power Centre in 2000 to revisit (and indeed validate) his earlier work in the course of their own quest for a turn-of-the-millennium strategy.⁸⁵ In the course of producing the present monograph, this author was made aware of a volume pending publication (in November 2026) that portends to be an important update of Hill’s theories; the promotional description, however, does not seem to indicate any Canadian content – somewhat amazingly, as the RCN was the only service to specifically develop and pursue such a strategy.⁸⁶

“New World Order” Strategies

The sudden and unexpected end of the Cold War in 1989, quite unlike the end of the Second World War nearly a half-century previously, did not allow Western naval staffs a self-satisfied period of celebration, notwithstanding the essential part maritime power had played in achieving the victory. Instead, navies everywhere struggled to define a rationale for their contribution to “the new world order” within the budget constraints of governments seeking a “peace dividend,” frequently invoking Huntington’s admonition in the process. Because it is so closely intertwined with that quest within the RCN, more detailed analysis will be pursued in Part 3. For the purposes of concluding this Part, it can suffice to note that no new lasting contributions to the naval strategy canon have appeared, although several attempts have been made, primarily by the United States Navy. First was the *From the Sea* series in 1992, 1994, and 1997, which was not so much a departure from the Maritime Strategy of the 1980s but an increased emphasis on the new *zeitgeist* of joint operations (to which *Leadmark 2020* was alive as well).⁸⁷ When that did not gain traction, the next attempt was the *Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower* (CS 21) promulgated in 2007,⁸⁸ better known as the basis for the “1000-ship Navy” concept of

closer cooperation among the American sea services, in concert globally with “coalitions of the willing” (an underlying principle to *Leadmark 2050*). That has not proven to be any more enduring, leading a major US Navy think tank to conclude it “suffers from a strategy deficit” and to outline “A Way Forward [for] The Navy Strategic Enterprise.”⁸⁹ Most recently, an extended March 2026 article in *Proceedings* employs Huntington’s structure to explore the USN’s emerging strategic concept of a “panoceanic navy,” shifting its core focus away from projecting power ashore and back toward reestablishing and maintaining command of the sea.⁹⁰ In October 2025, NATO promulgated an updated *Alliance Maritime Strategy*, as an uncharacteristically unclassified document posted to its website that has already been subjected to critical analysis.⁹¹ At the same time (November 2025), the Royal Australian Navy promulgated *A Maritime Strategy for Australia (AMS 2035)*.⁹² Interestingly, it is an academic product staffed largely by a cadre of former serving officers with a strong pedigree of sailor-scholarship in the field, and follows the ends-ways-means formula with great regard to Hill’s tenets for medium power naval strategy.

Canadian Contributions

Before moving on to the next Part, this one closes by noting the significant contributions of Canadians and friends of the RCN to the development of the preceding naval strategy canon and the general discussion that follows below. Many of these authors are acknowledged in the notes and bibliography, so the citation details will not be repeated here, but at the risk of overlooking anyone, a recap listing is attempted. Foundational works have been authored by Donald Schurman (*The Education of a Navy*), Barry Hunt (the Richmond biography), Nicholas Tracy (*Attack on Maritime Trade* and *A Two-Edged Sword*), Peter Haydon (*Sea Power and Maritime Strategy*), and Charles Oliviero (*Strategia*). Among these giants, Joel Sokolsky stands out as an especially prodigious commentator on NATO and Canadian maritime strategy and naval policy for over 40 years: quite a bit of his vast *oeuvre* is pertinent to this monograph, which leans on his seminal *Seapower in the Nuclear Age* (1991), “After the ‘Maritime Strategy’” (1992), and “Canada and North American Maritime Security: The Home and Away Game at Sea” (2005). A fuller sense of his contributions is to be recognized in a special issue of the *Canadian Foreign Policy Journal* set for publication as a *festschrift* dedicated to him in fall 2026 (after this monograph is posted).⁹³ Other significant academic papers have been scripted by Doug Bland, Isabel Campbell, Brad Gladman, Barry Gough, Mike Hennessy, Rob Huebert, Dan Middlemiss, Paul Mitchell, Nils Ørvik, and Martin Shadwick. Canadian sailor-scholars of this field include Fred Crickard, Hugues Canuel, Ken Hansen, Brian Santarpia, and this author. Foreigners who have written from an informed perspective on the Canadian condition include Norman Friedman, James Goldrick, Colin Gray, John Hattendorf, Aaron Jackson, J.J. Jockel, Paul Kennedy, Andrew Lambert, and Geoffrey Till. Much of the scholarship noted above resulted from conference presentations or research papers for the leading Canadian naval-maritime think tanks at Dalhousie University’s Centre for Foreign Policy Studies (CFPS, regrettably now in abeyance) and the University of Calgary’s Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies (CMSS), joined recently by the Canadian Maritime Security Network at St. Francis Xavier University (CMSN, which sponsored the preparation of this monograph). Another prominent forum is the ongoing series of the Navy’s own Maritime Command / RCN historical conferences held at irregular intervals since inaugurated by Dr. James Boutillier in 1980.⁹⁴

Part 3: A Survey of Canadian Naval Strategic Thinking

Pre-Confederation

Notwithstanding the contention of this Reader – that Canadian naval strategic development has not been strictly guided by the principles codified by the likes of Mahan and Corbett – this does not mean that Canada has not been subjected to the forces of history that animated those scholars’ chronicles of the see-sawing struggle for mastery of the sea by the great powers in the age of sail. Indeed, it is especially

germane that Canada was settled and came into being as a nation within the context of the principles that they described, through which Canadians have developed their own variations on an understanding of naval strategy.⁹⁵

A useful summary of how pre-Confederation Canada evolved, often at the mercy of sea power, is provided in the prologue to the first volume of the official history of the RCN, *The Seabound Coast*.⁹⁶ It is a useful corrective to the conclusion in general histories elsewhere, set against the backdrop of the Anglo-Dutch-French struggle for control of the high seas throughout the 17th and 18th centuries, that fleet actions were the prime contributing factor to the outcomes of the series of major wars through that period. Overlooked in those narratives is that most of the naval events relating to pre-Conquest New France unfolded instead as intercolonial encounters involving much smaller local forces from New England. Typically, these incidents were to the disadvantage of the French, the most famous assault being in 1690, when the self-styled "Admiral" Sir William Phips, having captured Port Royal in the summer, then sailed up the St. Lawrence to take Quebec. The effort, however, was stymied by the fact that the small armada arrived off Quebec in October to discover that the governor general of New France, le Comte de Frontenac, had hastily erected a palisade fortification, allowing him to make his famous response to Phips's demand to surrender: "*I have no reply ... other than from the mouths of my cannons....*"⁹⁷ With winter setting in and faced with a determined defence, the siege failed, and in late October, Phips retreated for Boston.

These attempts by Phips came in the midst of the rather more successful endeavours of the first native-born Canadian practitioner of what can be styled a naval strategy: Pierre Le Moyne d'Iberville, "the most renowned son of New France." His online biographies further describe him as "a soldier and adventurer,"⁹⁸ which is instructive, but for our purposes he is better known for a series of single-ship privateering actions in his 500-ton, 50-gun ship *le Pélican*, with which he terrorized the English colonies far and wide along the eastern seaboard and into the Caribbean, as well as in four northern expeditions over the decade 1686–1697 that effectively cleared the English fur traders from Hudson Bay.⁹⁹ The official history suggests he may have had some formal naval instruction in France, but the "soldier" designation is apt, because a close study of his tactics reveals them to be a maritime adaptation of the irregular form of frontier warfare known as "*la petite guerre*" – small units operating separately from the main force using speed and manoeuvre in hit-and-run attacks to disrupt the enemy.¹⁰⁰ There is no surviving record of d'Iberville's thoughts as to applying this as a strategy, but he pursued it quite methodically as a soldier ashore as well, memorably on a scorched-earth rampage across Newfoundland in 1696–1697.

Although d'Iberville's aggressive pursuit of colonial war at sea did not survive his death in 1706, his *canadien* successors otherwise regularized the conduct of privateering as more of a "*guerre de course*" commercial activity in their continuing struggles against the British-American colonies. They had some notable success during Queen Anne's War (1702–1713), only to see it cut short in both the subsequent War of Austrian Succession (1740–1748) and the Seven Years' War (1756–1763). However, the capture early in each of those conflicts of the fortress Louisbourg, guarding the entrance to the Gulf of St. Lawrence (first in 1745 and then in 1758), compounded by having already lost the Acadian coasts of the Bay of Fundy, foreclosed French maritime activity beyond the confines of the Gulf for the duration of the respective conflicts.

The conduct of privateering as a strategy in Canada had not ended, however, and rather enjoyed a renaissance when North America became the primary theatre of activity in the subsequent American Revolutionary War (1776–1783) and War of 1812–1815.¹⁰¹ In her detailed study of the latter conflict, Canadian historian Faye Kert asserts that, while the privateers of Atlantic Canada reached the apex of their activity at that time, the "[h]onest and, for the most part, the law-abiding merchants and shipowners of Atlantic Canada" had no set strategy in pursuing this economic weapon beyond it keeping their businesses literally afloat "when war with the United States eliminated their regular commercial activities."¹⁰²

Although this narrative has downplayed the influence of fleet actions as a major factor in Canadian naval strategic thinking, it is important to recognize that the overarching fate of Canada revolved around the back-and-forth outcomes of the struggle for mastery of the seas variously between the French, British, and American fleets in the wars cited in the paragraphs above, as chronicled by Mahan and Corbett and which subsequently shaped their codifications of naval strategy. Highlight summaries of the sequence of wars are germane. The year 1744 notably was “the first time both sides despatched large naval fleets to North American waters to protect their interests,” following which “the Royal Navy established a naval and military base at Halifax in 1749 ... to solidify its maritime position in North America.”¹⁰³ A decade later, the Royal Navy’s command of the sea was the precondition for the Conquest by Saunders and Wolfe of Louisbourg in 1758 and Quebec in 1759–1760.¹⁰⁴ The tables were turned when the loss of that control back to the French during the American Revolutionary War affirmed the independence of the Thirteen Colonies. And the challenge by the United States to Great Britain in the War of 1812 was thwarted by the Royal Navy’s blockade of the eastern seaboard, which strangled American trade and made them sue for peace.¹⁰⁵

But it is the activity below that inter-state level that is the concern of this monograph, and there, a different calculus was developing to shift Canadian naval attention from the high seas. For a start, the rationale for privateering disappeared with the settling of Anglo-American differences and the return of Maritime merchants to regularized commercial trade following the War of 1812. At the same time, another dimension had arisen that would come to dominate Canadian naval strategic thinking through the remainder of the century: as the land frontier between the British colonies and the American states extended inland, much of the border came to be defined by the navigable waters of the upper St. Lawrence River and the Great Lakes. From modest beginnings as small-vessel flotillas patrolling the Lakes during the Revolutionary War, the renewal of fighting in the summer of 1812 prompted both sides to quickly build proper large warships to contest those inland seas, with Commodore Perry famously winning control of Lake Erie in September 1813 (which the Americans held for the rest of the war, although the more central theatre of Lake Ontario remained undecided at war’s end). It is in the ensuing “peace” that a continental impulse comes into play as a factor in Canadian naval thinking. Whereas the Rush-Bagot Agreement limiting naval armaments on the Great Lakes is held up as key to the so-called “undefended border” between Canada and the United States, the fact is that the Canadians never felt that the Royal Navy, even with its command of the high seas, could reliably reinforce the inland frontier quickly enough if conflict broke out again. Thus, Canadian defence planners came to hold the concept that a Provincial Marine of minor warships (respecting the Rush-Bagot limitations but which could be up-armed quickly if needed) was essential to countering a renewed American invasion of the interior until British army reinforcements could arrive. It was never a potent force,¹⁰⁶ but the instinct became ingrained as a planning factor after Confederation in 1867, what with the post-US Civil War Fenian Raids being followed almost immediately by the withdrawal of the British garrisons from 1871.

1888 – The Gordon Plan (Document A)

With the new Dominion needing to assume increased responsibility for its own defence of the interior, an innovative solution to all this was developed in the mid-1880s, courtesy of a retired Royal Naval Reserve officer employed in the Marine and Fisheries department. Andrew Gordon had seen service in the Royal Navy with the Provincial Marine during the Fenian Raids of 1866 and subsequently immigrated to Canada, settling near Toronto in 1872. In 1880, he joined the federal department, initially in the Meteorological Service, where he immediately demonstrated a high degree of competence and, probably based also on his previous naval service, soon “became involved in several other activities [of the department] that indicated he was no ordinary public servant.” Indeed, in the summer of 1884, he was appointed to head the first Dominion government seaborne expedition into Hudson Bay, and the next year, he took command of the Fisheries Protection Service (FPS) on the east coast.¹⁰⁷ His transfer to the FPS in 1885 occurred in the wake of the ill-fated episode with the aging British steam corvette *Charybdis*: acquired in 1880 following the latest in a series of Anglo-Russian war scares, she was

intended as a training vessel for a sea-going force to defend against enemy auxiliary cruisers waging a *guerre de course* in local waters, but she proved unseaworthy and was then being broken up in Halifax.¹⁰⁸

Gordon had maintained a professional interest in current naval affairs, and he soon broadened his mandate to put together the first truly Canadian-derived strategic assessment of the Dominion's naval defences. Regrettably, records do not exist to establish to what degree he was influenced by contemporary writers such as Britain's Sir John Colomb or the French *Jeune École*, all of which were just then being published. However, elements of each of these, along with an understanding of new technologies, are clearly apparent in his proposal. Equally, he surely was responding to the popularity of Prime Minister Sir John A. Macdonald's "National Policy," considered Canada's first national grand strategy, designed to stimulate the post-Confederation economy through the pursuit of three pillars: tariffs to protect central Canadian manufacturing; immigration to consolidate claims to the Western interior; and the massive expansion of physical infrastructure, most famously through the building of the transcontinental Canadian Pacific Railway, but including also harbour development and "the subsidization of fast steamship services to Europe and Asia to facilitate the export of Canadian products."¹⁰⁹ Against all these imperatives, in November 1888, Gordon crafted a well-argued letter submitted directly to Minister of Marine and Fisheries Charles Hibbert Tupper (son of the future prime minister). Appreciating that the recent stillborn attempt at a naval force suffered as much from a lack of imagination as equipment obsolescence, and realizing the potential of the torpedo-boat forces at the heart of French strategic thinking, Gordon laid out a plan to reorganize the Fisheries Protection Service to become the nucleus of a naval force. The cornerstone of this reorganization was the acquisition of a pair of *Rattlesnake*-class torpedo-gunboats that could serve primarily as a deterrent to marauding enemy cruisers, while also being small enough to navigate the pre-Seaway St. Lawrence and Welland Canals to reach the Lakes in the event of an emergency.¹¹⁰ Considering the rudimentary bureaucratic resources at hand at the time (the 35-page handwritten document underscores that he clearly was his own "staff"), it is a rather amazing piece of staff work. A typed transcript is reproduced at Appendix A.

The seed of the message fell upon fertile soil. Tupper authorized the construction of three new iron-hulled fisheries cruisers, which, while not of the *Rattlesnake* class, had "ram bows, resembling some contemporary gunboats," and were built in a Great Lakes shipyard: *Petrel* to be stationed for fisheries patrol on the Great Lakes, *Curllew* for the same on the east coast, and *Constance* to be assigned to the Canadian Customs Preventive Service in the Gulf of St. Lawrence.¹¹¹ They entered service in 1892, however, just a year before Gordon's premature death to consumption. That also was at the start of the confusing political period following Macdonald's own death in 1891 and the rapid succession in five years of four other aging prime ministers, whose ambition was focused on the consolidation of the main thrusts of the National Policy. Without a champion, and losing a strong government mandate, the further development of the naval scheme was neglected.¹¹²

1909 - The Laurier / Kingsmill Plans (Documents B, C, & D)

Yet somehow, the institutional memory survived. When Liberal prime minister Sir Wilfrid Laurier determined a decade later to take steps toward Canada's naval defence, Gordon's proposal experienced an unacknowledged resurrection, to be realized with the drafting of a Naval Militia Bill in 1904 (which was never tabled), coincident with the purchase of a ship based on the *Rattlesnake* class, built in the United Kingdom, commissioned as the Canadian Government Ship *Canada*, and proudly advertised as "the nucleus of a Canadian naval militia."¹¹³ And that thinking was very much still alive when the year 1909 opened to become a watershed in Canadian naval strategic thinking, witnessing its rapid progression through three major stages in the period of half a year. This was precipitated when Conservative opposition member Sir George Foster tabled a motion before Parliament early in the year that Canada should look to "the suitable protection of her exposed coast line and great seaports."¹¹⁴ In preparation for the debate, Rear-Admiral Charles Kingsmill, recently retired from the Royal Navy to take charge of the reorganized Canadian Marine Service, prepared a preliminary report basically updating Gordon's plan for the use of the existing Fisheries establishment to begin naval training at Halifax.

Reproduced in this volume as Appendix B, it proposed a modestly paced buildup fully compliant with Laurier's limited approach to developing a naval policy: "The men trained in the first year would be available to man a destroyer or a Scout [small cruiser] next year, and so on until we had sufficient officers and men well trained to man our proposed defence which should, in my opinion, be confined to Destroyers and Scouts for many a long day."¹¹⁵

Before the Foster resolution could be discussed in the Canadian Parliament, however, the Dreadnought Crisis erupted in mid-March 1909, over the degree to which the Royal Navy should maintain its lead over Germany in battleship production. Sensing an opportunity to advance the gradual approach of his established domestic policy, Laurier shifted the course of the debate on March 29, 1909, to gain unanimous consent for "the speedy organization of a Canadian naval service."¹¹⁶ Kingsmill responded to the changed circumstances by quickly but only slightly redrafting his earlier plan, to provide for a more rapid implementation with slightly larger vessels while still adhering to the principle of local coastal defence. He submitted his new plan (reproduced as Appendix C) on April 19 "with a great deal of diffidence," maintaining that "[we] should at once commence building [ocean-going] destroyers and cruisers ... [so] that fisheries protection and training go hand in hand..."¹¹⁷

Armed with this plan, and confident of the bipartisan support of Parliament (serving as a de facto national grand strategy), Kingsmill proceeded to London that summer with the ministers of Marine and Fisheries and of Militia and Defence to negotiate with imperial authorities for the inclusion of the newly sanctioned Canadian naval force into the defence apparatus of the Empire. They discovered, however, that the mercurial First Sea Lord, Sir John Fisher, was using the opportunity presented by the Dreadnought Crisis to press for a major revamping of the imperial naval defence system. To share in the burden, the colonies were presented two options: make a substantial monetary contribution to assist the Royal Navy or establish a local naval force which, in time of war, could contribute immediately and materially to the requirements of imperial defence. The "fleet unit" Fisher advocated consisted of a dreadnought battlecruiser supported by three cruisers, six destroyers, and three submarines, in Canada's case to be based entirely on the Pacific Coast. It was a clearly offensive ocean-going force, well beyond the defensive coastal forces implied in all previous Admiralty discussions (and at the heart of Canadian aspirations), which now were dismissed as ineffective due to their poor radius of action and limited sea-keeping capabilities. In protracted negotiations, the Canadian delegation convinced Fisher to drop the battlecruiser from their establishment and allow the forces to be divided between both coasts, resulting in a scaled-down but still modern and capable cruiser-destroyer squadron on each coast (the original Admiralty proposal and a summary of the subsequent Canadian compromise are reproduced as Appendix D).¹¹⁸ The determination of the Laurier government to adhere to the agreement was reflected in the tenders subsequently issued for four *Bristol*-class light cruisers and six *River*-class destroyers, all the most current types and to be built in Canada. The government's expectation for what the Dominion should acquire for its seaward defence had expanded dramatically through 1909 in reaction to changing geopolitical circumstances, but the prospects were promising that "[t]he proposed operational fleet was a reasonable compromise between Admiralty operational interests and Canadian political interests."¹¹⁹ In the interim, the Laurier government accepted the loan of two aging but impressive protected cruisers as training vessels - the 11,000-ton *Niobe* and 3,440-ton *Rainbow*.¹²⁰ The bipartisan consensus soon collapsed, however, and when the Liberals lost the September 1911 general election to Robert Borden's Conservatives, the tenders were cancelled, the nascent fleet atrophied, and the RCN did not, as a result, make a significant contribution to the Great War at sea.

1919 - The Occasional Papers & The Jellicoe Report (Documents E & F)

The next occasion for a strategic evaluation came immediately after that war, in 1919-1920, when Viscount Jellicoe of Scapa was charged to advise the Dominion governments of the Empire on their postwar naval requirements. Perhaps flushed from Canada's major contribution to the recent Allied victory, Prime Minister Borden suggested that "[i]t might be possible for the Canadian Government to ... take over a fleet unit consisting, let us say, of a battleship, certain large and small cruisers, with the

necessary quota of destroyers and submarines.”¹²¹ Kingsmill’s staff struck a naval committee under the direction of Commodore Walter Hose to produce a series of “Occasional Papers” as a planning basis for discussions with the Jellicoe Commission, the most important of these being the second, entitled “Proposals for Canadian Naval Expansion.” Reproduced as Appendix E, it is interesting for advocating a moderate scope and pace, clearly reflecting Kingsmill’s long experience as head of the Navy (Hose had been with the RCN for nearly as long as Kingsmill, having transferred from the Royal Navy in 1911 to command *Rainbow*, and was equally familiar with its troubled past). The key paragraph under the subtitle heading “Permanent Policy Necessary” expressed a sentiment that remains applicable a century later:¹²²

At the same time, it is most necessary that a definite policy extending over a period of years should be inaugurated. By this is meant that a certain sized Naval Service should be aimed at in say 15 or 20 years, the whole scheme being sealed by a special act of Parliament. The effect of such a policy would greatly tend to economy in the prevention of hurried and ill-considered annual programmes, and it would give stability to the whole service, as those joining (especially officers, who make the navy their life’s career) would fully understand what prospects were before them. It is unnecessary to dilate here on the enormous advantage which would accrue if it were possible to find a policy on which all political parties could agree. It is not too much to say that a navy founded on the above principles, even though of very small size, would be far more efficient than a numerically larger navy constructed on some haphazard principle.

The scheme harkened back to Kingsmill’s original spring 1909 argument for a gradual, albeit now more ambitious, acquisition program. It envisioned the creation of a 46-ship navy, over two seven-year building periods (1920–1927 and 1927–1934), to consist finally of seven cruisers, 12 destroyers, 18 anti-submarine patrol craft, three submarines, and three tenders, all to be built in Canada and to be crewed by an all-Canadian complement of 8,500 officers and ratings. It specifically rejected capital ships as being beyond the resources of Canadian shipyards and the numbers of existing senior Canadian officers to command them. Although this was accepted as one of the options in Lord Jellicoe’s report (reproduced as Appendix F), the former First Sea Lord’s stronger recommendations largely reflected the composition he had proposed and completed already for India, Australia, and New Zealand, in terms of the old fleet unit notion including battlecruisers and now also aircraft carriers, with the increased crewing to be augmented by newly surplus Royal Navy veterans.¹²³ Borden’s ruminations aside, this was too bold an expansion of a Dominion navy which at war’s end consisted of only a few trawler-sized vessels and for which there existed no clearly demonstrable peacetime need, especially as the onset of a postwar recession was heightening concern over the accumulated war debt. Even the scaled-down version of Jellicoe’s plan reflecting the premise of Occasional Paper No. 2 was rebuked by Cabinet. Kingsmill resigned in protest as Director of the Naval Service and was replaced by Commodore Walter Hose (the principal author of the Occasional Papers series), who set about a “strategy of survival” that saw him re-establishing the RCN on an even more modest scale to see it through the interwar period. This involved paying off the bulk of the permanent force to fund the establishment of local Royal Canadian Naval Volunteer Reserve (RCNVR) divisions in communities across the country.¹²⁴

1939–1940 – Wartime Objectives of the Naval Service (Documents G & H)

Another series of Canadian naval strategic appraisals emerged through 1939–1940, in order to substantiate rearmament as war threatened in Europe and then soon spiralled yet again into global conflict. Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King was a champion of limited engagement and found in the Navy a near-ideal force to maintain that policy. He had allowed a modest expansion of the fleet through the 1930s, with the acquisition of a half-dozen River-class destroyers, and the first “Canadian” Chief of the Naval Staff (CNS), Rear-Admiral Percy Nelles (he had joined as a cadet in 1908 and succeeded Hose in 1934), dared to capitalize upon this pattern with a statement in January 1939 of the “Objectives of the Canadian Naval Service”¹²⁵ (reproduced as Appendix G). In any future conflict, he explained, the RCN’s primary responsibility would be coast defence, for which cruisers were the best

forces to act against surface raiders, although their cost and personnel and maintenance requirements placed them beyond Canada's means. There existed a perfect alternative, however, in the form of the new class of "pocket cruisers" then being commissioned by the Royal Navy – the Tribal class of fleet destroyers – and Nelles proposed that a flotilla of six of them on each coast would provide "reasonable Naval defence." Underlying his thinking, to be sure, was the determination that, if war was inevitable, it also was wise to look to the distant future and insure against a recurrence of postwar retrenchment "by acquiring warships too valuable to scrap."¹²⁶ If somewhat opportunistic, the general thrust nonetheless struck a chord with the government. The minister of National Defence signalled concurrence in acknowledging before Parliament in May 1939 that "the ultimate objective that the navy has set for Canada is to build up a force of eighteen destroyers" – by implication, the six Rivers already in service, plus 12 Tribals.¹²⁷

It might seem odd to modern eyes that the next strategic naval appreciation, drafted in the fall of 1940, would be titled "Canada's Post-War Navy"¹²⁸ (reproduced as Appendix H), but this must be assessed in the context of its time. Certainly, there was the underpinning determination of the naval staff that the RCN emerge from this war in much better shape than the previous. But contrary to our foreknowledge that that event still was five years in the future, this document appeared in the dark days of the fall of 1940. Hitler had conquered the continent, and the *Kriegsmarine* had gained access to forward French and Norwegian bases for its fleet of powerful battleships and surface raiders (the U-boat threat to the North Atlantic lifeline had not yet materialized). At the same time, the United States was neutral, and the removal of Britain from the war, either by invasion or a separate peace, was not an unreasonable proposition. Planning for the joint defence of the Americas under that scenario was beginning to be developed through the auspices of the just-established Permanent Joint Board on Defence (PJBD). There continued, therefore, to be a plausible need in the near term for a strong coast defence navy, with the RCN as potentially the lead empire force against an unrestrained German high seas fleet – whether belligerent or neutral – or the too-paternalistic hemispheric protection offered by the United States Navy (an early recognition of Ørvik's "defence against help" thesis). The analysis, therefore, was peppered with the classic Mahanian language of imperial defence of the trade routes, maintaining that the core of the fleet should be four cruisers and 18 destroyers (now all Tribals), split equally between the coasts. Happily, this scenario was entirely consistent with Mackenzie King's view of the purpose for a Canadian naval force, and the November 1940 paper remained the basis of government-approved naval planning for the next couple of years, modified only to accommodate the arising additional wartime requirement for anti-submarine forces.

1943-1944 – The Postwar Appreciation (Document I)

The high-water mark of Canadian naval strategic thinking arose in the spring of 1943, by which time a number of factors had coalesced to precipitate what one scholar has termed "The Golden Age of Canadian Naval Planning."¹²⁹ Firstly, Allied fortunes had improved considerably, victory in Europe was a reasonable expectation, and focus was expected to shift against Japan, where the vast oceanic reaches of the Pacific theatre and the large enemy surface fleet ordained that future planning should be guided by the Mahanian maxims practised by all of the protagonists (with adaptations, as discussed in Part 2, by modern thinkers such as Bernard Brodie). Secondly, the mobilization of the Canadian economy had reached the state where finally there existed the manpower and industrial base to sustain a larger and more complex fleet establishment. Thirdly, the naval staff had benefited from an expanded and better-organized Naval Service Headquarters (NSHQ), which, with wartime recruitment, had come to include quite a number of university-educated reserve officers capable of producing insightful planning. One such person was Lieutenant-Commander G.F. (Geoffrey) Todd, RCNVR, assigned to the plans section of the Canadian naval staff, and who became its acting head in mid-1943 (see more below). Perhaps the most critical factor, however, was that, coincidentally from mid-1943, the RCN was gaining unprecedented admittance to broader bureaucratic networks. Through the last two years of the war, the Canadian government constituted its first-ever strategic planning cell, in the form of the Post-Hostilities Planning (PHP) Committee, chaired by the formidable Hume Wrong from the Department of External

Affairs and comprising representatives from the major departments, as well as from each of the three services. The foreign policy establishment was undergoing a fundamental shift of direction, and the "mandarins" at External were looking to build upon the outsized Canadian contributions to the war effort in developing a policy of commitment to collective security as the basis for the postwar international order (besides Wrong as chair, also contributing to the committee were Lester Pearson, John Holmes, and Escott Reid). Todd, as the lead representative from the RCN, was astute enough to recognize their increasing influence and to appeal to their new mantras of "middle powers" and the "functional principle" in his analyses. And it worked: where the Army and the Air Force sometimes presented less-than-coherent recommendations, Wrong invariably was impressed by the naval submissions.¹³⁰

As noted, the work of the PHP Committee ensued over nearly two years, beginning in the summer of 1943. Through that time, Todd and the Naval Plans Division prepared a number of analyses; however, as representative of their groundbreaking work, this Reader will look only to the example of their first major submission, prepared to guide the efforts of the senior naval staff at the Quebec Conference in August 1943: an "Appreciation of RCN Ship Requirements for the War Against Japan and for the Post-War Navy" (reproduced as Appendix I).¹³¹ As we have seen previously with Andrew Gordon in regard to the likes of *la Jeune École*, it is impossible to determine how deeply Todd was read into Mahan and Brodie's more recent contributions, but he must have been to some extent, as their influences are apparent in even a quick skim of the "appreciation." In its essence, apart from the depth and clarity of its analysis, this July 1943 proposal was not terribly different from those put forward in January 1939 and November 1940. Where it differed was in expanding the Canadian objectives for its fleet beyond local coast defence and pointing to greater strategic ends, with Todd arguing for a large surface fleet "[as] essential for the maintenance of Canadian prestige ... [to] take a direct and not insignificant part in this phase of the war," which was projected to entail surface fleet actions "to challenge Japanese command of these seas and to secure bases along the avenues of approach to the ... main assaults." Discounting anti-submarine forces as peripheral to this aspect of the Pacific war, he also specifically precluded following the British and Americans in the acquisition of battleships as being "beyond the resources of the RCN," and while he left the matter open as to the procurement of aircraft carriers ("It may supersede the battleship as queen of the seas"), he recommended a squadron of four cruisers, supported by flotillas of fleet destroyers, as adequate to the purpose. His further comments that "it certainly is not fitting that the second Navy of the Empire should be a mere spectator on such a vital occasion" and "[t]o obtain the prestige and recognition of status [as a growing power in world affairs] which it thus seeks, it is essential that Canada should have as strong a Navy as possible" surely appealed to the diplomats at External, who would come to accept that Canadian intervention in postwar crises implied military force with global reach, which in those days only a navy could provide.

Over the course of 1944 and 1945, as the Canadian government debated the size of its commitment to the war against Japan – and by extension, that of its postwar forces – the only major change to Todd's original proposal was the evolution of the cruiser squadron into two full carrier task forces. These would constitute the postwar structure of what the naval staff was envisioning in July 1945 as the "Continuing Royal Canadian Navy," comprising two light fleet carriers, four light cruisers, and 18 fleet destroyers, split equally into a task force on each of the east and west coasts. As Alec Douglas has so aptly put it, "By 1945 [the RCN] had most of the capabilities of a well-balanced modern fleet and ambitions to match."¹³²

1947 – The Interim Navy (Document J)

Before these ambitions could be fully realized, the atomic bombing of Japan brought the war to an unexpected end. Where a protracted Pacific campaign had promised an orderly transition to a large, balanced, and capable postwar structure, fleet planning suddenly was thrown into flux. The future of the postwar RCN was far from assured, not least from the fact that Prime Minister Mackenzie King did not share the interventionist inclinations of the mandarins at External and instead steered a return to pre-war isolationism. In the first flush of demobilization, until Canada's postwar needs could be determined, the initial planning figure approved by Cabinet was for a 10,000-man "Interim Force" naval establishment

(the Army and RCAF had proportionate limitations). Barely sufficient to crew a single carrier, one cruiser, and a handful of destroyers, the "good workable little fleet," as it was styled, was effectively a truncated single-carrier task force split between the two coasts, which even then the RCN struggled to keep in commission.¹³³

The government was keen, however, to maintain two other legacies of the vast expansion of Canada's maritime war effort: the large ocean-going merchant marine that once again had become the third largest in the world, and a strong shipbuilding industry that had employed nearly 70,000 persons. Michael Hennessy has traced how, in the first two decades of the postwar period, "Canada pursued a dedicated maritime policy reminiscent of that proposed by Mahan."¹³⁴ It did so through a deliberate strategy of state intervention, with the establishment of the Canadian Maritime Commission (1947-1963) and the Department of Defence Production (1951-1969), with specific responsibilities for developing policies to preserve the shipping industry, maintain Canada's shipyards, and coordinate naval shipbuilding programs. Remarkably, this success story has not had the exposure it deserves, not least for the fact that its demise by the mid-1960s has objective lessons for Canada's present efforts to deal with a disrupted international situation.

It was not until early 1947, with the signs all pointing toward the Soviet Union being the major adversary, that the naval staff finally felt confident to produce an analysis to guide the "Planning of [the] Post-War Navy."¹³⁵ Reproduced as Appendix J, it assessed that "the optimum Naval potential of Russia lies in the field of the submarine weapon," predicting that the next war would likely be a replay of the recent Battle of the Atlantic. It therefore is significant in two respects: firstly, it marks the point at which it was determined that the primary postwar purpose of the RCN would be as an anti-submarine force; and, secondly, it laid the requirement for the design and construction of what would become the *St. Laurent*-class destroyer-escort.¹³⁶

Modern developments in submarines have made the bulk of present day surface escorts virtually obsolete. The escort of the future does not yet exist. It will be necessary, however, for it to have greater speed, better sea-keeping qualities, and be of such construction as to promote rapid construction in an emergency.

These recommendations, however, did not come to pass beyond internal naval planning for another year and a half, until after Mackenzie King retired in October 1948 to be succeeded by his former minister of External Affairs, Louis St-Laurent. St-Laurent had expounded on his foreign policy notions in his famous "Gray Lecture" in January 1947,¹³⁷ and, with Lester Pearson taking his place at External, this now became Canada's de facto national grand strategy. They immediately set about changing the isolationist direction of Canada's foreign policy by resurrecting the interventionist approach envisioned by the Post-Hostilities Planning Committee. This was witnessed most demonstrably by their push to establish the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which came into being on April 4, 1949 (it is noteworthy that St-Laurent's cabinet approved the construction of the first of the new destroyer-escorts two weeks before that, on March 26). They buoyed their foreign policy by dropping the Interim Force recruiting limits and identifying that Canada's initial commitment to the alliance would be the aircraft carrier task force based principally in Halifax, given that neither the Army nor the RCAF had the forces at hand to constitute what eventually would be, respectively, a brigade and a fighter wing for basing on the continent.¹³⁸

1950 - The Accelerated Programme (Document K)

Still, it was not until the summer of 1950, following the unexpected North Korean invasion of South Korea, that Canadian rearmament was stepped up and the government directed the three services to provide their plans to meet an "Accelerated Defence Programme." The Navy's response, "Recommendations for the Increase in Strength of the R.C.N.," submitted on August 17, 1950, and reproduced as Appendix K,¹³⁹ cannot truthfully be categorized as a "strategy" but is included in this collection for the strategic implications that sprang from it. To begin, it is a marker for the Navy's dramatic expansion throughout

the ensuing decade, starting with the recommissioning of wartime vessels in reserve, to be replaced with the newly constructed destroyer-escorts as they were completed.¹⁴⁰ In determining the commitments to meet the naval threat, the document identified that:

The R.C.N. has three vital tasks in the Naval defence of Canada, namely:

- a) the provision of seaward defences for the important harbours;
- b) minesweeping the approaches of these harbours; and
- c) anti-submarine warfare.

More to the thrust of this Reader, in noting that the RCN program "can well be construed as a sign of good faith in our Naval commitments to NATO," it is from this point, early in the Cold War, that the composition of the Navy (and, for that matter, also the Canadian Army and the RCAF in their own program responses) shifted decisively from being ordained by national objectives and instead became contingent upon what one scholar aptly has described as "a strategy of commitments,"¹⁴¹ with force levels and doctrine determined by NATO force planning goals. The effect of this for the Navy was a move away from a balanced general-purpose fleet to one of "specialization" in anti-submarine warfare (ASW), with the consequence of limiting naval options for the government in response to other crisis situations.¹⁴² Fred Crickard put it more bluntly: "Canadian naval policy during the Cold War [was] driven primarily by the [ASW] fleet-in-being," and to underscore the strategic danger, he quoted his British partner in sailor-scholarship, Richard Hill: "if a medium power emphasizes its alliance commitment to the extent of saying its forces are a 'contribution' and that only, it is very likely to get a force structure that is not suited to its national needs."¹⁴³ As a corollary to all this, Dan Middlemiss has analyzed the role that economic considerations have played in the development of the postwar Canadian Navy, with the conclusion that they have been underappreciated: "... the interaction among political, military, and economic considerations in the development of the modern Canadian navy has been complex and has varied with time and circumstance. But if one overriding conclusion stands out, it is this: for the Canadian navy, what politics has proposed, economics has disposed."¹⁴⁴

The Navy implicitly understood the limitations of a specialized commitment to anti-submarine warfare and was able to manage a balance of capabilities for as long as an aircraft carrier and "big gun" destroyers such as the Tribals remained elements of the fleet and offered capabilities beyond the narrow ASW focus (the best examples being maintaining an air-to-ground role for the fighters embarked in the carrier and quickly repurposing those vessels for a sealift role to dispatch the peacekeeping contingents first to the Sinai in 1957 and then Cyprus in 1964, and separately the reputation gained by the destroyers as "train-busters" in Korea from 1950-1953). However, by the late 1950s, the days of both these vessel types clearly were numbered, with the carrier and all wartime construction (including the Tribals) expected to be paid off without replacement by the late 1960s. The fleet thereafter was to be constituted entirely of variants of the modern destroyer-escorts, albeit buttressed by a new fleet replenishment type to extend their at-sea endurance.

Even within the boundaries of the strategy of commitments, modifications to Canadian naval thinking did occur. As Isabel Campbell observes in her article quoted above, and as Peter Haydon also notes in his chronicle of this era as the preliminary stage in "The Evolution of the Canadian Naval Task Group,"¹⁴⁵ typically these adaptations came in concert with changes to NATO strategy, which the naval staff in Ottawa did not hesitate to use to their advantage. The first major opportunity came following the NATO response to the Soviet detonation of a hydrogen (thermonuclear) bomb. Promulgated on November 22, 1954, MC 48 most often is remembered as "the first official NATO document to explicitly discuss the use of nuclear weapons, and it first introduced the concept of massive retaliation."¹⁴⁶ But it also was based on the assumption that after the opening 30-day nuclear exchange, the war would settle into a more traditional format. For Canada, this would be the reinforcement and resupply of Western Europe, forgoing any option for drawn-out mobilization and forecasting a protracted "come as you are" third Battle of the Atlantic. Within a year, the RCN had refined its "Requirements for a Re-Appraisal of Current War Plans"¹⁴⁷ to demand a fleet structure that resurrected the long-standing desire for a second carrier

(*Bonaventure* then about to commission, while retaining *Magnificent*), supported by 25 destroyer escorts (the 14 *St. Laurent* class building and on order, while retaining the converted seven older wartime Tribals and four Intermediate destroyers) and 25 other ocean and coastal escorts (the converted *Prestonians* and their projected replacements).¹⁴⁸

1956-1958 - The Naval Warfare Study Group (Document L)

Predictably, such a much-expanded force proved controversial to the other services, served more to entrench air staff opposition to RCN carrier operations, and clearly never came to be implemented.¹⁴⁹ Facing this resistance, the RCN appreciated that it had to provide a better rationale for its aspirations. In January 1956, Vice-Admiral Harry DeWolf, in one of his earliest acts upon becoming Chief of the Naval Staff, established a Naval Warfare Study Group "to address the myriad of strategic, organizational, and technological challenges [presented by ...] the concept of massive retaliation, the possibility of surprise attack, the implementation of the SOSUS underwater sound surveillance system, and the organizational issues associated with a quick transition from peace to war."¹⁵⁰ This committee was an innovative concept, the first of its kind by the Canadian naval staff to undertake a comprehensive appraisal of a strategic problem. Quite aside from any results, doing so demonstrated the Navy's increasing confidence and competence, in having the capacity to bring together a variety of experienced talents resident across the naval staff - in this initial instance, under the leadership of Captain Duncan Raymond, Assistant Chief of the Naval Staff (Plans), and including representatives variously from the Plans and Operations, Intelligence, Naval Aviation, and Engineering divisions.¹⁵¹

The Naval Warfare Study Group deliberated for the next several months, producing several draft iterations that demonstrate the intensity of the debates within the RCN as to its force rationale with regard to national as well as NATO requirements, covering both peace and wartime roles and, hence, platform structure. Regrettably, the existing files do not contain a complete version of the final report, although sufficient records do exist to piece together its broad conclusions, reproduced in Appendix L.¹⁵² The committee had quickly determined that two recent revolutionary technological advancements demanded a fundamental reassessment of Canadian naval actions in the event of general war. The first was the new ability of Soviet submarines to fire cruise missiles against targets on the North American mainland from a "danger zone" some 200 miles offshore, precluding much warning time after launch. The second was the recent implementation of the SOSUS system mentioned in the paragraph above, which promised to greatly increase the odds of detecting and countering the Soviet submarine threat prior to missile launch. The Working Group encapsulated this thinking in its conclusion that, in the opening phase of war, rather than dispatching forces to support operations ashore on the European continent:

... the primary task of the Canadian maritime forces will be [the] provision of warning of the approach of enemy submarines to the Canadian coasts and the location and destruction of such submarines before they can reach a position from which they can attack important land targets in Canada and the United States with guided missiles.

The Naval Board considered the draft on June 15 and "directed a long series of minor re-wordings."¹⁵³ With those incorporated, DeWolf forwarded the final report to his colleague, the Chief of the Air Staff, which, with further revisions, would form the basis for the joint RCN and RCAF concept of maritime operations that appeared in April 1957 (a progressive development in itself). Appreciating as well that this conclusion was at odds with extant NATO strategy, concurrently, the naval staff undertook discussions with SACLANT staff to incorporate the new Canadian planning factors into NATO strategy.¹⁵⁴

1961 - The Brock Report (Document M)

The RCN nonetheless continued to be plagued by the problem of specialization and how "to adopt a more flexible, general purpose naval capability while retaining a strong ASW capability."¹⁵⁵ A better-

known, or perhaps more infamous, investigation came in 1961 when the Chief of the Naval Staff (now Vice-Admiral Herbert Rayner) struck an "Ad Hoc Committee on Naval Objectives" chaired by Rear-Admiral Jeffry Vanstone Brock and hence remembered more by its short title, "The Brock Report" (excerpts are reproduced as Appendix M).¹⁵⁶ Historians have tended to dismiss it as being overly ambitious and out of touch with reality, probably due as much as anything to the off-putting inflated self-opinion of its author. However, it is possible also to see it as being quite visionary, in recommending the modernization and expansion of the RCN into a "Three-Ocean Navy," mentioning the Arctic Ocean for the first time, noting the need for nuclear-powered attack submarines to patrol it, and advocating for the development of novel vessel types such as the "heliporter" frigate, large enough to carry eight to ten helicopters to deliver an embarked company-sized force of soldiers to a contested shore. Other than a brief and now-dated article written in a different context (albeit still recommended as being of great value to readers), no proper detailed study of the Brock Report has been published.¹⁵⁷ But at a full 130 pages, and given its wide distribution within the department (Brock purposely drafted the bulk of it as "unclassified" to enable this), it demands attention as the Navy's first-ever comprehensive assessment of its place in the Canadian security framework and the first one truly worthy of being labelled a "strategic plan" (the numbers below in parentheses are page references for quotes from the Report, reproduced in the Appendix). Starting from base principles, and fulfilling its assessed need "to devote considerable attention to a re-examination of our Canadian defence and external policies before formulating more detailed proposals" (ix), it then provides readers with a précis of naval strategy and how that applies to Canada, followed by a consideration of technological advances as well as the "changing international scene," before describing the proposed force structure to enable a response. Appearing at a time when the accepted NATO strategy was still rapid escalation to "massive retaliation" (MC 14/3 "Flexible Response" would not appear until 1967), the Brock Report was prescient in its analysis. One historian has noted that it was "rather ahead of conventional thought, [in saying] the navy must handle not just general nuclear war but the whole range through conventional conflict to brushfire wars and police action."¹⁵⁸ Arguing, in consequence, that the Navy should return to a balanced general-purpose structure, the Report proposed a sweeping reorganization of the Canadian fleet:

- it accepted that the carrier should be paid off at the end of its service life in the mid-1970s;
- by then, its air defence capabilities would be replaced by general-purpose frigates (GPFs) equipped with guided anti-air missile systems;
- the GPFs, the existing destroyer-escorts, and any new construction should be converted to embark anti-submarine helicopters;
- that an immediate acquisition of modern conventional submarines be followed with nuclear-propelled vessels, stating that "the submarine may be looked upon as the capital ship of the future" (82) (the accompanying images show, respectively, an American *Barbel* and *Skipjack* submarine);
- that the new-concept heliporters mentioned above were "seen as a successor to *Bonaventure* and the Prestonian class frigates ... [to] provide troop lift and support facilities, and have the capability of training junior officers" (84);
- that an additional pair of fleet replenishment ships and a submarine depot ship should be built to provide afloat logistics;
- that the Navy should "re-enter the Arctic for the purpose of mastering the environment and re-asserting Canadian sovereignty [with] ... an initial ... two Arctic Patrol Vessels" (85, 107); and finally,
- that research and development should continue into "unconventional craft" such as hovercraft and hydrofoils (86).

The committee arguably was correct in its assessment of the Canadian security environment, and it conducted its deliberations with input from the other services and in the context of the background chatter already permeating Canadian Forces Headquarters about "integration." The Report was read with interest at the Chiefs of Staff Committee and received a nod of approval from the influential Canadian defence research scientist Dr. R.J. Sutherland, who identified that "this report should prove of the

greatest value.... The general concept of developing greater versatility without making an abrupt shift seems to be extremely sound."¹⁵⁹ But in the "uncertainty that attended the Diefenbaker and first Pearson [minority] governments, no decisions were taken on naval procurement."¹⁶⁰ What Brock had put forward was too aspirational for any contemporary government, with "a fleet concept ... that was beyond the capability of the naval budget or Canadian industry to produce.... [And] the greatest failing ... was its omission of a coherent personnel policy to 'man' the new fleet."¹⁶¹ Neither did it survive the test when Lester Pearson became prime minister in 1963 and made Paul Hellyer his defence minister. Even with the logic of their plan to create a "rapid response force" through the unification of the Canadian Armed Forces, pointing to a combined (nowadays "joint") Canadian variant of a US Marine Corps force structure, Hellyer "was not ready to accept at face value any previous defence estimates or plans."¹⁶² His rejection of Brock's report was just one of the irritants in their acrimonious relationship that resulted in the minister firing the flag officer in the course of the so-called revolt of the admirals against unification. Nor was there consensus within the naval staff. Through the years leading up to unification, in the absence of firm direction from CNS Rayner as to how to proceed otherwise, internal bickering among groups of staff officers advocating for their particular projects (new and more aircraft carriers, nuclear submarines, the GPF) created a situation in which they were played off against one another, making the Navy "its own worst enemy" and resulting in none of the programs advancing.¹⁶³

1972 - The Maritime Policy Review (Document N)

Whatever the merit of any of the string of naval "reports" produced through the convulsive decade of the 1960s, even with many of them giving more than a nod to integrated-joint-combined forces, the step too far of unification instead became a cost-cutting exercise to fund the social programs of the growing Canadian welfare state. With the carrier scrapped along with all the remnants of the wartime gun destroyers, Maritime Command (MARCOM) - as it now was styled - lost any semblance of a balanced force structure and was condemned to provide, as best it could within the "strategy of commitments," its niche capability NATO role of anti-submarine warfare. It was not until 1972 that the now-familiar unified structure of National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ) finally was settled, with the operational MARCOM headquartered in Halifax and the "naval staff" in Ottawa reconstituted as CMDO (Chief of Maritime Doctrine and Operations). Still, the chastened naval planners did manage a rapid and inspired adaptation to the circumstances, producing a "Maritime Policy Review" in May of that year (reproduced as Appendix N).¹⁶⁴ Very much reflecting the "ends-ways-means" recognizable to present-day strategy developers, albeit without using those terms, it benefited as well from flowing directly from the recent government White Paper on Defence, *Defence in the 70s* (a national grand strategy in all but name).¹⁶⁵ It was advertised as having "been undertaken by a joint military-civilian group ... with assistance from representatives of the Privy Council Office and the Treasury Board Secretariat," the new "whole of government" offices established by the Trudeau government. The Deputy Minister and Chief of Defence Staff promptly recommended it to the minister "as the basis for future planning of Maritime activities within the Department and as the basis also of submissions on new or replacement equipment which will require Cabinet or Treasury Board approval in the future." Ticking all those boxes, one should expect it to have favourably shaped the rebuilding of the Canadian fleet with a return to the balanced force structure recommended in the Policy Review. However, as Dan Middlemiss observes:¹⁶⁶

Indeed, for the navy the [Pierre] Trudeau era amounted to 'constraint as usual.' ... [Significantly], the intra-budgetary trade-off between personnel and capital expenditures continued unabated. Personnel expenditures ... increased abruptly to 65 per cent of MARCOM budget in 1977. Capital expenditures experienced a more rapid decline ... to only 8 per cent in 1975, a post-war low.... Operations and maintenance expenditures ... decreased substantially ... in response to the dramatic increase in fuel costs caused by the 1973 OPEC crisis.

The 1972 policy review recommended the acquisition of general-purpose capabilities in four broad areas (the numbers in parentheses indicate the chapter / page in the document):

- expanded surface and sub-surface surveillance capabilities (2 / 11);
- the "Maritime Defence of North America" (4 / 41);
- the protection of the transatlantic sea lanes to Europe for "NATO Maritime defence" (5 / 54); and,
- general support for "Peacekeeping and Unforeseen Maritime Contingencies" (6 / 59).

However, in the subsequent department-wide Defence Structure Review (DSR) of 1975, the MARCOM programs were determined to be lower in priority than the acquisition programs required for Mobile Command (Leopard tanks for the Army brigade in Europe) and Air Command (CF-18 fighter aircraft and CP-140 Aurora long-range patrol aircraft, although notably, the MARCOM review supported the latter as a replacement for the Argus¹⁶⁷).

1977 - Cabinet Decision / Surface Ship Requirements (Document O)

The final recommendation of the Maritime Policy Review was "that the Department of National Defence undertake technical studies, including studies of cost-effectiveness, and, following their completion, make recommendations to the Cabinet, as to the number, types and mix of surface ships and submarines which should be procured or maintained in service during the period 1972 to 1985."¹⁶⁸ As an exception to the comment in the paragraph above, this objective – although it did not see immediate acquisition results – was pursued determinedly to result in the submission of a Memorandum to Cabinet in November 1977 on "Maritime Surface Ship Requirements"¹⁶⁹ (reproduced as Appendix O). Although not a strategy document in itself, it is a noteworthy statement of strategic principles as endorsed by the highest level of political approval. In seeking approval "to conduct a project definition for the first portion of a ship acquisition program," Cabinet agreed that Canada must "continue to maintain a combat capable maritime surface fleet ... of 24 fully combat capable surface vessels [to] meet Canada's requirement for participation in collective defence" (p. 0009). Notable here, in this direction, is the continued deference to the strategy of commitments. And as an aside, the "vessels" eventually would become known as the Canadian Patrol Frigate (CPF) or *Halifax* class, the last of which would be delivered just shy of two decades later.

We have seen in Part 2 how Canadian staff officers in SACLANT were instrumental in the development of NATO's Concept of Maritime Operations (CONMAROPS). Coincident with that work, naval officers at home in Canada were performing a parallel tactical development with strategic implications: the systematizing of the task group concept. Peter Haydon has described this process in his insightful article called "The Evolution of the Canadian Naval Task Group."¹⁷⁰ It had been NATO practice over the decades to split up various national squadrons to be combined into mixed multinational groups specialized for a certain purpose (such as anti-submarine warfare). By the 1970s, however, "changes in technology ... and the nature of war itself ... required some new thinking," so one aspect of CONMAROPS was that:

SACLANT began to change the concept for assigning national forces to operational tasks. Rather than continuing to use the previous ad hoc method of assigning individual ships to tasks, ships were assigned increasingly to tasks on the basis of national task groups.... The advantages were many. A national task group came fully trained, ready for its task, and more importantly was self-sufficient.¹⁷¹

The Canadian naval staff were easily converted, having come to appreciate that, for example, although the RCN had made a significant contribution to the Korean War, the potential for gaining any political influence from that had been diminished by the destroyers being split up into British and American task groups.¹⁷² The new task group concept not only could make the Navy more attractive to its political masters, but together with the robust strategic model of CONMAROPS, it provided the rationale for the long-delayed recapitalization of the Canadian fleet with acquisition programs that would allow for balanced, self-supporting national task groups.¹⁷³ These programs included, specifically, the

modernization of the *Iroquois*-class DDH 280s to take on better command and control and area air defence capabilities (the Tribal Update and Modernization Project, or TRUMP), the construction of the *Halifax*-class Canadian Patrol Frigates optimized for ASW, and an eventual replacement for the existing *Protecteur*-class replenishment ships. Thus, the task group concept became the organizing principle for the Canadian Navy for the last decade of the Cold War. In the meantime, it served “the rust-bucket navy” well in adapting to remain a key element of the US Navy’s overarching Maritime Strategy being implemented throughout that period.¹⁷⁴ And the task group concept was the rationale for the force that Canada deployed to the Persian Gulf to join the coalition effort in response to Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990–1991, a contribution that, in consequence, was accorded outsized recognition. The great irony is that, with the completion of the TRUMP refits and the introduction of the CPFs, the Navy had, by the mid-1990s (that is, after the end of the Cold War), finally achieved the quest begun in the mid-1950s for a force structure of balanced capabilities.

1989 – Fleet Mix Alternative Study (Document P)

Indeed, this push was a factor in expanded naval capabilities being a significant dimension of the Mulroney government’s 1987 Defence White Paper, *Challenge and Commitment*.¹⁷⁵ The document contained bold statements confirming the TRUMP and CPF projects, as well as the revitalization of the naval reserve through assigning it the distinct role of mine countermeasures, but it is known more for calling for a fleet of 10–12 nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs).¹⁷⁶ When the SSN project was cancelled in the belt-tightening spring 1989 budget, the Navy immediately undertook a “Fleet Mix Study”¹⁷⁷ to determine how to make good the lost capability difference within the new financial framework. The Study is reproduced as Appendix P, but its introductory paragraph is pertinent here:

(S) This paper reviews policy and strategic considerations affecting Canada’s maritime force development over the past 14 years. It then considers the current situation and the implication on the future maritime force structure of the three ocean strategy outlined in the current White Paper. The 15 year force development plan is then examined and the importance of the nuclear propelled submarines as a component of a balanced maritime capability for Canada is explored. The impact of not pursuing nuclear propulsion is discussed and the paper concludes that a restructuring of the Maritime portion of the Canadian Forces Development Plan (Provisional) is required given that nuclear propulsion is no longer acceptable. Finally, the paper identifies an alternative maritime force structure that would satisfy the requirement that is derived from policy.

Again, while not properly a strategic assessment as such, the study is instructive for reviewing the general conditions a Canadian fleet was required to address. Working through a variety of options, it concluded that the cancellation of the SSNs could be compensated for through the acquisition of a dozen conventional submarines (SSKs), along with an additional eight frigates (on top of the dozen CPFs already under construction, as well as the four Tribals being modernized), for a total of 24 surface warships. In short order, however, further financial constrictions not only cancelled the additional frigates but also deferred the submarine acquisition indefinitely.

1990 – The Osbaldeston Report (Document Q)

A coincidental effort, undertaken in the shadow of the same funding pressures, was a study to assess if any efficiencies could be gained by combining the government fleets. Dan Middlemiss has summarized the attempts, beginning in the early 1960s, “to merge the CCG, or at least parts of it, under navy auspices,”¹⁷⁸ which finally was achieved in September 2025, with the CCG officially becoming a Special Operating Agency within DND. One of the most exhaustive examinations of the issue was undertaken in 1990, published in October of that year as “All the Ships that Sail: A Study of Canada’s Fleets.”¹⁷⁹ More commonly short-titled the Osbaldeston Report (for its author, Gordon F. Osbaldeston, recently retired as Clerk of the Privy Council), extracts are reproduced as Appendix Q. After reviewing a range of

alternatives for managing government fleets, Osbaldeston concluded that “[t]he full consolidation or ‘single fleet’ option, while theoretically possible is not a viable option ... [with] no evidence that the benefits are sufficient to justify the costs in both human and financial terms.”¹⁸⁰ The main issue was the differing roles and cultures of the two fleets, as well as the danger that, in merging them, “either the civilian component would become excessively militarized, or ... the military component’s combat effectiveness would be compromised.”¹⁸¹ While much has changed in government operations and even naval culture over the years to temper these concerns, Osbaldeston’s findings are a cautionary tale with many points for consideration to ensure success in the present effort.

The 1990s Vision Quest (Documents R, S, & T)

The Osbaldeston Report appeared just as the Canadian naval task group arrived in theatre to begin operations. The Gulf War deployment of 1990-1991 came at an opportune time for the Canadian Navy (and for most forces of other nations, for that matter), demonstrating as it did the continuing need for viable naval and military forces even after the fall of the Berlin Wall, to police the crises that soon enough would come to define the “new world order.” Still, that need was not so obvious to governments seeking a “peace dividend” following the successful conclusion of the Cold War. The record of the 1990s can be chronicled by the search for a naval strategy to enable survival in this cost-cutting environment. The lead example for Western navies, perhaps surprisingly, was the United States Navy, itself not immune from the prevailing trend.¹⁸² The US’s “From the Sea” series¹⁸³ became the guide for Britain, Australia, and Canada. In the Canadian case, it witnessed a chain of documents drafted through the 1990s, all sponsored by successive Commanders of Maritime Command (or Chiefs of the Maritime Staff, as they became known after 1997) seeking to find the right “voice” to respond to the sometimes confusing prescriptions from government and NDHQ policy staffs. In sequence, they were *The Maritime Command Vision: Charting the Course to Navy 2008* (Vice-Admiral Peter Cairns, 1993 [principal author Captain(N) David Bindernagel]); *The Naval Vision: Charting the Course for Canada’s Maritime Forces into the 21st Century* (Vice-Admiral Peter Cairns, 1994, following the promulgation of the White Paper [principal author then-Captain(N) Eric Lerhe]); and *Adjusting Course: A Naval Strategy for Canada* (Vice-Admiral Gary Garnett, 1997 [principal authors then-Captain(N) Dan McNeil and Lieutenant-Commander Doug Maclean]). Other than to note that they constitute an intellectually compelling series of documents deserving of further detailed study, they will not be addressed here, as none of them gained any traction. However, the process they traced was examined in detail by Laura Higgins of the Centre for Foreign Policy Studies,¹⁸⁴ and they are attached as appendices R, S, and T.¹⁸⁵

2001 – Leadmark 2020 (Document U)

This culminated with the development of *Leadmark: The Navy’s Strategy for 2020*¹⁸⁶ (short title, *Leadmark 2020*), in which the author of this monograph had some personal part as the lead writer for the team. Accepting the inherent “biases of their own aspirations” warning that was noted in the introduction to this Reader, *Leadmark 2020* is discussed at some length here, primarily because it caught the traction that had eluded the previous attempts and has been independently assessed against concurrent allied efforts as being “successful”¹⁸⁷ (and arguably, because it has never formally been replaced by an approved new document, it remains the extant guidance). Principal among the reasons for its wide acceptance is that it was developed not as an insular in-service project but with a broad range of inputs. To begin, enabled by the newfound “magic” of email and occasional in-person conference encounters, it enjoyed loose coordination with allied staffs, specifically Britain, where Eric Grove was rewriting *BR 1806: The Fundamentals of British Maritime Doctrine*,¹⁸⁸ and Australia, where James Goldrick was engaged in codifying *Australian Maritime Doctrine*.¹⁸⁹ These exchanges of ideas were enhanced within the CAF through personal interaction with the Land Staff Concept Development team at Fort Frontenac in Kingston (there were no similar contacts with the air staff, an equivalent of the Air Warfare Centre in Trenton having not yet been established). Secondly, starting from a base of the practical experience of professional officers, the draft document was developed consciously with academic pretensions, so that it was rigorously tested against historical experience as well as the evolving concepts of “medium power

naval strategy” just then being developed by leading thinkers in that emerging field, such as Richard Hill, Geoffrey Till, Eric Grove, and Canada’s own Peter Haydon (as noted in the Part 2 discussion; these and more are listed in *Leadmark 2020*’s three-page “Select Bibliography,” pages 172-174). Thirdly, progressive drafts of the document were circulated for comment and were “seminared” extensively with the Canadian academic community, with the defence centres at the Dalhousie and Calgary universities each sponsoring multi-day conferences to that effect.

Many of the concepts were new to the Canadian Navy (and for that matter, the academic community) and demanded elaboration, so the final document (not unlike the Brock Report) struggled to encompass it all, and with an additional “marketing” chapter on “Future Naval Capability Requirements” and several supporting appendices, it swelled to just under 200 pages (a summary version was developed in tandem but at a still-too-long 50 pages). Attention is drawn to several core concepts that remain pertinent to present deliberations (the numbers in parentheses are the pages in the document, reproduced as Appendix U):

- A theoretical discussion of “the elements of successful sea power as they apply to a medium-sized nation” (28) led off with Ken Booth’s conception of the “use of the sea as the unity underlying a trinity of roles – military, diplomatic and policing [constabulary] – which inter-relate across the spectrum of conflict” (30-41); arguably, “Booth’s Triangle” remains a useful construct to this day;¹⁹⁰
- Eric Grove’s “Typology for Navies” was described (43-45) as not derived from a simple order-of-battle quotient but rather informed by state intention to employ it. It was noted for placing Canada in the “Rank 3: Medium Global Force Projection Navy” grouping (with Australia and the Netherlands), defined as “navies that may not possess the full range of capabilities, but have a credible capacity in certain of them and consistently demonstrate a determination to exercise them at some distance from home waters, in cooperation with other Force Projection Navies.” The USN was alone in the first rank, with Britain and France as Rank 2;
- Condensing the book-length analyses of Richard Hill and Peter Haydon¹⁹¹ to a three-page summary, it identified six “Principles of Medium Power Naval Strategy” (46-48, summarized here):
 - *Influence Events at a Distance*: sea power is best exercised “away” from the near offshore, to keep direct threats to the “home” at bay;
 - *Freedom of the Seas*: exploitation of the seas can only sensibly be managed through the cooperative efforts of ocean users;
 - *Joint Enabler*: the navy can play a critical part in getting land and air forces to a conflict zone, and in sustaining them with logistical and fire support;
 - *Wide Range of Operations*: the navy should be capable of conducting sea control and sea denial operations in home waters, but also crisis management and naval diplomacy abroad, and cooperating in power projection operations to a limited scale;
 - *Versatile and Capable*: a broad base of capabilities is the surest guarantee of a flexible response, independence of action in a crisis, and managing the response to that crisis;
 - *Alliances / Coalitions*: with navies globally experiencing force reductions, the necessary weight for most crisis situations typically can be obtained by working in combination with a number of like-minded states;
 - *Interoperability*: the corollary to collective action, navies must be able to cooperate both jointly with their other national services, and in combination with allies; and
 - *Indigenous Capacity*: elevated and sustained commitments of departmental and national resources are essential to assure the capacity for and effectiveness of independent action;

- The task group concept was highlighted and defined as “the task-tailored mix of capabilities brought together in a variety of surface, sub-surface and aerial platforms [for a specified mission],” with discussion of its defining characteristics (117); and
- Finally, it concluded with “... a clear and concise strategy that establishes the Leadmark to which Canada’s navy should steer on its course into the 21st century” (119) (note that the “ends-ways-means” mantra had not yet become fashionable in CAF usage but can be discerned with a careful reading):

The Canadian navy will continue its development as a highly adaptable and flexible force, ready to provide the government with a wide range of relevant policy options across a continuum of domestic and international contingencies up to mid-level military operations. [Ends]

The navy will generate combat capable forces that are responsive, rapidly deployable, sustainable, versatile, lethal and survivable. [Ways] Canada’s naval forces, from individual units to complete Task Groups, will be tactically self-sufficient and be able to join or integrate into a joint, US or multinational force, anywhere in the world. The navy will enhance the capability to deploy Vanguard elements for crisis response and to support the rapid deployment of the Land and Air Main Contingency Forces. [Means]

Although admittedly “aspirational,” unlike its Brock Report predecessor of four decades before, all that academic rigour and coordinating efforts with like-minded forces amazingly paid off. This synthesis found an audience in government circles, and *Leadmark 2020* was able to gain the departmental approval needed for Vice-Admiral Greg Maddison to publish it in June 2001 for wide external as well as internal promulgation.¹⁹²

2005 – Securing Canada’s Ocean Frontiers (Document V)

As will be recalled, within a couple of months of that date came the 9/11 terror attacks. That the Canadian naval response rolled out precisely as prescribed was ignored in the immediate post-operation analysis, the staff instead getting caught up in the moment and being charged to develop a correspondingly “new” strategy to meet the “everything had changed” circumstances. However, the resultant *Securing Canada’s Ocean Frontiers*¹⁹³ that appeared in 2005, in truth, mostly reaffirmed the principles of *Leadmark 2020* (see its pages 9–12), along with offering a nod to kickstarting an interest in the Arctic (22 and *passim*) and providing still-relevant sections on “emerging naval missions” (19–29, summarized here), some of which have become reality, while others remain aspirational:

- *Coordination of Government Maritime Operations*: the navy is the natural leader of a “whole of government” federal approach in our maritime areas of responsibility;
- *National Maritime Presence*: the requirement for greater presence in Canadian home waters;
- *Forward Security*: the notion that Canada is made more secure by seeing to the resolution of global problems at their source, before they can expand to threaten the homeland;
- *Maritime Interdiction*: the need to intercept and inspect shipping suspected of transporting various dangerous or illicit cargoes before they can threaten our territorial waters;
- *Task Group Command*: the ability to exercise command of formations of coalition warships in complex operations both domestically and overseas;
- *Sea-Based Joint Operations*: the navy has a key role to play in the Canadian Forces’ transformation into a joint fighting force across a broad range of operations both at home and abroad; and,
- *Sea-Based Logistics Support*: given the vast distances over which the navy operates, whether at home or away, underway support vessels enable the navy to keep its warships at sea and on patrol instead of in port for resupply.

A further listing of “strategic imperatives” (30-31), while perhaps a statement of the obvious, bears repeating as similarly having continued relevance to the present pursuit of a renewed Canadian naval strategy:

- Must be relevant to Canadians
- Must be Able to Act
- Must have the Right Capabilities
- Must have Critical Mass

The 2010s Vision Quest (Documents W & X)

A term that became popular at about that time was reference to the years of the Chrétien ministry as a “decade of darkness” due to its underfunding of the military.¹⁹⁴ This author proposes similarly to style the period after 2005 as the “decade of churn”: the installation of General Rick Hillier as Chief of Defence Staff precipitated a throwback to a true understanding of integration, and serious attention was given to concepts of “jointness” (not all of them “jarmy” – one especially interesting notion being his “big honking ship” [i.e., amphibiousness]). All of that was lost, however, in the Harper government’s need for retrenchment to resolve the 2008 financial crisis and the focus on Afghanistan. Thus, Hillier’s so-called “transformation” of the Canadian Armed Forces was not the major impetus for the change of the Navy that it might have been.¹⁹⁵

A more direct factor suggesting a shift in strategic thinking was the USN’s promulgation in 2007 of its *Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower* (CS 21).¹⁹⁶ Synthesized by Geoffrey Till as “a radically different approach to thinking about maritime operations which gave prominence to the notion of navies not competing but cooperating with one another to defend an international seabased trading system on which everyone’s peace and prosperity ultimately depended,”¹⁹⁷ this was widely interpreted as signalling an American appreciation of a loosely organized collection of coalitions banding together in pursuit of sustaining the rules-based order of international relations. In Canada, it rationalized the drawdown of fleet availability to accommodate the modernization of the *Halifax*-class frigates and the consequent decline in capacity to deploy national task groups for much of the next decade. At a conference in 2010 marking the centenary of the founding of the Navy, Rob Huebert delivered a paper noting the challenges in creating a modern Canadian naval strategy, what its key elements should include, and, importantly, “Why it matters.”¹⁹⁸ Successive commanders of the RCN embarked on a replay of the 1990s’ quest for a new and inspiring document with the right voice to rise above the churn and garner departmental buy-in to sustain fleet renewal. This led to the production of *Horizon 2050* in 2013 in the late years of the Stephen Harper ministry, and then *Leadmark 2050* in 2016, essentially the same document retitled and lightly repackaged for the new Justin Trudeau government.¹⁹⁹ Alas, although they were well-crafted strategic communications documents embodying the new DND-CAF mantra of “ends-ways-means” and the language of the Navy’s promise to contribute, for instance, to the protection of the rules-based international system of globalized trade, neither achieved the right tone for departmental sign-off and official public release (like many digital documents, the latter did find its way into unofficial distribution).

And meanwhile, as noted in the opening to this monograph, the paying off without immediate replacement of all the *Iroquois*-class command and air defence destroyers – as well as both tankers – and failure to achieve a reliable operational status for either the *Victoria*-class attack submarines or the CH-148 Cyclone maritime helicopters meant the hollowing out of the task group concept. With the main premises of *Leadmark 2020* no longer pertaining, the Canadian Navy, by the middle of the 2010s, had arguably fallen to Rank 5 or 6 in Groves’s typology, no longer capable of carrying out high-level independent operations over oceanic distances.

2006–present – A National Grand Strategy?

Critical progress, however, has been made, slowly but surely, over the past two decades, in the form of successive governments promulgating a series of policy documents that collectively lay the groundwork from which to frame a national grand strategy. Although not yet the coveted single coherent document, they do set guidance for the Navy in its strategic assessments. They are listed here (as well as in the Bibliography) for ease of reference by researchers:

- Stephen Harper ministry (2006–2015):
 - Arctic policy (speech August 17, 2006);²⁰⁰
 - *Canada First Defence Strategy* (May 12, 2008);²⁰¹ and
 - *National Shipbuilding Procurement Strategy* (June 3, 2010).²⁰²
- Justin Trudeau ministry (2015–2025):
 - *National Shipbuilding Strategy* (May 26, 2016, a revamping of the Harper defence policy);²⁰³
 - *Canada's Indo-Pacific Strategy* (November 2022);²⁰⁴
 - *Strong, Secure, Engaged* (June 7, 2017, another revamping of a Harper policy);²⁰⁵ and,
 - *Our North, Strong and Free* (April 8, 2024, yet another revamping of a Harper policy).²⁰⁶
- Mark Carney ministry (2025–present):
 - The Davos speech (January 29, 2026); and
 - *Defence Industrial Strategy* (February 26, 2026).²⁰⁷

That brings us to the present and concludes this survey. Clearly, the Navy's existing strategic guidance is outdated, and the world being in the throes of a major shift in geopolitics makes it an opportune time to embark upon the development of a refreshed Canadian naval strategy. The capstone documents surveyed here provide signposts to guide such an undertaking. They run the gamut of style, format, and intent. Rarely were they developed with any appreciation of the classic teachings of the naval strategy canon, the only one to consciously do so being *Leadmark 2020*, constructed against the premises of the medium-power naval theory that was emerging in the aftermath of the Cold War. Many were not "strategies" at all but rather force planning documents, although with sufficient strategic assessment content to warrant inclusion here. Most did not achieve their purposes, being either too ambitious or, more frequently, out of step with government ambitions. As noted in the introduction, a sure predictor of failure was the lack of alignment with an overarching national grand strategy.

The process got off to a promising start with Gordon's 1888 proposal that was developed in consideration of the Macdonald government's National Policy, but the post-Confederation structures of government were immature, and the plan could not be sustained beyond force of habit following the deaths of its prime movers. Thereafter, only on three other occasions were the attempts made within the scope of a recognizable national grand strategy: in 1909, 1943, and 2001. But even those tended not to survive for long: in the former two instances, governments changed, and with them, the national grand strategy, the Navy's scheme lacking the flexibility to adapt to the circumstances; and in the latter case, the Navy itself failed to follow through on its strategy, erroneously believing that the strategic geopolitical setting had fundamentally shifted, but with no firm government indications to that effect. If one might discern common grounds for failure, it would seem to be the fact that a consistent Canadian government "strategy" has been to spend as little as possible on military and especially naval capabilities.

The challenge to the drafters of any new naval strategy is to address that political mindset. Any refreshed document must be developed in alignment with national ambitions and shaped to embrace the tenets of Canada's self-ascribed status as a medium power. And it should have inherent flexibility and be adaptable to changing circumstances so that it can prove durable into the foreseeable future.

Notes

¹ *Leadmark: The Navy's Strategy for 2020* (June 2001) [hereafter *Leadmark 2020*]; *Securing Canada's Ocean Frontiers: Charting the Course from Leadmark* (May 2005); *Horizon 2050: A Strategic Maritime Concept for the Canadian Forces* (2013, not promulgated); and *Leadmark 2050: Canada in a New Maritime World* (2019, not promulgated). Greater discussion and full bibliographical information are provided in the detailed discussion in Part 3 below.

² For concise narrative discussions of these various ship classes and aircraft types, see Richard H. Gimblett and Karl Gagnon, *Guardians of the North: Canadian Warships and Maritime Aircraft, 1910-2025* (Dundurn, 2025).

³ A powerful discussion of this trend arrived as this Introduction was being crafted: Timothy Garton Ash, "Greenland and the Need for a New Internationalism," History of the Present Substack, January 18, 2026, https://open.substack.com/pub/timothygartonash/p/greenland-and-the-need-for-a-new?r=1g4myu&utm_medium=ios&shareImageVariant=overlay. Just two days later, Prime Minister Mark Carney made the points explicit in his speech to the World Economic Forum at Davos, Switzerland, on January 20, 2026: "For decades, countries like Canada prospered under what we called the rules-based international order.... This bargain no longer works. Let me be direct: we are in the midst of a rupture, not a transition.... To help solve global problems, we are pursuing variable geometry – different coalitions for different issues, based on values and interests." See Prime Minister's Office, "'Principled and pragmatic: Canada's path': Prime Minister Carney Addresses the World Economic Forum Annual Meeting," Prime Minister of Canada, January 20, 2026, <https://www.pm.gc.ca/en/news/speeches/2026/01/20/principled-and-pragmatic-canadas-path-prime-minister-carney-addresses>.

⁴ *Canada in Extremis: Rebalancing the Canadian Armed Forces and Rebuilding the Canadian Navy* (Naval Association of Canada, May 2024), 10. This point was emphasized in the American *2026 National Defense Strategy*, 10 (and also 3, albeit there with a menacing undertone). US Department of War [sic], January 23, 2026, <https://media.defense.gov/2026/Jan/23/2003864773/-1/-1/0/2026-NATIONAL-DEFENSE-STRATEGY.PDF>.

⁵ Dan Middlemiss, "'Geography as Destiny' in Canada-US Military Relations," *Canadian Naval Review* 22, no. 1 (Spring 2026): 26.

⁶ The notion of "middle / medium power" will be developed and explored further in Parts 2 and 3. The quote here is from *Leadmark 2020*, 46, employing the term as commonly understood in Canadian government circles. A useful précis history of the meaning of the phrase, albeit with a contrarian slant, is Peter Jones, "Canada Keeps Calling Itself a Middle Power. It Isn't," *The Walrus*, July 29, 2026, <https://thewalrus.ca/canada-middle-power/>. For the sake of consistency, this monograph will employ the traditional understanding, with the caution that readers should be alert to any changing usage.

⁷ Author Gimblett recalls that, when appointed in 1999 as a core member of the team charged with developing the original *Leadmark 2020*, both of the elements noted in this paragraph were in play: firstly, that the effort was itself the latest in a string of attempts, through the decade, to develop a strategic document; but also that he had had limited professional exposure to any of the literature on naval strategy, other than a general awareness of the historical works of Mahan and Corbett, and his first months "on the job" thus consisted of a self-directed reading course into the subject. Much of that exposure to the literature is reflected in this monograph, noting that studies especially on the nature of strategy have proliferated since then. Additionally informing this work is his observation of the Navy's subsequent strategic development processes, initially as a contractor embedded in the process and then from a distance as the Command Historian, until his retirement from public service in 2018.

⁸ See the discussion by Professor Barney Rubel of the US Naval War College in his review of Sebastian Bruns and Sarandis Papadopoulos, eds., *Conceptualizing Maritime & Naval Strategy: Festschrift for Captain Peter M. Swartz, United States Navy (Ret.)* (Nomos, 2020), in *Naval War College Review* 74, no. 4 (2021): Article 11.

⁹ Christopher Perry, "Has Canada Outsourced Maritime Strategy? Why NATO Makes a Canadian Naval Strategy More Important than Ever" (unpublished, undated manuscript shared with the author, July 8, 2026).

¹⁰ As noted most recently and authoritatively by Brian Santarpia, "Canada's Need for a Grand Strategy," *Starshell* 104 (Fall 2025): 24–28, https://www.navalassoc.ca/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/Starshell-Fall-2025-MR_compressed.pdf.

¹¹ See the discussion at this US Army War College site, accessed May 9, 2023:

https://www.reddit.com/r/WarCollege/comments/uah34s/doctrine_vs_strategy_vs_tactics/.

¹² Cited in footnote 3 above.

¹³ Hew Strachan, "The Lost Meaning of Strategy," *Survival* 47, no. 3 (October 2005): 34, as quoted in Brad Gladman, *Good Strategy and Bad: A Primer on the Creation of a Royal Canadian Air Force Service Strategy* (Defence Research and Development Canada Scientific Letter, DRDC-RDCC-2021-205, July 2021), 2.

¹⁴ Lawrence Freedman, *Strategy: A History* (Oxford University Press, 2013), ix.

¹⁵ Lawrence Freedman, "Strategy: The History of an Idea," in *The New Makers of Modern Strategy: From the Ancient World to the Digital Age*, ed. Hal Brands (Princeton University Press, 2023), 17-18.

¹⁶ Charles S. Oliviero, *Strategia: A Primer on Theory and Strategy for Students of War* (Double Dagger, 2022), 188.

¹⁷ Canada, Department of National Defence, *Shaping the Future of Canadian Defence: A Strategy for 2020* [short title *Strategy 2020*] (June 1999 [Deputy Minister Jim Judd and Chief of Defence Staff General Maurice Baril]).

¹⁸ *Leadmark 2020*, 20.

¹⁹ Arthur F. Lykke, Jr., "Defining Military Strategy," *Military Review* (January-February 1997): 185-186.

²⁰ Most recently, and perhaps infamously, as the driving mechanism of the second Trump administration's *National Security Strategy* (one does not have to agree with the content of the document to note its adherence to the ends-ways-means formula): *National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (The White House, November 2025), <https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/2025-National-Security-Strategy.pdf>.

²¹ Lykke, "Defining Military Strategy," 184.

²² Gladman, *Good Strategy and Bad*.

²³ Gladman, *Good Strategy and Bad*, 2.

²⁴ Gladman, *Good Strategy and Bad*, 1, 4.

²⁵ Gladman, *Good Strategy and Bad*, 5-8.

²⁶ Gladman, *Good Strategy and Bad*, 9.

²⁷ Originally developed for my presentation, "The Historical Evolution of Canadian Naval Strategic Thinking" (paper presented to the Kingston Consortium on International Security [KCIS], Kingston, ON, November 19, 2025 [TBP]), upon which Part 3 of this monograph has been revised and greatly expanded. This is inspired by, and is a slight contraction of, the definition developed by the RCN in its recent *Trident: Royal Canadian Navy Strategic Doctrine* (p. 11):

If one thinks of strategy as comprising the ends, ways, and means, then the political purposes for which governments deploy their naval asset represent the ends, naval platforms are the means, and strategic and operational doctrines describe the ways. Taken together, the ends, the ways and the means provide the best plan for the use of naval power as an effective instrument of strategic policy.

²⁸ Freedman, *Strategy: A History*, 108-122 [the subsection is 115-120].

²⁹ Edward Mead Earle, ed., *Makers of Modern Strategy: Military Thought from Machiavelli to Hitler* (Princeton University Press, 1943 [reprinted 1971]); Peter Paret, ed., *Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age* (Princeton University Press, 1986). This is especially distressing to the Canadian situation, as these books in succession were issued as standard texts to cadets at the Canadian Military Colleges.

³⁰ Brands, *The New Makers of Modern Strategy*, *op. cit.* John H. Maurer's chapter on Mahan (pp. 169-192) is most valuable in our context for its treatment of how the American strategist fit within and subsequently influenced the other major philosophies in the naval canon, Maurer in most instances validating the interpretations of this monograph; see *inter alia* his passing references to *la Jeune École*, Julian Corbett, Bernard Brodie, Sergei Gorshkov, the US Navy's Maritime Strategy, and the rise of the modern Chinese navy.

³¹ Oliviero, *Strategia*, *passim*.

³² D.M. Schurman, *The Education of a Navy: The Development of British Naval Strategic Thought* (Cassell, 1965).

³³ Schurman makes this point forcefully in an examination of the state of naval strategy education in Canada in the mid-1980s (his observations and conclusions remain pertinent to the present): D.M. Schurman, "Historical Strategy and Its Uses in Large and Small Navies," in *The RCN in Transition, 1910-1985*, ed. W.A.B. Douglas (University of British Columbia Press, 1988), 49-60.

³⁴ One good example of a subject this author is not sufficiently knowledgeable in to attempt here would be the Indian Navy, what with its combination of British and Soviet professional influences, responsibility for an

oceanic basin, and facing the challenge of an expansive China in some sort of cooperation with regional partners (specifically “The Quad,” composed of Australia, India, Japan, and the United States).

³⁵ Freedman, *Strategy: A History*, 115.

³⁶ Schurman, *The Education of a Navy*, 1.

³⁷ Schurman, *The Education of a Navy*, 3.

³⁸ David Morgan-Owen and Louis Halewood, “Introduction: Strategy, Economics, and the Sea,” in *Economic Warfare and the Sea: Grand Strategies for Maritime Powers, 1650-1945*, ed. Morgan-Owen and Halewood (Liverpool University Press, 2020), 5.

³⁹ The first – and to date, still the only – full account of Sir John Colomb is the second chapter in Schurman, *The Education of a Navy*, “Imperial Naval Strategist,” 16-35, and *inter alia*. Sir John often is paired with his older brother Vice-Admiral Philip Colomb, RN, to whom Schurman also devotes a full chapter (“3: Clio and the Admiral,” 36-59). However, the consensus is that Philip, although an important writer and educator, was more of a tactician and inventor, without significant strategic conception of his own, and as such he is not included in this discussion of the naval strategy canon. Others may think differently.

⁴⁰ This meaning has been modified over time, so that the modern understanding of a “blue-water navy” is a maritime force capable of operating globally across deep open oceans, distinct from a “green-water navy” (regional coastal) or a “brown-water navy” (rivers and estuaries), the colour variations corresponding to the respective shadings of water depth on hydrographic charts. See Michael Lindberg and Daniel Todd, *Brown-, Green-, and Blue-Water Fleets: The Influence of Geography on Naval Warfare, 1861 to the Present* (Praeger, 2001) [see also this author’s review, at *Naval War College Review* 56, no. 4 (Autumn 2003): Article 19].

⁴¹ Named for its chairman, Henry Herbert, 4th Earl of Carnarvon, the formal title was the “Royal Commission Appointed to Enquire into the Defence of British Possessions and Commerce Abroad.” On Canadian aspects, see Richard A. Preston, *Canada and “Imperial Defense”: A Study of the Origins of the British Commonwealth’s Defense Organization, 1867-1919* (Duke University Press, 1967), 91-95, 131-135, and *passim*.

⁴² The leading student of *la Jeune École* for many years was Theodore Ropp, *The Development of a Modern Navy: French Naval Policy, 1871-1904* (Naval Institute Press, 1987). A recent volume not viewed by this author is Arne Røksund, *The Jeune École: The Strategy of the Weak* (Brill, 2007). More accessible is Canadian sailor-scholar Hugues Canuel’s “From a Prestige Fleet to the Jeune École,” *Naval War College Review* 71, no. 1 (2018): Article 7, <https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol71/iss1/7>.

⁴³ See John Dotson, “The Jeune École Offers Lessons for a Contested Maritime Environment,” *Proceedings* (August 2024), accessed August 5, 2026, <https://www.usni.org/magazines/naval-history/2024/august/jeune-ecole-offers-lessons-new-contested-maritime-environment>.

⁴⁴ As noted previously, much has been written on Mahan. The best starting point would be the previously referenced chapter in *The New Makers of Modern Strategy* (2023 ed.) by John Maurer, 169-192 (Maurer incidentally held the position of Alfred Thayer Mahan Distinguished Professor of Sea Power and Grand Strategy at the US Naval War College). Schurman chronicles him as chapter 3 in *Education of a Navy* (60-82), and Hattendorf’s introduction to his selection of Mahan’s writings (cited in the following note) has a good sketch of his work, including “A Topical Catalog of Quotations on Naval Strategy” (xviii-xxx). In this author’s opinion, the best book-length analysis of Mahan is Jon Tetsuro Sumida, *Inventing Grand Strategy and Teaching Command: The Classic Works of Alfred Thayer Mahan Reconsidered* (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997) [see this author’s review in *The Northern Mariner* 8, no. 4 (Winter 1998): 127-128].

⁴⁵ Excerpts are included in Rear-Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan, *Mahan on Naval Strategy: Selections from the Writings of Rear Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan* (Classics of Sea Power: edited with an Introduction by John B. Hattendorf) (Naval Institute Press, 1991).

⁴⁶ Corbett is the subject of the seventh and final chapter in Schurman’s *The Education of a Navy* (147-184), the opening sentence of which is “All of the men hitherto discussed in this book had, at some stage in their careers, practical military experiences. Julian Corbett was a civilian” (147), the suggestion being not that this disqualified him from the enterprise but rather that it possibly accounted for his difference of perspective. With all the attention devoted to Mahan for the bulk of the 20th century, Corbett remained relatively unstudied until the successful conclusion of the Cold War, soon after which James Goldrick and John B. Hattendorf edited *Mahan Is Not Enough: The Proceedings of a Conference on the Works of Sir Julian Corbett and Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond* (Naval War College Historical Monograph Series No. 10, 1993). Of particular note in this volume is Schurman’s reflection, “Julian Corbett’s Influence on the Royal Navy’s Perception of Its Maritime Function,” 51-63. Corbett finally has had a book-length treatment in Andrew Lambert, *The British Way of War: Julian Corbett and the Battle for a National Strategy* (Yale University Press,

2021). See also Lambert's earlier article, "Sir Julian Corbett, Naval History and the Development of Sea Power Theory," in *Strategy and the Sea: Essays in Honour of John B. Hattendorf*, ed. N.A.M. Rodger et al. (The Boydell Press, 2016), 190–200.

⁴⁷ Julian S. Corbett, *Some Principles of Maritime Strategy* (Classics of Sea Power: edited with introduction and notes by Eric J. Grove) (Naval Institute Press, 1988). Lambert synthesizes the development of *Some Principles* in his chapter in the Hattendorf *festschrift* volume cited in the previous note (Rodger et al., *Strategy and the Sea*). The historical study by Corbett of most interest to Canadians is *The Seven Years War: A Study in British Combined Strategy* (Longmans Green, 1907) [this author recommends the Folio edition, 2001, edited and with an introduction by Jeremy Black].

⁴⁸ Lambert, "Sir Julian Corbett," 196, 199.

⁴⁹ If much has been written on Mahan, much more exists on Jomini and Clausewitz. Readers seeking a background introduction are referred to their subject chapters in Freedman's *Strategy: A History*; any of the *Makers of Modern Strategy* series; and Oliviero, *Strategia*, 64–67 and *passim*. Those wishing for a deeper philosophical study might engage Sumida's *Decoding Clausewitz: A New Approach to On War* (University Press of Kansas, 2008), which adopts the same structure as his earlier analysis of Mahan cited above, noting the specific reference to Corbett, 17–25. A very useful comparison of the two theorists is Canadian scholar Barry M. Gough, "Maritime Strategy: The Legacies of Mahan and Corbett as Philosophers of Sea Power," *The RUSI Journal* 133, no. 4 (Winter 1988): 55–62.

⁵⁰ Freedman, *Strategy: A History*, "Chapter 9: Annihilation or Exhaustion," 108–122.

⁵¹ This author admits no familiarity with what appears to be the only full-length biographical treatment of Mackinder – Brian Blouet, *Halford Mackinder: A Biography* (Texas A&M University Press, 1987) – relying instead on the sketch in Freedman, *Strategy: A History*, 120–122, and further discussion by Colin S. Gray, "In Defence of the Heartland: Sir Halford Mackinder and His Critics a Hundred Years On," *Comparative Strategy* 23, no. 1 (2004): 9–25, and Torbjorn L. Knutsen, "Halford J. Mackinder, Geopolitics, and the Heartland Thesis," *The International History Review* 36, no. 5, Special Issue: Traditions in British International Thought (October 2014): 835–857. An important article contrasting continental against maritime strategic approaches as they pertain to the present era (albeit without reference to any of Mackinder, Mahan, or Corbett, or, for that matter, Donald Trump) is S.C.M. Paine, "By Land or by Sea: Continental Power, Maritime Power, and the Fight for a New World Order," *Foreign Affairs* (September/October 2025).

⁵² H.J. Mackinder, "The Geographical Pivot of History," *The Geographical Journal* 23, no. 4 (April 1904): 421–437; *Democratic Ideals and Reality: A Study in the Politics of Reconstruction* (Penguin Books, 1919); and "The Round World and the Winning of the Peace," *Foreign Affairs* 21, no. 4 (July 1943): 595–605.

⁵³ Gray, "In Defence of the Heartland"; Knutsen, "Halford J. Mackinder," *op. cit.*

⁵⁴ Nicholas Tracy, *Attack on Maritime Trade* (University of Toronto Press, 1991); Douglas C. Peifer, "Maritime Commerce Warfare: The Coercive Response of the Weak?," *Naval War College Review* 66, no. 2 (Spring 2013): Article 8, 83–109, <https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1372&context=nwc-review>.

⁵⁵ Nicholas Tracy, *A Two-Edged Sword: The Navy as an Instrument of Canadian Foreign Policy* (McGill-Queen's University Press, 2012). He condensed his line of argument in "Canada's Naval Strategy – Purposeful Force, Collective Action and National Responsibility," *The Northern Mariner* 23, nos. 3 & 4 (Summer and Autumn 2014): 311–323, <https://tnm.journals.yorku.ca/index.php/default/article/view/273>.

⁵⁶ This is a subject covered by German-Canadian historian Holger W. Herwig, "Luxury" Fleet: *The Imperial German Navy, 1888–1918* (George Allen & Unwin, 1980), 36–37 and *passim*.

⁵⁷ Matthew S. Seligmann, "Britain and Economic Warfare in German Naval Thinking in the Era of the Great War," in Morgan-Owen and Halewood, *Economic Warfare and the Sea*, *op. cit.*, 197, 202.

⁵⁸ Wolfgang Wegener, *The Naval Strategy of the World War* (Classics of Sea Power: trans. by Holger H. Herwig; edited with an introduction by Wayne P. Hughes) (Naval Institute Press, 1989).

⁵⁹ Kenneth P. Hansen, "Raeder Versus Wegener: Conflict in German Naval Strategy," *Naval War College Review* 58, no. 4 (Autumn 2005), <https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2228&context=nwc-review>.

⁶⁰ Raoul Castex, *Strategic Theories* (Classics of Sea Power: selections translated and edited with an introduction, by Eugenia C. Kiesling) (US Naval Institute Press, 1994); Michael Shurkin, "Admiral Raoul Castex: The Naval Strategist for Non-Hegemons," *War on the Rocks*, March 13, 2024, accessed January 29, 2026, <https://warontherocks.com/2024/03/admiral-raoul-castex-the-naval-strategist-for-non-hegemons/>. Hansen, "Raeder Versus Wegener" (14ff), argues that Raeder was influenced by Castex (without definitive evidence to the satisfaction of this author, although the premise is reasonable).

⁶¹ Richmond is the subject of the sixth chapter in Schurman, *The Education of a Navy*, "Historian in Uniform," 116-146. A book-length biographical study was undertaken subsequently by Schurman's colleague from the faculty of the Royal Military College of Canada, Barry D. Hunt, *Sailor-Scholar: Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond, 1871-1946* (Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1982). See also Hunt's chapter, "Richmond and the Education of the Royal Navy," in Goldrick and Hattendorf, *Mahan Is Not Enough*, *op. cit.*, 65-81.

⁶² See James Goldrick, "The Irresistible Force and the Immovable Object: *The Naval Review*, the Young Turks, and the Royal Navy, 1911-1931," in Goldrick and Hattendorf, *Mahan Is Not Enough*, *op. cit.*, 83-102. Michael Whitby prepared a review of Canadian contributors for the centenary edition of the *Naval Review*: "A Distance Beyond Geography: The Royal Canadian Navy," in *Dreadnought to Daring: 100 Years of Comment, Controversy and Debate in The Naval Review*, ed. Peter Hore (Seaforth, 2012).

⁶³ Schurman has a bibliographical note listing the principal publications of all his subjects, with Richmond on 195. Those of note to this monograph are *Sea Power in the Modern World* (Reynal & Hitchcock, 1934), and *Statesmen and Sea Power* (Clarendon Press, 1946).

⁶⁴ David C. Evans and Mark R. Peattie, *Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics, and Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1887-1941* (Naval Institute Press, 1997) discuss Akiyama's theories, 70-74, 144-146, and *passim.*, with discussion on sourcing, xxii-xxiii and 550-551, notes 50 thru 57.

⁶⁵ Evans and Peattie, *Kaigun*, 461, 472-479, and *passim.* S.C.M. Paine, "Japan Caught Between Maritime and Continental Imperialism," in Brands, *The New Makers of Modern Strategy*, *op. cit.*, 415-439, is a good survey of the background to and unfolding of Imperial Japanese strategy.

⁶⁶ Bernard Brodie, *Sea Power in the Machine Age: Major Naval Inventions and Their Consequences on International Politics, 1814-1940* (Princeton University Press, 1941), and *A Layman's Guide to Naval Strategy* (Princeton University Press, 1942).

⁶⁷ Hew Strachan, "The Future of Strategic Studies: Lessons from the Last 'Golden Age,'" in *New Directions in Strategic Thinking 2.0: ANU Strategic & Defence Studies Centre's Golden Anniversary Conference Proceedings*, ed. Russell W. Glenn (ANU Press, 2018), 149-166.

⁶⁸ Bernard Brodie, *A Guide to Naval Strategy: Naval War College Edition*, 4th ed. (Princeton University Press, 1958). It was reissued in paperback format by Praeger in 1965.

⁶⁹ Joel J. Sokolsky, "Anglo-American Maritime Strategy in the Era of Flexible Response, 1960-80," in *Maritime Strategy and the Balance of Power: Britain and America in the Twentieth Century*, ed. John B. Hattendorf and Robert S. Jordan (Palgrave Macmillan UK, 1989), 304.

⁷⁰ Samuel P. Huntington, "National Policy and the Transoceanic Navy," *Proceedings* 80/5/615 (May 1954), <https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/1954/may/national-policy-and-transoceanic-navy>.

⁷¹ The standard account of the naval aspects of the alliance through the Cold War period remains Joel Sokolsky, *Seapower in the Nuclear Age: The United States Navy and NATO 1949-80* (Naval Institute Press, 1991). It was the published version of his 1986 dissertation, supervised by Samuel Huntington at Harvard University; Sokolsky returned to Canada for a long teaching career at Queen's University, rounded out as Dean of Arts and eventually Principal of RMC. See also Eric J. Grove, "NATO as a Maritime Alliance in the Cold War," in *The Sea in History - The Modern World*, ed. N.A.M. Rodger and Christian Buchet (Boydell & Brewer, 2017), 574-583.

⁷² An overview of the NATO documents discussed in this paragraph is NATO, "Strategic Concepts," last modified July 18, 2022, <https://www.nato.int/en/about-us/official-texts-and-resources/strategic-concepts>.

⁷³ As summarized in Sokolsky, "Anglo-American Maritime Strategy," 304-329.

⁷⁴ Sergei Gorshkov, *The Sea Power of the State* (Naval Institute Press, 1979) [note that as a "new" publication, it was not issued as part of the Classics of Sea Power series]; Bruce W. Watson, "Comments on Gorshkov's 'Sea Power of the State,'" *Proceedings* 103/4/890 (April 1977); and David Joseph Kenney, "A Primer on S.G. Gorshkov's Sea Power of the State," *Naval War College Review* 29, no. 4 (Spring 1977): 94-104. A good biography with more analysis was produced by Norman Polmar et al., *Admiral Gorshkov: The Man Who Challenged the U.S. Navy* (Naval Institute Press, 2019).

⁷⁵ Grove, "NATO as a Maritime Alliance in the Cold War," 582.

⁷⁶ The earliest to tackle the subject, late in the Cold War when it was very much the basis for NATO operations, were Sokolsky, *Seapower in the Nuclear Age*, *op. cit.*, and Eric Grove, *Maritime Strategy and European Security* (Brassey's, 1990), both *passim*, followed later by Peter M. Swartz, "Preventing the Bear's Last Swim: The NATO Concept of Maritime Operations (CONMAROPS) of the Last Cold War Decade," in *NATO's Maritime Power, 1949-1990*, ed. I. Loucas and G. Marcoyannis (Inmer Publications, 2003), 47-61, and the summary by Grove, "NATO as a Maritime Alliance in the Cold War," *op. cit.* A contemporary first-hand account is D.N. Mainguy, "The Evolution of NATO Maritime Strategy," in *NATO: A Maritime Alliance*,

ed. Robert N. Huebert et al. [Proceedings of a Conference held in Halifax, NS, April 6, 1989] (Dalhousie University, Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, 1989), 49-51. A valuable recent and extended analysis is Udo Sonnenberger, "The Development and Content of NATO's Concept of Maritime Operations: Findings from the German Military Archives," in *HM 32 New Interpretations in Naval History*, ed. Benjamin Armstrong (US Naval War College Digital Commons, 2023), 149-160, https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/usnwc-historical-monographs/30/?utm_source=digital-commons.usnwc.edu%2Fusnwc-historical-monographs%2F30&utm_medium=PDF&utm_campaign=PDFCoverPages.

⁷⁷ Mainguy, "The Evolution of NATO Maritime Strategy," 51.

⁷⁸ Sokolsky, *Seapower in the Nuclear Age*, 120-121.

⁷⁹ Grove, *Maritime Strategy and European Security*, 20.

⁸⁰ See especially John B. Hattendorf and Peter M. Swartz, eds., *U.S. Naval Strategy in the 1980s: Selected Documents* (Naval War College Press, Newport Papers No. 33, 2008); John Lehman, *Oceans Ventured: Winning the Cold War at Sea* (W.W. Norton, 2018); and Steven T. Wills, *Strategy Shelved: The Collapse of Cold War Naval Strategic Planning* (Naval Institute Press, 2021). It forcefully entered the realm of contemporary public discussion with the US Naval Institute dedicating its January 1986 edition to the subject, *The Maritime Strategy, Proceedings* 112/1/995 Supplement (January 1986), <https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/1986/january-supplement>.

⁸¹ Sokolsky, *Seapower in the Nuclear Age*, 121.

⁸² Joel J. Sokolsky, "Trends in United States Strategy and the 1987 White Paper on Defence," *International Journal* 42, no. 4 (Autumn 1987): 689-697.

⁸³ Richard Hill, *Maritime Strategy for Medium Powers* (Naval Institute Press, 1986) [again too contemporary to be included in the Classics of Sea Power series].

⁸⁴ Geoffrey Till, ed., *Seapower: Theory and Practice* (Frank Cass, 1994); Eric Grove, *The Future of Sea Power* (Routledge, 1990); Peter T. Haydon, *Sea Power and Maritime Strategy in the 21st Century: A "Medium" Power Perspective* (Dalhousie University, Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, 2000).

⁸⁵ Richard Hill, *Medium Power Strategy Revisited* (RAN SPC, 2000), accessed August 17, 2026, https://seapower.navy.gov.au/sites/default/files/2023-02/Working_Paper_3.pdf.

⁸⁶ Steven Haines et al., eds., *Maritime Strategy for Medium Powers in the Twenty-First Century* (Boydell & Brewer, [publication pending, November 2026]).

⁸⁷ *From the Sea: Preparing the Naval Service for the 21st Century* (Department of the Navy, 1992); *Forward... From the Sea* (Department of the Navy, 1994); *The Navy Operating Concept* (Department of the Navy, 1997).

⁸⁸ *Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower* (Department of the Navy, 2007).

⁸⁹ James A. Russell et al., *Navy Strategy Development: Strategy in the 21st Century* (Naval Postgraduate School: Project #FY14-N3/N5-0001, June 2015).

⁹⁰ Jeff Vandenengel, "National Policy and the Panoceanic Navy," *Proceedings* 152/3/1,477 (March 2026), accessed August 14, 2026, https://www.usni.org/NationalPolicy_PanoceanicNavy.

⁹¹ *Alliance Maritime Strategy*, NATO, October 29, 2025, accessed August 15, 2026, <https://www.nato.int/en/about-us/official-texts-and-resources/official-texts/2025/10/29/alliance-maritime-strategy>; Emma Salisbury, "Collective Seapower: NATO's New Maritime Strategy," Foreign Policy Research Institute, November 10, 2025, accessed August 15, 2026, <https://www.fpri.org/article/2025/11/collective-seapower-natos-new-maritime-strategy/>.

⁹² Peter Jones and Jennifer Parker, eds., *A Maritime Strategy for Australia: AMS 2035* (University of New South Wales [Canberra] Naval Studies Group, 2025), accessed August 18, 2026, <https://navalinstitute.com.au/australian-maritime-strategy-2035/>.

⁹³ Look in particular for Dan Middlemiss, "Making a Virtue of Necessity? Joel Sokolsky and the Strategic Logic of Canadian Naval Policy," *Canadian Foreign Policy Journal* [publication pending, fall 2026].

⁹⁴ See a comprehensive listing of "Conference Proceedings & Essay Collections" at this author's "Guide to Sources for Research into the RCN," accessed August 21, 2026, https://navalmarinearchive.com/research/navies/rcn_source_guide_04.html.

⁹⁵ In the interests of space (word count), this part is drafted with a presumption that readers will have a working knowledge of Canadian maritime and naval history. Anyone new to the topics (or wishing for a refresher) is recommended to consult a pair of comprehensive single-volume histories written in very "accessible" language: Victor Suthren's engaging *The Island of Canada: How Three Oceans Shaped Our Nation*, and Marc Milner's authoritative *Canada's Navy: The First Century* (full citations given in the Bibliography). A brief but pertinent history from the RCN's own perspective is at *Leadmark 2020*, Chapter 4: "Sternmark to 2020," 52-70, setting the framework for the strategic analysis in that document.

⁹⁶ William Johnston et al., "Prologue: Canada and Sea Power," in *The Seabound Coast: The Official History of the Royal Canadian Navy, 1867-1939, Volume I*, ed. William Johnston et al. (Dundurn, 2010), xv-xlii.

⁹⁷ William E. Utley, "The Phips Expedition of 1690: Or, How NOT to Try to Capture Quebec," New England Historical Society, last modified 2025, accessed January 25, 2026, <https://newenglandhistoricalsociety.com/the-phips-expedition-of-1690/>.

⁹⁸ James H. Marsh, "Pierre Le Moyne d'Iberville et d'Ardillières," *Canadian Encyclopedia*, last modified September 23, 2021, accessed January 25, 2026, <https://thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/pierre-le-moyne-diberville-et-dardillieres>. See also Bernard Pothier, "Pierre Le Moyne d'Iberville et d'Ardillières," *Dictionary of Canadian Biography, Volume II (1701-1740)*, accessed January 25, 2026, https://www.biographi.ca/en/bio/le_moyne_d_iberville_et_d_ardillieres_pierre_2E.html.

⁹⁹ For a fuller account, see Suthren, *The Island of Canada*, 85-91.

¹⁰⁰ Bruce Buchan, "Pandours, Partisans, and Petite Guerre: The Two Dimensions of Enlightenment Discourse on War," *Intellectual History Review* 23, no. 3 (2013), <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/17496977.2012.723338>. Since this is the only at-sea instance of this form of warfare in this narrative; *la petite guerre* has not been included in "The Naval Canon" of Part 2 above. One notes, however, the affiliation with *guerre de course* and the consequent premonitions of *la Jeune École*, which are described therein.

¹⁰¹ Suthren, *The Island of Canada*, has a full chapter on the subject, which is recommended reading: "10: Booty and Adventure: The Canadian Privateers" (163-177). Another good summary is Marc Milner and Glenn Leonard, *New Brunswick and the Navy: Four Hundred Years* (Goose Lane, 2010).

¹⁰² Faye Margaret Kert, *Prize and Prejudice: Privateering and Naval Prize in Atlantic Canada in the War of 1812* (International Maritime Economic History Association, Research in Maritime History No. 11, 1997), 3.

¹⁰³ Johnston et al., *The Seabound Coast*, xvii, xix.

¹⁰⁴ Corbett's *The Seven Years War* remains one of the best accounts of the naval dimensions of the conflict.

¹⁰⁵ Andrew Lambert, *The Challenge: Britain Against America in the Naval War of 1812* (Faber & Faber, 2012).

¹⁰⁶ As described in Roger Sarty, "The Army Origin of the Royal Canadian Navy': Canada's Maritime Defences, 1855-1918," *The Northern Mariner* 30, no. 4 (Winter 2020): 341-378, <https://tnm.journals.yorku.ca/index.php/default/article/view/41>.

¹⁰⁷ Morley K. Thomas, "Andrew Robertson Gordon," *Dictionary of Canadian Biography, Volume XII (1891-1900)*, accessed January 28, 2026, https://www.biographi.ca/en/bio/gordon_andrew_robertson_12E.html. Note - this entry is very good on his Meteorological Service endeavours and the Hudson Bay expedition, but it mentions his command of the FPS only in passing and notes nothing at all of the naval strategic recommendations made in the text here.

¹⁰⁸ Johnston et al., *The Seabound Coast*, 8-10.

¹⁰⁹ Robert Craig Brown, "National Policy," *Canadian Encyclopedia*, last modified March 4, 2015, accessed January 28, 2026, <https://thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/national-policy>; "National Policy," Wikipedia, accessed January 28, 2026, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Policy.

¹¹⁰ Andrew Gordon to C.H. Tupper, November 6, 1888, Library and Archives Canada (LAC), Record Group (RG) 25, A-1, vol. 105 [reproduced as Appendix A]. The official history, Johnston et al., *The Seabound Coast*, has a detailed discussion, 31-37. Readers interested in researching this topic further should be aware of the concurrent contemporary efforts being undertaken within the Department of Militia and Defence by Gordon's fellow ex-Royal Naval Reserve (RNR) colleague Colin Campbell, all of it informed by the inquiries of the Carnarvon Commission (1879-1882), that factored in the establishment of the Fisheries Protection Service; see Johnston et al., *The Seabound Coast*, 21-24.

¹¹¹ Charles D. Maginley and Bernard Collin, *The Ships of Canada's Marine Services* (Vanwell, 2001), 86.

¹¹² Notably, all three vessels were commanded by RNR officers and flew commissioning pennants to confirm their status, and Militia plans were made to arm them with 12-pounder guns.

¹¹³ See Gimblett and Gagnon, *Guardians of the North*, Chapter 1: "The Proto-Navy: CGS/HMCS Canada," 6-10.

¹¹⁴ Foster had been Minister of Marine and Fisheries when Gordon first joined the department in the early 1880s and held senior ministries thereafter. He most certainly was aware of Gordon's scheme.

¹¹⁵ Kingsmill to Brodeur, "Memorandum on Coast Defence," February 1, 1909, LAC, MG 27 II, C4 [L.P. Brodeur Papers], vol. 2, file 17 [reproduced as Appendix B]. Notably dropped by Kingsmill was reference to Gordon's original assessment of the need for the up-armed FPS vessels to be moved to the Lakes, the threat of conflict there now being substantially diminished due to much better relations with the Americans. See

Roger Sarty, "Canada and the Great Rapprochement, 1902-1914," in *The North Atlantic Triangle in a Changing World*, ed. B.J.C. McKercher and Lawrence Aronsen (University of Toronto Press, 1996), 12-47.

¹¹⁶ House of Commons *Debates*, March 29, 1909 (col. 3565). The events of 1909 are covered in Gimblett, "Reassessing the Dreadnought Crisis of 1909 and the Origins of the Royal Canadian Navy," *The Northern Mariner / Le Marin du nord* 4, no. 1 (January 1994): 35-53, and developed further (and more exhaustively) in the official history, Johnston et al., *The Seabound Coast*, 131-135 and *passim*.

¹¹⁷ Kingsmill to Brodeur, "Defence of Coasts -Generally," April 19, 1909, LAC, RG 24, D1, NS 1017-1-1 [reproduced as Appendix C].

¹¹⁸ *Admiralty Memorandum* (July 20, 1909) and *Canada: Summary of Result of Meetings* (August 1909), LAC, MG 27 II C4, vol. 2, file 20, reel H-1917 (Brodeur Papers) [reproduced as Appendix D]. For a discussion of the change in strategic direction, see Nicholas Lambert, "Economy or Empire? The Fleet Unit Concept and the Quest for Collective Security in the Pacific, 1909-1914," in *Far Flung Lines: Studies in Imperial Defence in Honour of Donald Mackenzie Schurman*, ed. Greg Kennedy and Keith Neilson (Frank Cass, 1996), 44-83. While not directly pertinent to this monograph, it is interesting to note that Kingsmill had studied recently under Julian Corbett at Greenwich in 1904, Andrew Lambert noting that "... it was no accident that Naval War Course graduates were sent to oversee the creation of the Royal Canadian and Royal Australian navies," in "Sir Julian Corbett," 193. Professor and student had met again in July 1908 on the occasion of the Quebec Tercentenary, aboard the just-commissioned battlecruiser HMS *Indomitable*, meaning he was familiar with the technical aspects of the new vessel; see Johnston et al., *The Seabound Coast*, 125-127.

¹¹⁹ Mark Tunnicliffe, "The Fleet We Never Had," *Canadian Naval Review* 2, no. 1 (Spring 2006): 20, https://www.navalreview.ca/wp-content/uploads/CNR_pdf_full/cnr_vol2_1.pdf.

¹²⁰ See Gimblett and Gagnon, *Guardians of the North*, Chapter 2: "The Beginning: Rainbow and Niobe," 12-17.

¹²¹ Borden to Lord Milner, April 18, 1919, as quoted in James Eayrs, *In Defence of Canada, Volume I: From the Great War to the Great Depression* (University of Toronto Press, 1980), 151.

¹²² "Occasional Paper No. 2: Proposals for Canadian Naval Expansion," July 3, 1919, LAC, RG 24, vol. 5696, NSS 1017-31-2 [reproduced as Appendix E].

¹²³ *Report of Admiral of the Fleet Viscount Jellicoe of Scapa on Naval Mission to the Dominion of Canada (November - December 1919)* (3 vols) (His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1919) [excerpt vol. 1, i-18], *passim* [reproduced as Appendix F]. The best general analysis of the Jellicoe Mission is Ian S. Yeates, "Admiral Jellicoe Goes to Sea: The Naval Mission and the Ambition for an 'Imperial Royal Navy,'" *The Northern Mariner / Le Marin Du Nord* 33, no. 1 (2023): 43-80, <https://doi.org/10.25071/2561-5467.1082>.

¹²⁴ See Barbara Winters, "The Reserve Preserve: How the RCNVR Saved the Navy," in *Citizen Sailors: Chronicles of Canada's Naval Reserve, 1910-2010*, ed. Richard H. Gimblett and Michael L. Hadley (Dundurn, 2010), 35-52.

¹²⁵ "Objectives of the Canadian Naval Service," January 17, 1939, LAC, RG 24, vol. 3844, NSS 1017-10-34 [reproduced as Appendix G].

¹²⁶ Michael Whitby, "Instruments of Security: The Royal Canadian Navy's Procurement of the Tribal-Class Destroyers, 1938-1943," *The Northern Mariner / Le Marin du nord* 2, no. 3 (July 1992): 3. See also Gimblett and Gagnon, *Guardians of the North*, Chapter 10: "The Mighty Tribals," 55-59.

¹²⁷ House of Commons *Debates*, May 16, 1939, 4129.

¹²⁸ "Canada's Post-War Navy," November 11, 1940, LAC, RG 24, vol. 3844, NHS 1650-1, vol. 2 [reproduced as Appendix H].

¹²⁹ R.H. Caldwell, "The Golden Age of the [NSHQ] Naval Plans Division, April - December 1943," February 3, 1997, unpublished Directorate of History and Heritage (DHH) Naval History Narrative, DHH 2000/5, Douglas-Sarty-Whitby Collection, box 10, file 168.

¹³⁰ R.H. Caldwell, "The Government's Planning Dilemma and the Canadian Naval Service in 1943-44," March 18, 1997, unpublished DHH Naval History Narrative, *passim*, especially Part I, pp. 18-21, 36-37, 45 n. 84, and Part II, pp. 2-3. On the workings of the Committee generally, see also Don Munton and Don Page, "Planning in the East Block: The Post-Hostilities Problems Committees in Canada 1943-5," *International Journal* 32, no. 4 (Autumn 1977), <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/002070207703200401>.

¹³¹ Director of Plans [Todd] to ACNS, "Appreciation of R.C.N. Requirements for the War Against Japan and for the Post-War Navy," July 29, 1943, LAC, RG 24, vol. 3844, NSS 1017-10-34 [reproduced as Appendix I]. For an incisive look at the RCN's "blue-water navy" aspirations at this moment, see Roger Sarty, "The Ghosts of Fisher and Jellicoe: The Royal Canadian Navy and the Quebec Conferences," in *The Second Quebec Conference Revisited. Waging War, Formulating Peace: Canada, Great Britain and the United States in 1944-*

1945, ed. David B. Woolner (St. Martin's Press, 1998). See also Gimblett and Gagnon, *Guardians of the North*, Chapter 22: "The Last Cruisers," 122-127.

¹³² Alec Douglas, "Conflict and Innovation in the Royal Canadian Navy, 1939-1945," in *Naval Warfare in the Twentieth Century*, ed. Gerald Jordan (Croom Helm, 1977), 210.

¹³³ Jan Drent, "A Good Workable Little Fleet," in *A Nation's Navy: In Quest of Canadian Naval Identity*, ed. Michael Hadley et al. (McGill-Queen's University Press, 1996), 205-220.

¹³⁴ Michael A. Hennessy, "The Rise and Fall of Canadian Maritime Policy, 1939-1965: A Study of Industry, Navalism and the State" (unpublished PhD dissertation, University of New Brunswick, 1995), 419.

¹³⁵ Director of Naval Plans and Intelligence (Capt H.N. Lay) to Deputy [sic Vice] Chief of the Naval Staff (A/Cmdr H.L. Houghton), "Planning of [the] Post-War Navy," March 14, 1947, LAC, RG 24, acc. 83-84/167, box 455, NSS 1650-26, vol. 3 [reproduced as Appendix J]. The use of the phrase "Post-War" in the title even at this date points to the existence of continuity in Canadian naval strategic processes, in that Houghton was the drafter of the November 1940 assessment, and Lay had been in charge of the Plans division in early 1943.

¹³⁶ See Gimblett and Gagnon, *Guardians of the North*, Chapter 25: "The Cadillacs: St. Laurent-Class Destroyers and Successors," 142-150.

¹³⁷ Louis St-Laurent [Secretary of State for External Affairs], "Speech... Inaugurating the Gray Foundation Lectureship at Toronto University," January 13, 1947, <https://n2t.net/ark:/69429/m0x639z93n5k>.

¹³⁸ This designation of the Navy's carrier task force was primarily due to its being in place and mostly operationally ready (neither the Army nor the RCAF had sufficient operational units). Additionally, Pearson seems to have retained a good impression of the Navy's wartime capabilities but was quite unaware of how badly the fleet had declined with demobilization, because even earlier that year, in late February 1949, he had taken the lead in the dispatch of the destroyer HMCS *Crescent* to China to participate in what today would be described as a coalition endeavour, to support the Commonwealth diplomatic community in civil war-torn China (the episode did not turn out well). See Richard H. Gimblett, "Canadian Gunboat: HMCS *Crescent* and the Chinese Civil War, 1949," in *Canadian Gunboat Diplomacy: The Canadian Navy and Foreign Policy*, ed. Ann Griffiths et al. (Dalhousie University, Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, 2000), 77-94.

¹³⁹ CNS to MND, "Accelerated Defence Programme: Recommendations for the Increase in Strength of the R.C.N.," August 17, 1950, LAC, RG 24, acc. 83-84/167, box 455, NSS 1650-26, vol. 3 [reproduced as Appendix K].

¹⁴⁰ The RCN would achieve its greatest peacetime strength in time for its golden anniversary in 1960: a total of 62 ships, comprising an aircraft carrier, destroyers and destroyer-escorts, frigates, minesweepers, and miscellaneous craft. The RCN graphically illustrated the scale of the fleet in 1960 with a hand-drawn poster created to mark the occasion, showing every vessel then in service, reproduced in Gimblett and Gagnon, *Guardians of the North*, xii.

¹⁴¹ Douglas L. Bland, *Chiefs of Defence: Government and the Unified Command of the Canadian Armed Forces* (Canadian Institute for Strategic Studies, 1995), 214-224.

¹⁴² This is not to suggest that it was entirely top-down direction from NATO. Canadian historian Isabel Campbell has demonstrated that, within these parameters, the RCN was able to influence NATO strategy to take national interests into consideration. See her "Canadian Insights into NATO Maritime Strategy, 1949-70: The Role of National and Service Interests," *The Northern Mariner / Le marin du nord* 25, no. 3 (July 2015): 239-264, <https://tnm.journals.yorku.ca/index.php/default/article/view/236/221>.

¹⁴³ Fred W. Crickard, "Strategy, the Fleet-in-Being, and the Strategic Culture of the Officer Corps," in Hadley et al., *A Nation's Navy*, *op. cit.*, 57, 59.

¹⁴⁴ Dan W. Middlemiss, "Economic Considerations in the Development of the Canadian Navy Since 1945," in Douglas, *RCN in Transition, 1910-1985*, *op. cit.*, 278.

¹⁴⁵ Campbell, "Canadian Insights into NATO Maritime Strategy," *op. cit.*; Haydon, "The Evolution of the Canadian Naval Task Group," in Griffiths et al., *Canadian Gunboat Diplomacy*, *op. cit.*, 95-112.

¹⁴⁶ NATO, "Strategic Concepts."

¹⁴⁷ "The Requirements for a Re-Appraisal of Current War Plans," November 28, 1955, NSTS 11650-26, DHH Raymont Collection 73/1223, file 147, referenced in Haydon, "The Evolution of the Canadian Naval Task Group," 109.

¹⁴⁸ For details of the various classes listed, see the pertinent chapters in Gimblett and Gagnon, *Guardians of the North*, *passim*.

¹⁴⁹ The often-bitter decade-long postwar struggle between the naval and air staffs over the control of fixed-wing maritime aviation has not received adequate attention by historians; an overview is provided by John

Orr, "Canadian Naval Aviation: A Cautionary Tale," *Canadian Naval Review* 21, no. 1 (2025): 2-4, <https://www.navalreview.ca/past-issues-2020-to-2023/>.

¹⁵⁰ Isabel Campbell, "A Transformation in Thinking: The RCN's Naval Warfare Study Group of 1956," in *People, Policy and Programmes: Proceedings of the 7th Maritime Command (MARCOM) Historical Conference (2005)*, ed. Richard H. Gimblett and Richard O. Mayne (Canadian Naval Heritage Team, 2008), 171. The Sound Underwater Surveillance System (SOSUS) was only then coming into existence as a network of passive hydrophones linked via undersea cable to a shore facility where the received signals could be analyzed and submarine probability areas passed to ASW forces. See Gimblett, "Canada and SOSUS," *Canadian Encyclopedia*, last modified December 9, 2021,

<https://thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/canada-and-sosus>. Campbell notes as well (172) the important concurrent step "to ease the quick transition from peace to war" of the RCN obtaining Chiefs of Staff Committee approval for the new appointments of Maritime Commanders Atlantic and Pacific, giving the coastal naval commanders operational control over the shore-based maritime air assets of the RCAF.

¹⁵¹ Campbell, "A Transformation in Thinking," provides a fuller listing and biographical details at 173.

¹⁵² "Naval Warfare Study Group: Final Report," DHH 2010/1, RCN Committees, Meetings & Conferences: The Naval Warfare Study Group (1956), declassified photocopies of LAC, RG 24, 97-98/260, vol. 28, file 1279-155, vol. 2. Noting the file does not contain a complete copy of the Final Report, the documents included as the appendix to this monograph comprise the initial terms of reference approved by the Naval Board on January 5, 1956; the preamble to the Draft Final Report presented to the Naval Board on June 15, 1956, which includes a summary of its conclusions; and the list of revisions subsequently required by the Naval Board [no date] [extracts reproduced as Appendix L].

¹⁵³ Campbell, "A Transformation in Thinking," 179-180.

¹⁵⁴ Campbell, "Canadian Insights into NATO Maritime Strategy," 255-257.

¹⁵⁵ Sharon Hobson, *The Composition of Canada's Naval Fleet, 1946-85* (Dalhousie University, Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, 1986), 32.

¹⁵⁶ "Ad Hoc Working Group on Naval Objectives" ("The Brock Report" [1961]), DHH 2002-13, box 4, folder 3, file 2 [reproduced as Appendix M].

¹⁵⁷ Douglas Bland, "Continuity in Canadian Naval Policy 1961-1987," *Canadian Defence Quarterly* 19, no. 2 (April 1989): 29-32, https://navalmarinearchive.com/research/navies/pdf/bland_april_1989.pdf. Valuable contextual discussion is provided as well in Richard Oliver Mayne, "The Annapolis Riddle: Advocacy, Ship Design and the Canadian Navy's Force Structure Crisis, 1957-1965" (unpublished PhD dissertation, Queen's University, 2008), 84-90 and *passim*.

¹⁵⁸ Tony German, *The Sea Is at Our Gates: The History of the Canadian Navy* (McClelland & Stewart, 1990), 276.

¹⁵⁹ Quoted in Mayne, "The Annapolis Riddle," 89.

¹⁶⁰ Bland, "Continuity in Canadian Naval Policy," 31.

¹⁶¹ Peter Haydon, "Vice-Admiral Herbert S. Rayner: The Last Chief of the Canadian Naval Staff," in *The Admirals: Canada's Senior Naval Leadership in the Twentieth Century*, ed. Michael Whitby et al. (Dundurn, 2006), 259-260.

¹⁶² Bland, "Continuity in Canadian Naval Policy," 31.

¹⁶³ Naval Constructor Rear-Admiral S. Mathwin Davis, as quoted in Richard Mayne, "Its Own Worst Enemy: Ship Advocacy in the RCN, 1963-1964," *Canadian Naval Review* 2, no. 3 (Fall 2006): 28, <https://www.cntha.ca/static/documents/papers/vol2num3art5.pdf>.

¹⁶⁴ "Maritime Policy Review," May 16, 1972, 1150-110/M21 (ATIP release, courtesy Peter Haydon fonds) [reproduced as Appendix N].

¹⁶⁵ A good measure of the times and circumstances was made by Colin S. Gray, in his first major published foray into strategic analysis, for the notable Canadian foreign policy think-tank, the Canadian Institute of International Affairs: *Canadian Defence Priorities: A Question of relevance* (Clarke, Irwin, 1972).

¹⁶⁶ Middlemiss, "Economic Considerations in the Development of the Canadian Navy," 267-268.

¹⁶⁷ See the discussion of the Aurora acquisition project in Gimblett and Gagnon, *Guardians of the North*, Chapter 57.

¹⁶⁸ "Maritime Policy Review," May 16, 1972, 83.

¹⁶⁹ Memorandum to Cabinet, "Maritime Surface Ship Requirements," November 3, 1977, 545-77MC (ATIP release 98-A-00017, courtesy Peter Haydon Collection), beginning p. 21 [reproduced as Appendix O].

¹⁷⁰ Haydon, "The Evolution of the Canadian Naval Task Group," 95-129.

¹⁷¹ Haydon, "The Evolution of the Canadian Naval Task Group," 120.

¹⁷² Fred W. Crickard and Richard H. Gimblett, "The Navy as an Instrument of Middle Power Foreign Policy: Canada in Korea 1950 and the Persian Gulf 1990," in *Maritime Forces in Global Security: Comparative Views of Maritime Strategy as We Approach the 21st Century*, ed. Ann L. Griffiths and Peter T. Haydon (Dalhousie University, Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, 1995), 327-342.

¹⁷³ In addition to the overview discussion of CONMAROPS in Part 2, its Canadian aspects are reviewed in Milner, *Canada's Navy*, 288-289 and *passim*.

¹⁷⁴ *The Maritime Strategy* (Department of the Navy, 1984), reproduced in Hattendorf and Swartz, *U.S. Naval Strategy in the 1980s*, "Document Two," 45-104.

¹⁷⁵ A pair of contemporary discussions of the impact of the USN Maritime Strategy on Canadian thinking regarding the White Paper are Sokolsky, "Trends in United States Strategy," *op. cit.*, and Joseph T. Jockel, "The US Navy, Maritime Command, and the Arctic," *Canadian Defence Quarterly* 19, no. 3 (December 1989): 23-33.

¹⁷⁶ *Challenge and Commitment: A Defence Policy for Canada* (1987), 49-55. See also Gimblett and Gagnon, *Guardians of the North*, chapters on the *Halifax*, *Kingston*, and *Victoria* classes.

¹⁷⁷ "Fleet Mix Alternative Study 1989" [no date, no file number] (ATIP release, courtesy Peter Haydon fonds) [reproduced as Appendix P].

¹⁷⁸ Dan Middlemiss, "The DND-CCG Merger: Back to the Future?," *Canadian Naval Review* 21, no. 3 (February 2026): 29-30.

¹⁷⁹ "All the Ships that Sail: A Study of Canada's Fleets" [short title, The Osbaldeston Report], October 15, 1990, Treasury Board of Canada [reproduced as Appendix Q].

¹⁸⁰ Osbaldeston Report, 58.

¹⁸¹ Middlemiss, "The DND-CCG Merger," 29.

¹⁸² See Joel Sokolsky, "After the 'Maritime Strategy': The United States Navy in the Post-Cold War Era," in *Can America Remain Committed?: U.S. Security Horizons in the 1990s*, ed. David G. Haglund (Westview Press, 1992), 163-188.

¹⁸³ *From the Sea; Forward... From the Sea; The Navy Operating Concept*.

¹⁸⁴ Laura Higgins, "Examining the 'Adjusted Course' of the Canadian Navy in the 'New World Order'" (unpublished Master's thesis, Dalhousie University, 2000).

¹⁸⁵ In sequence: *The Maritime Command Vision: Charting the Course to Navy 2008* (1993) [reproduced as Appendix R]; *The Naval Vision: Charting the Course for Canada's Maritime Forces into the 21st Century* (1994) [reproduced as Appendix S]; and *Adjusting Course: A Naval Strategy for Canada* (1997) [reproduced as Appendix T]; all listed at https://navalmarinearchive.com/research/navies/rcn_source_guide_06.html.

¹⁸⁶ *Leadmark 2020* [reproduced as Appendix U].

¹⁸⁷ Aaron P. Jackson, *Keystone Doctrine Development in Five Commonwealth Navies: A Comparative Perspective* (Sea Power Centre - Australia: Papers in Australian Maritime Affairs No. 33, 2010), Chapter 2: "Canada," *passim*, <https://seapower.navy.gov.au/publications-and-research/keystone-doctrine-development-five-commonwealth-navies-comparative-perspective>.

¹⁸⁸ Great Britain, Directorate of Naval Staff Duties, *The Fundamentals of British Maritime Doctrine (BR 1806, 2nd edition)* (Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1999).

¹⁸⁹ Australia, Chief of Navy, *Australian Maritime Doctrine: RAN Doctrine 1 (1st edition)* (RAN Sea Power Centre, 2000).

¹⁹⁰ Ken Booth, *Navies and Foreign Policy* (Croom Helm, 1977), 15-16ff.

¹⁹¹ Hill, *Maritime Strategy for Medium Powers*, 218-227; Haydon, *Sea Power and Maritime Strategy in the 21st Century*, 119-128.

¹⁹² The only three terms that the Assistant Deputy Minister (Policy) shop review had the Navy remove were "amphibiosity," "ballistic missile defence," and "build in Canada," all of which have since proven to be prescient and have had a subsequent re-look.

¹⁹³ *Securing Canada's Ocean Frontiers* [reproduced as Appendix V].

¹⁹⁴ A contemporary exploration of this theme with much resonance to the conclusion of this study is Joel J. Sokolsky, "Realism Canadian Style: National Security Policy and the Chrétien Legacy," *Policy Matters* 5, no. 2 (2004), <https://irpp.org/research-studies/policy-matters-vol5-no2/>.

¹⁹⁵ Daniel Gosselin, "Hellyer's Ghosts: Unification of the Canadian Forces Is 40 Years Old - Part One," *Canadian Military Journal* 9, no. 2 (2009): 6-15, <https://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/vo9/no2/03-gosselin-eng.asp#n3>.

¹⁹⁶ *Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower*.

¹⁹⁷ Geoffrey Till, "The Accidental Dialectic: The Real World and the Making of Maritime Strategy Since 1945," in *Conceptualizing Maritime & Naval Strategy: Festschrift for Captain Peter M. Swartz, United States Navy (ret.)*, ed. Sebastian Bruns and Sarandis Papadopoulos (Nomos, The Kiel Seapower Series, 2020), 19.

¹⁹⁸ Rob Huebert, "The Quest for a Canadian Naval Strategy, 1991-2014: Why It Matters," *The Northern Mariner* 24, nos. 3 & 4 (July and October 2014): 324-335. Four other papers of note to this monograph, delivered at the same conference (proceedings not published until 2014), were James Goldrick, "From Fleets to Navies: The Evolution of Dominion Fleets into Independent Navies of the Commonwealth," 6-31; Dean McFadden, "The Navy and Canada's National Interests in this Maritime Century," 349-356; Geoffrey Till, "A Commonwealth Naval Strategy in the 21st Century?," 336-348; and Nicholas Tracy, "Canada's Naval Strategy – Purposeful Force, Collective Action, and National Responsibility," 311-323; all accessed August 17, 2026, at: <https://tnm.journals.yorku.ca/index.php/default/issue/view/35>.

¹⁹⁹ *Horizon 2050* [reproduced as Appendix W]; *Leadmark 2050*, available at <https://www.navalassoc.ca/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/Leadmark-2050-13-May-2016.pdf> [reproduced as Appendix X].

²⁰⁰ "The Call of the North – Address by the Prime Minister Stephen Harper" (Yellowknife, NWT, August 17, 2006), accessed July 15, 2026, <https://www.canada.ca/en/news/archive/2006/08/call-north-address-prime-minister-stephen-harper.html>; not formally published until three years later: Government of Canada, *Canada's Northern Strategy: Our North, Our Heritage, Our Future* (2009), <https://web.archive.org/web/20150320084935/http://www.northernstrategy.gc.ca/cns/cns-eng.asp>.

²⁰¹ Government of Canada, *Canada First Defence Strategy* (May 12, 2008), <https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/corporate/policies-standards/canada-first-defence-strategy-complete-document.html>.

²⁰² "Government of Canada Announces National Shipbuilding Procurement Strategy," June 3, 2010, accessed July 15, 2026, <https://www.canada.ca/en/news/archive/2010/06/government-canada-announces-national-shipbuilding-procurement-strategy.html>.

²⁰³ "Government of Canada Announces Way Forward for National Shipbuilding Strategy," May 26, 2016, accessed 15 July 2026, <https://www.canada.ca/en/public-services-procurement/news/2016/05/government-of-canada-announces-way-forward-for-national-shipbuilding-strategy.html>.

²⁰⁴ Government of Canada, *Canada's Indo-Pacific Strategy* (2022), <https://international.canada.ca/en/global-affairs/corporate/reports/indo-pacific-implementation-2022-2023>.

²⁰⁵ Government of Canada, *Strong, Secure, Engaged: Canada's Defence Policy* (June 7, 2017), <https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/corporate/reports-publications/canada-defence-policy.html>.

²⁰⁶ Government of Canada, *Our North, Strong and Free: A Renewed Vision for Canada's Defence* (April 8, 2024), <https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/corporate/reports-publications/north-strong-free-2024.html>.

²⁰⁷ Government of Canada, *Canada's Defence Industrial Strategy* (2026), <https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/corporate/reports-publications/industrial-strategy/security-sovereignty-prosperity.html>.

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Appendices: List of Capstone Documents

Documents found in the separate, accompanying appendix section:

	Date	Event / Document	Reference
A	06 Nov 1888	Gordon to Tupper (letter)	Gordon to C.H. Tupper, November 6, 1888, LAC, RG 25, A-1, vol. 105
B	01 Feb 1909	"Memorandum on Coast Defence" (Kingsmill)	Kingsmill to Brodeur, LAC, MG 27 II C4, vol. 2, file 17
C	19 Apr 1909	"Defence of Coasts - Generally" (Kingsmill)	Kingsmill to Brodeur, April 19, 1909, LAC, RG 24, D1, NS 1017-1-1
D	1909 (Aug)	"Admiralty Memorandum on Naval Defence"	Brodeur Papers <i>Confidential Papers Laid Before the Imperial Conference 1909</i>
E	1919 (July)	"Occasional Paper No 2: Proposals for Canadian Naval Expansion"	LAC, RG 24, vol. 5696, NS 1017-31-2/4
F	1919 (Nov)	Jellicoe Report (Published) [excerpt vol. 1, i-18]	DHH Library
G	17 Jan 1939	"Objective of the Naval Service" (Nelles)	LAC, RG 24, vol. 3844, NSS 1017-10-34
H	Nov 1940	"Canada's Post-War Navy" (Houghton)	LAC, RG 24, vol. 3844, NSS 1017-10-34
I	29 Jul 1943	"Appreciation of RCN Ship Requirements for the War Against Japan and for the Post-War Navy" (Todd)	LAC, RG 24, vol. 3844, NSS 1017-10-34
J	14 Mar 47	"Planning of Post-War Navy" (Lay)	LAC, RG 24, acc. 83-84/167, box 455, file 1650-26, pt. 3
K	17 Aug 50	"Accelerated Defence Programme: Recommendations for the Increase in Strength of the R.C.N."	CNS to MND [later Memo to Cabinet Defence Cmttee] LAC, RG 24, acc. 83-84/167, box 455, file 1650-26, pt. 3
L	15 June 1956	Naval Warfare Study Group: Final Report [extracts]	DHH 2010/1 [photocopies of: LAC, RG 24, 97-98/260, vol. 28, file 1279-155, vol. 2]
M	1961	"Ad Hoc Working Group on Naval Objectives" (Brock Report)	DHH 2002-13, box 4, folder 3, file 2
N	16 Nov 1972	"Maritime Policy Review"	CDS Sharp & DM Cloutier ATIP Release / Haydon Collection
O	22 Dec 1977	"Maritime Surface Ship Requirements"	545-77RD (Cab Doc) ATIP Release / Haydon Collection
P	1989	"Fleet Mix Alternative Study"	ATIP Release / Haydon Collection
Q	1990	<i>All the Ships that Sail</i> [Osbaldeston Report]	https://navalmarinearchive.com/research/navies/rcn_source_guide_06.html

R	1993	<i>Maritime Command Vision</i> [Cairns]	https://navalmarinearchive.com/research/navies/rcn_source_guide_06.html
S	1994	<i>Naval Vision</i> [Cairns]	https://navalmarinearchive.com/research/navies/rcn_source_guide_06.html
T	1997	<i>Adjusting Course</i> [Garnett]	https://navalmarinearchive.com/research/navies/rcn_source_guide_06.html
U	2001	<i>Leadmark: The Navy's Strategy for 2020</i> [G. Maddison]	https://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2012/dn-nd/DB3-22-2001-eng.pdf
V	2005	<i>Securing Canada's Ocean Frontiers</i> [Buck / MacLean]	https://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2008/nd-dn/D2-164-2005E.pdf
W	2013	<i>Horizon 2050</i> [P. Maddison]	https://navalmarinearchive.com/research/navies/rcn_source_guide_06.html
X	2016	<i>Leadmark 2050</i> [Norman]	https://www.navalassoc.ca/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/Leadmark-2050-13-May-2016.pdf

