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A Canadian Naval Strategy Reader

Richard Gimblett | May 2026

Today, the Royal Canadian Navy is reviewing its strategy in light of rapidly shifting global geopolitics. To support this effort the Canadian Maritime Security Network has published this overview of naval strategy and Canadian strategic thinking. It is designed to inform and support this process, and to offer insight into Canadian naval strategy at the highest level.

This version is still in draft form and will be published in full in the Spring/Summer of 2026. It is being disseminated early given the time-sensitive nature of the RCN's review.

Richard Gimblett
Canadian Maritime Security Network
May 2026

Cover image: Commander Nicole Robichaud, CO HMCS MARGARET BROOKE displays the replenishment at sea approaches during Exercise TRADEWINDS off the coast of Barbados (photo Corporal Connor Bennett, CAF).

Acknowledgements

The preparation of this review has benefited from the assistance of many colleagues over many decades. A quarter century ago Peter Haydon (Commander RCN ret'd, and then a Fellow with the Dalhousie Centre for Foreign Policy Studies / CFPS) helped me compile the original list of documents that should be examined and graciously provided copies of the several that he had obtained through federal Access to Information requests. He has remained a steadfast friend and mentor, and this Reader is dedicated to him.

Also, from CFPS since that time is Dan Middlemiss, who has helped me obtain copies of other of the documents and provided important comments. Roger Sarty, long ago the senior naval historian at the Directorate of History and Heritage, and the present incumbent Isabel Campbell, both the ablest of colleagues, similarly pointed me to important documents and provided invaluable observations. Other contributors include: Nigel Brodeur (Vice Admiral RCN ret'd, another mentor over the years, and recently deceased and unable to see this latest fruits of my labours); Paul Mitchell (Director of Studies at the Canadian Forces College Toronto); Chris Perry (my successor as RCN Command Historian); and Ian Yeates (RMC '79 classmate and fellow member of the Canadian Nautical Research Society).

The final catalyst to undertaking this long-deferred enterprise was the invitation to present vaguely on the subject of "Canadian naval strategy" to the Kingston Consortium on International Security (KCIS 2025), and this monograph is an extensively revised and expanded version of the article that will appear in the proceedings of that conference. Importantly, it was the interest in my presentation shown by the RCN's Director of Naval Strategy, Captain (RCN) Rob Watt and his staff, that encouraged me finally to put fingers on the keyboard to record it all. I humbly hope it will be of some use in their present endeavour to shape Canada's naval strategy for the coming tumultuous decades.

Richard Gimblett

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Introduction

A number of factors have combined recently to suggest the time is opportune to embark upon the development of a refreshed Canadian naval strategy. The *Leadmark* series of documents[1] that constitute the present guidance for the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) trace their evolution back a quarter century to the turn of the millennium, and while large elements of their prescriptions remain relevant, some others have become less so over the past decade. Indeed, as will be discussed later in this paper, the last pair of those documents failed to achieve departmental – let alone governmental – sign-off authorizing their promulgation beyond internal use. High among the factors contributing to their declining relevance was the hollowing out, through the 2010s, of core capability elements of the task group concept that was at the heart of the *Leadmark* series, specifically the paying-off (decommissioning) without assured replacement of the *Iroquois*-class destroyers (with their area air defence and command and control capabilities) and the original *Protecteur*-class replenishment ships (providing sustained afloat logistics), and the concurrent failure to achieve a reliable operational status for either the *Victoria*-class attack submarines or the CH-148 Cyclone maritime helicopters.[2]

The immediate catalyst for a strategic reassessment is the disruption emanating from the United States to the rules-based international order, which is imperilling the structures of allied cooperation upon which the *Leadmark* series was also premised. Another consideration is that, although "interoperability" with the United States Navy (USN) appears to continue effectively at the working level, future "coalitions of the willing" that form in response to a crisis situation are likely to be far more politically transactional and manifest in differing combinations, not necessarily centred around American leadership (this is not a new phenomenon, the experience of Libya in 2011 being an early example).[3] Coinciding with this has been the increased presence of potentially hostile actors in the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans in the form, respectively, of Chinese and Russian forces – and, most worryingly, their increasing naval and commercial activity in the Arctic. The foreboding return to a geopolitical era of great power competition is unlikely to fade in the coming decade and must be factored into Canada's calculations, even if its ramifications are largely out of our control. Where these themes of rupture and offshore challenges intersect is in the simple fact of our geography: "Canada is the northern half of a continental island," and a continued close relationship with the United States for the shared defence of North America will remain a fundamental planning factor.[4]

Against all this, several positive factors have developed that are within the Navy's power to manage, which also recommend the conduct of a strategy update:

- indications by the new Liberal ministry of a pragmatic approach to foreign and defence policy, with an associated willingness to greatly increase defence spending;
- the revival of interest in the notion of Canada as a "middle power" begs reflection on the Navy's self-ascribed status as a "Rank 3 Medium Global Force Projection Navy";[5]
- the amalgamation of the ships and aircraft of the Canadian Coast Guard (CCG) and the Department of Transport (DoT) into the Department of National Defence (DND) for employment in concert with the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) generally and specifically the RCN; and,
- perhaps most importantly, the impressive increased capabilities anticipated to be delivered with the platform acquisition programs presently in progress – guided-

missile destroyers, under-ice-capable submarines, continental defence corvettes, and maritime patrol aircraft – promise the development of a fleet capable, once again, of sustained independent national task group operations (that is, to enable "strategic autonomy," to borrow a phrase from Prime Minister Carney in his Davos speech referenced above).

Rationalizing the purposeful acquisition of these forces, and sanctioning their operational employment subject to government ambitions, will require strategic guidance beyond doctrine.

It is not the intent of this monograph to suggest what a renewed Canadian naval strategy should look like or include. Rather, it aims to provide a framework for discussions surrounding any efforts to explore the issue. This motivation springs from a number of premises informed by the author's own experience.[6] To begin, Canadians generally – but including even military and civilian members of DND/CAF and academics in defence studies faculties – have a poor understanding of naval strategy as it has applied to national circumstances, historically and in the present. Then there is the tendency of all these groups to overlook past endeavours, either from a lack of awareness of the literature or to cater to the perceived need of successive admirals desiring documents promulgated under their own signatures.

The objective of this *Canadian Naval Strategy Reader*, therefore, is the compilation of a monograph that might serve as an educational instrument, establishing a foundation upon which staffs, politicians, academics, and the interested public can develop and assess any fresh strategy document. In this vein, it is not meant to be a definitive examination of the various aspects of the topic, but it instead aims to describe themes and point to sources to guide further research and analysis. The monograph is structured as a covering introductory essay presenting select readings that are then listed in a fuller bibliography, with the bulk of the Reader given over to extracts of documents selected to illustrate the various points and reproduced as appendices. The essay itself is in three parts. It opens (Part 1) with a short discourse on the general nature of strategy. This is followed (Part 2) by a summary of the foundational strategic concepts pertinent to navies and naval warfare. In addition to the obvious personalities of Mahan and Corbett and their inspiration respectively from Jomini and Clausewitz, this includes (but is not limited to) surveys of disparate theories – such as those developed by *la Jeune École*, Mackinder, and Wegener – that also guided many fleets through to the end of the Second World War. It then examines variations adapted to the nuclear age, ranging from Gorshkov in the Soviet Navy to the United States Navy's Maritime Strategy, and culminates with the considerations that have shaped thinking since the end of the Cold War. Notably, this part is not conceived as a complete examination of naval strategies past and present but rather a summary exposition of general principles as they have pertained to the Canadian condition. This stems from a further premise that will be developed through the Reader: that the classical naval strategies of Mahan, Corbett, and others have not been central to Canadian deliberations, other than the extent to which they have governed the actions of the great power of the day from whose protection Canada has benefited (those being, in succession, France, Britain, and the United States). The point, then, is that there has been a limited need for Canadians to be familiar with their tenets – only to the extent required to act as a contributor to the accepted allied strategy. Conversely, knowledge of the strategies pursued by the enemy of the day should inform our understanding of their intentions. In this sense, it is useful to note that both Admirals von Tirpitz and Liu Huaqing (the "fathers,"

respectively, of the Imperial German High Seas Fleet and the modern Chinese People's Liberation Army Navy) were well-versed in Mahan.

The remaining bulk of the introductory essay (Part 3) is given over to a detailed study of naval strategic thinking as it has progressed in Canada over the centuries, and it therefore includes discussions of the context and details of the various documents cited and reproduced in whole or in part (as extracts) in separate appendices. The literature has come to employ the term "capstone documents" to describe these sorts of snapshot strategic records, and that term will be used as such here.[7] A general observation that unfolds from this survey is that only on three occasions of major shifts in global geopolitics has a genuine "Canadian naval strategy" been developed: firstly in April 1909, in the immediate wake of the Dreadnought Crisis, in response to Parliament's direction for the "speedy construction of a Canadian naval service" (Appendix C); next, in consequence of the pan-government post-hostilities planning work undertaken in 1943, to define how the RCN might best contribute to postwar structures (Appendix I); and finally at the turn of the millennium, to account for the "new world order" that followed the end of the Cold War, with *Leadmark 2020* (Appendix U). While the other capstone documents may not share this feature of uniqueness, they provide useful signposts marking the pathway tracing the evolution of Canadian thinking.

Another of the several themes running through the Reader is that a major impediment to the development of a Canadian naval strategy too often has been the absence of an overarching national grand strategy.[8] That has not prevented naval professionals from attempting the feat, but the consequence has been their need, first, to divine the wishes of government and then, in pursuing the aim, their inevitable deferment – as fallible humans – to the biases of their own aspirations. Often enough, this has proven to be somewhat prescient, leading to great innovation in concepts and technology; however, just as regularly, the result was overreach that was counterproductive to long-term naval objectives in alignment with evolving national objectives. A better understanding of the win-and-lose cycles that emerge here could more sufficiently prepare future efforts to avoid similar pitfalls.

A final opening note is that this Reader endeavours to keep the discussion on the level of strategy, as distinguished from the lower levels codified as doctrine and tactics. A simple ordering has it that strategy is the "why and what" statement of a long-term plan, tactics are the "how" specifying standardized actions to execute that plan, with doctrine being the "principles" bridging the two with amplifying operational guidance.[9]

Having set the scene, with the world apparently now in the throes of yet the latest major shift in global geopolitics – and with Prime Minister Carney's Davos speech providing the outline of what could develop into a national grand strategy[10] – let the renewed exploration of a Canadian naval strategy begin and offer an informed baseline framework for discussion.

Part 1: Defining Strategy

It has become commonplace that all cutting-edge organizations should have a strategy to lead their efforts, but far too often the prospective drafters fail to ask (let alone answer) a fundamental question: "What do we mean by 'strategy'?" In 2005, the respected British

historian Hew Strachan made an observation that generally has been overlooked (and rarely addressed) in the intervening two decades:

> … lately the word 'strategy' has been used with such imprecision that its meaning has been significantly weakened if not lost altogether. He argues it "has acquired a universality which has robbed it of its meaning and left it only with banalities."[11]

A decade later, another eminent British scholar, Lawrence Freedman, made much the same reflection as the opening statement to his magisterial *Strategy: A History*, quoted here at length for the several points that are pertinent to the development of a new Canadian naval strategy:[12]

> Everyone needs a strategy. Leaders of armies, major corporations, and political parties have long been expected to have strategies, but now no serious organization could imagine being without one. Despite the problems of finding ways through the uncertainty and confusion of human affairs, a strategic approach is still considered to be preferable to one that is merely tactical, let alone random. Having a strategy suggests an ability to look up from the short term and the trivial to view the long term and the essential, to address causes rather than symptoms, to see woods rather than trees. Without a strategy, facing up to any problem or striving for any objective would be considered negligent. Certainly no military campaign, company investment, or government initiative is likely to [receive] backing unless there is a strategy to evaluate.

Freedman's eight-page preface, with its sweeping examination of the nature and purposes of strategies, is recommended for reading in full.

Although the requirement for a "strategy" has become a habit in the corporate world since the 1970s, it only became established in the Canadian Armed Forces with the publication in 1999 of *Shaping the Future of Canadian Defence: A Strategy for 2020* (short title *Strategy 2020*).[13] At the risk of getting ahead of the detailed analysis of this period in Part 3 below, *Strategy 2020* was driven by the government's imperative to rein in the spiralling debt crisis of the 1990s by turning to the notion that departments should be run like corporations, resulting in their adoption of many of the premises of the business world. Without any previous military modelling to rely upon (and in the absence of an overarching national grand strategy), however, *Strategy 2020* was peppered with the imprecision and banalities to which Strachan referred. This became, in turn, the language with which cascading service strategies strove to align, as witnessed by the below excerpt from the Navy's *Leadmark 2020*, which gives a nod to the then-popular notion of "mission-values-vision" as the driver behind the strategy's production:[14]

> Canada's military, like those elsewhere in the Western world, has profited in recent years from the adoption of the modern business practices currently in use in the private sector…. One expression of the corporate decision-making environment illustrates the relationships among mission, vision, values and strategy by posing a series of questions, as described below:
>
> - Mission – speaks to the institution's raison d'être. It is a general statement of why it exists: what is our long-term purpose?
> - Values – are also long-term and general in nature, and describe how the institution is to be run. The emphasis is on beliefs and behaviours: what do we stand for in our everyday behaviour?

- Vision – focuses on the specific features of a desirable future state for the institution, providing a reasonably specific and tangible aim, or destination, for the people in the institution to strive to achieve: where do we want the institution to be in ten to thirty years?
- Strategy – is the articulation, or the path to realisation, of the vision: how do we intend to fulfil our mission and vision, while reinforcing our values?

The drafters of *Leadmark 2020* struggled to rise above the "imprecision and banalities" of expressing fealty to the mission-vision-values statements required to align with the higher departmental "guidance," while also developing what they felt would be a meaningful actual strategy. As will be discussed in Part 3 below, this contradiction inevitably led to structural problems in maintaining the thrust of the final document. But it was rewarded with departmental endorsement.

While the "mission-vision-values" methodology remained the guiding model for CAF strategic development into the 2010s, an alternate model from a more directly military perspective had been postulated in the late 1980s by a senior instructor at the United States Army War College. As graduates of Carlisle rose in the ranks of the American and Canadian militaries, this language gained a foothold. According to its author, Colonel Arthur F. Lykke, Jr.:[15]

> National security, our most vital interest, is supported on a three-legged stool titled "Military Strategy." The three legs of the stool are labeled "Objectives," "Concepts" and "Resources." This simple analogy leads one to the observation that the legs must be balanced or national security may be in jeopardy. If military resources are not compatible with strategic concepts, or commitments are not matched by military capabilities, we may be in trouble.
>
> … military strategy [therefore] consists of the establishment of military objectives, the formulation of military strategic concepts to accomplish the objectives, and the use of military resources to implement the concepts.

Shortened further to the three-legged catchphrase "ends-ways-means," this model has lately come to permeate the literature.[16]

Lykke was content to allow that "this conceptual approach is applicable to all three levels of war [strategic, operational, and tactical] … in that it also reveals the fundamental similarities among national military strategy, operational art and tactics."[17] However, over the decades, practitioners have come to accept that there is a need to distinguish the differing documentary codification for the three levels, separating strategic guidance from doctrine and tactical procedures.

Would-be Canadian naval strategists have the benefit of further thought on all this, courtesy of their counterparts in the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF), for whom Defence Scientist Brad Gladman recently has prepared a primer on military strategy. Entitled *Good Strategy and Bad*,[18] it is an incisive study of the subject and should be read in full, although it is instructive to underscore some key points for the purposes of this monograph. To begin, the quote attributed to Hew Strachan at the beginning of this part is drawn from Gladman's own opening section on "Misuse of the term 'Strategy'," in which he (Gladman) also notes that "at the national level the term 'strategy' has recently been conflated with 'policy' and both have lost some of

their unique characteristics. Strategy has been used as a noun, verb, adjective, and an adverb, normally to emphasise something's importance."[19] He underscores the need as well to distinguish an "institutional" or service strategy from other types that may be encountered within the department:[20]

> It must be said from the outset that a service strategy is neither a war fighting strategy, nor is it a national military strategy. Each of these three types of strategies have very different purposes, and thus will look quite different. A service strategy is not about specific capabilities, or how those capabilities will be employed, but rather is a clearly defined target or vision for [the future service] that will describe its main features and the concerted actions in the near and longer-terms needed to realise the vision.…
>
> Unlike a strategy of force employment, [a service strategy will] translate a senior leader's vision for their organization into direction for the future force while meeting today's commitments, consistent with their responsibilities and authorities.… However, this service vision is also a means to present the [Government of Canada] with a view of the kind of [service] needed to meet both policy goals and the challenges of an uncertain and evolving security environment.

Gladman goes on to provide an important discourse on considerations as to the audience for the resulting strategy, as well as timelines for its development, and a recommended broad structure for any such document (pp. 5–8). His concluding statement makes an important allusion to Lykke's ends-ways-means definition:[21]

> What should be remembered is that strategy is about choices, and effective strategies clearly define the target for the strategy [ends] – phrased in clear and feasible terms vice vaporous desires. They then diagnose the current problems facing the institution as it strives to move towards the target, identifying the key obstacles and proposing ways to overcome them [ways]. Finally, effective strategies give clear guidance and propose a series of coherent and coordinated actions to transform the [service] of today into that future vision [means].

With all of that, however, we are left without an actual definition of "strategy." Appreciating, as we shall see in the next two parts, that the meaning and intended use of the term have evolved over time, something more appropriate to a layperson's colloquial understanding has been adopted for the purposes of this monograph:[22]

> Strategy is a set of principles to guide the purpose of a force (in our case the fleet) [ends], from which is determined its employment and consequent force structure development [ways], and the measures to achieve those [means].

Part 2: The Naval Strategy Canon

While the study of military strategy has a long pedigree, as witnessed most comprehensively in the aforementioned *Strategy: A History* by Lawrence Freedman, naval strategy only began to be studied and codified comparatively recently, from the mid-19th century – and to nowhere near the same level of curiosity. To illustrate the point, out of Freedman's more than 600 pages

of text, only five are devoted to purely naval subjects – exclusively Mahan and Corbett, and even they are referenced primarily as examples in a chapter entitled "Annihilation or Exhaustion" on differing applications of the theories of Jomini and Clausewitz (to Freedman's credit, as will be noted below, it is a brilliant exposition of their concepts).[23] But a lamentable retrograde example is the influential *Makers of Modern Strategy*, where the original edition, subtitled *Military Thought from Machiavelli to Hitler* (ed. Edward Mead Earle, 1943), had a full section on "Sea and Air War," with chapters on Mahan, continental doctrines of sea power, and Japanese naval strategy. This was only to be succeeded by a second edition, *From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age* (ed. Peter Paret, 1986), which made space to extend the narrative forward in time by reducing naval coverage to only a single chapter on Mahan (admittedly, a very good update of it, although dropping even the two passing references to Corbett from the earlier edition).[24] It is an egregious oversight by the global naval history community that no comprehensive single-volume study of the codification of naval strategy has been attempted to account for new scholarship since the long out-of-print *Education of a Navy* by Donald Schurman (notably a Canadian).[25]

It is neither the place nor the ambition of this Reader to fill that void. Rather, this part of the monograph endeavours to provide an introduction to what might be called "the naval strategy canon." It advances from the standpoint that a knowledgeable familiarity with the major tenets of the different philosophies presented across the canon is fundamental to a working understanding of the range of solutions available to Canadian naval professionals in responding to the challenges they have confronted. At the same time, this Reader does not pretend to be definitive and list every naval strategy that has ever been recorded, but rather it seeks to focus only on those that have had some reference to or influence on Canadian thinking.[26] From that perspective as well, this monograph will attempt to synthesize discussion to typically only a couple of summary paragraphs for each subject and to be selective in its offerings for further study. For example, where it is not hard to find any number of volumes on Alfred Thayer Mahan, readers will be directed to only a handful of pertinent studies. Finally, confessing in advance that such selections will reflect the biases of this author, priority will be given, wherever possible, to creditable studies by Canadian authors or authors known to have insight into the Canadian condition.

Author note – this part remains to be developed. The following bullet points are provided in the interim to indicate the scope of works to be reviewed, some pertinent sources, and the broad themes to be address.

Colomb Brothers / many previous histories of the Royal Navy (RN); first to approach as an object of inquiry (Schurman)

Mahan / derivative of Jomini (Freedman)

- "Naval Strategy"
  - Analysis: Sumida "Reconceptualizing"
  - also Sumida's Clausewitz

Corbett / derivative of Clausewitz (Freedman)

- "Some Principles" / "Seven Years War"
  - Analysis: Andrew Lambert "British Way of War"

Maritime Trade War / both Mahan and Corbett give short shrift to this dimension

- Nicholas Tracy "Maritime War on Trade" (& "Two-Edged Sword") / D.C. Peifer
  - Privateering / *guerre de course* / blockade
- *la Jeune École* (Ropp / Ruksand / Canuel)
- Wegener vs. Raeder (Hansen)
- Barry Hunt on "Strategy and Maritime Law"

Mackinder (Heartland thesis)

- Colin Gray "In Defence of Mackinder"
- Gorshkov "Sea Power of the State" (analysis by Norman Polmar)
- Modern age update (Riber)

NATO

- Samuel Huntington / Bernard Brodie
- NATO Concept of Maritime Operations (CONMAROPS) (1980) / no good secondary sources, needs to be developed / underappreciated that it was largely developed by Canadian officers on staff at Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT)
  - Milner, *Canada's Navy*, 287–289 & Grove (Fiords, 18–20)
  - Dan Mainguy memoir[27] (and Nigel Brodeur)
- The Maritime Strategy as derivative globalization of CONMAROPS
  - Wikipedia defers to standard oppo interpretation
  - Hattendorf "Selected Docs," Till in Swartz volume
  - Gimblett, "The Navy Paradigm"[28]
- NATO Maritime Strategy 2025

Post–Cold War Medium Navies

- Richard Hill / Geoffrey Till / Peter Haydon
- Hattendorf and Goldrick "Mahan Is Not Enough"
- Hattendorf "Selected Documents / US Naval Strategy in the 1990s"

Works of special interest to Canadians:

- Tracy / Maritime Trade
- Haydon / Medium Power Perspective
- *RCN in Transition* keynotes:
  1) Paul Kennedy / "Naval Mastery: The Canadian Context"
  2) Don Schurman / "Historical Uses in Medium Navies"
  3) Hunt / "Free Seas / Maritime Law"
- Crickard / Strategic Culture in *A Nation's Navy*
- Colin Gray / early work was on Canadian defence priorities
- Nils Orvik, "Defence Against Help"

Naval-maritime think tanks: Dalhousie CFPS (Middlemiss correspondence) / Calgary CMSS (Huebert) / StFX CMSN (Lajeunesse)

- International academics engaged by especially CFPS: Norman Friedman, James Goldrick, Eric Grove, John Hattendorf, Andrew Lambert, Peter Swartz, Geoffrey Till, Stan Weeks
- Maritime Command (MARCOM)-RCN Historical Conferences

Part 3: A Survey of Canadian Naval Strategic Thinking

Notwithstanding the contention of this Reader – that Canadian naval strategic development has not been strictly guided by the principles codified by the likes of Mahan and Corbett – this does not mean that Canada has not been subjected to the forces of history that animated those scholars' chronicles of the see-sawing struggle for mastery of the sea by the great powers in the age of sail. Indeed, it is especially germane that Canada was settled and came into being as a nation within the context of the principles that they described, through which Canadians have developed their own variations on an understanding of naval strategy.[29]

A useful summary of how pre-Confederation Canada evolved, often at the mercy of sea power, is provided in the prologue to the first volume of the official history of the RCN, *The Seabound Coast*.[30] It is a useful corrective to the conclusion in general histories elsewhere, set against the backdrop of the Anglo-Dutch-French struggle for control of the high seas through the 17th and 18th centuries, that fleet actions were the prime contributing factor to the outcomes of the series of major wars through that period. Overlooked in those narratives is that most of the naval events relating to pre-Conquest New France unfolded instead as intercolonial encounters involving much smaller local forces from New England. Typically, these incidents were to the disadvantage of the French, the most famous assault being in 1690, when the self-styled "Admiral" Sir William Phips, having captured Port Royal in the summer, then sailed up the St. Lawrence to take Quebec. The effort, however, was stymied by the fact that the small armada arrived off Quebec in October to discover that the governor general of New France, le Comte de Frontenac, had hastily erected a palisade fortification, allowing him to make his famous response to Phips's demand to surrender: "*I have no reply … other than from the mouths of my cannons*…."[31] With winter setting in and faced with a determined defence, the siege failed, and in late October, Phips retreated for Boston.

These attempts by Phips came in the midst of the rather more successful endeavours of the first native-born Canadian practitioner of what can be styled a naval strategy: Pierre Le Moyne d'Iberville, "the most renowned son of New France." His online biographies further describe him as "a soldier and adventurer,"[32] which is instructive, but for our purposes he is better known for a series of single-ship privateering actions in his 500-ton, 50-gun ship *le Pélican*, with which he terrorized the English colonies far and wide along the eastern seaboard and into the Caribbean, as well as in four northern expeditions over the decade 1686–1697 that effectively cleared the English fur traders from Hudson Bay.[33] The official history suggests he may have had some formal naval instruction in France, but the "soldier" designation is apt, because a close study of his tactics reveals them to be a maritime adaptation of the irregular form of frontier warfare known as "*la petite guerre*" – small units operating separately from the main force using speed and manoeuvre in hit-and-run attacks to disrupt the enemy.[34] There is no surviving record of d'Iberville's thoughts as to applying this as a strategy, but he pursued it quite methodically as a soldier ashore as well, memorably on a scorched-earth rampage across Newfoundland in 1696–1697.

Although d'Iberville's aggressive pursuit of colonial war at sea did not survive his death in 1706, his *canadien* successors otherwise regularized the conduct of privateering as more of a "*guerre de course*" commercial activity in their continuing struggles against the British-American

colonies. They had some notable success during Queen Anne's War (1702–1713), only to see it cut short in both the subsequent War of Austrian Succession (1740–1748) and the Seven Years' War (1756–1763). However, the capture early in each of those conflicts of the fortress Louisbourg, guarding the entrance to the Gulf of St. Lawrence (first in 1745 and then in 1758), compounded by having already lost the Acadian coasts of the Bay of Fundy, foreclosed French maritime activity beyond the confines of the Gulf for the duration of the respective conflicts.

The conduct of privateering as a strategy in Canada had not ended, however, and rather enjoyed a renaissance when North America became the primary theatre of activity in the subsequent American Revolutionary War (1776–1783) and War of 1812–1815.[35] In her detailed study of the latter conflict, Canadian historian Faye Kert asserts that, while the privateers of Atlantic Canada reached the apex of their activity at that time, the "[h]onest and, for the most part, the law-abiding merchants and shipowners of Atlantic Canada" had no set strategy in pursuing this economic weapon beyond it keeping their businesses literally afloat "when war with the United States eliminated their regular commercial activities."[36]

Although this narrative has downplayed the influence of fleet actions as a major factor in Canadian naval strategic thinking, it is important to recognize that the overarching fate of Canada revolved around the back-and-forth outcomes of the struggle for mastery of the seas variously between the French, British, and American fleets in the wars cited in the paragraphs above, as chronicled by Mahan and Corbett and which subsequently shaped their codifications of naval strategy. Highlight summaries of the sequence of wars are germane. The year 1744 notably was "the first time both sides despatched large naval fleets to North American waters to protect their interests," following which "the Royal Navy established a naval and military base at Halifax in 1749 … to solidify its maritime position in North America."[37] A decade later, the Royal Navy's command of the sea was the precondition for the Conquest by Saunders and Wolfe of Louisbourg in 1758 and Quebec in 1759–1760.[38] The tables were turned when loss of that control back to the French during the American Revolutionary War affirmed the independence of the Thirteen Colonies. And the challenge by the United States to Great Britain in the War of 1812 was thwarted by the Royal Navy's blockade of the eastern seaboard, which strangled American trade and made them sue for peace.[39]

But it is the activity below that inter-state level that is the concern of this monograph, and there, a different calculus was developing to shift Canadian naval attention from the high seas. For a start, the rationale for privateering disappeared with the settling of Anglo-American differences and the return of Maritime merchants to regularized commercial trade following the War of 1812. At the same time, another dimension had arisen that would come to dominate Canadian naval strategic thinking through the remainder of the century: as the land frontier between the British colonies and the American states extended inland, much of the border came to be defined by the navigable waters of the upper St. Lawrence River and the Great Lakes. From modest beginnings as small-vessel flotillas patrolling the Lakes during the Revolutionary War, the renewal of fighting in the summer of 1812 prompted both sides to quickly build proper large warships to contest those inland seas, with Commodore Perry famously winning control of Lake Erie in September 1813 (which the Americans held for the rest of the war, although the more central theatre of Lake Ontario remained undecided at war's end). It is in the ensuing "peace" that a continental impulse comes into play as a factor in Canadian naval thinking. Whereas the Rush-Bagot Agreement limiting naval armaments on the Great Lakes is held up as key to the so-called "undefended border" between Canada and the United States, the fact is

that the Canadians never felt that the Royal Navy, even with its command of the high seas, could reliably reinforce the inland frontier quickly enough if conflict broke out again. Thus, Canadian defence planners came to hold the concept that a Provincial Marine of minor warships (respecting the Rush-Bagot limitations but which could be up-armed quickly if needed) was essential to countering a renewed American invasion of the interior until British army reinforcements could arrive. It was never a potent force,[40] but the instinct became ingrained as a planning factor after Confederation in 1867, what with the post-US Civil War Fenian Raids being followed almost immediately by the withdrawal of the British garrisons from 1871.

With the new Dominion needing to assume increased responsibility for its own defence of the interior, an innovative solution to all this was developed in the mid-1880s, courtesy of a retired Royal Naval Reserve officer employed in the Marine and Fisheries department. Andrew Gordon had seen service in the RN with the Provincial Marine during the Fenian Raids of 1866 and subsequently immigrated to Canada, settling near Toronto in 1872. In 1880, he joined the federal department, initially in the Meteorological Service, where he immediately demonstrated a high degree of competence and, probably based also on his previous naval service, soon "became involved in several other activities [of the department] that indicated he was no ordinary public servant." Indeed, in the summer of 1884, he was appointed to head the first Dominion government seaborne expedition into Hudson Bay, and the next year, he took command of the Fisheries Protection Service (FPS) on the east coast.[41] His transfer to the FPS in 1885 occurred in the wake of the ill-fated episode with the aging British steam corvette *Charybdis*: acquired in 1880 following the latest in a series of Anglo-Russian war scares, she was intended as a training vessel for a sea-going force to defend against enemy auxiliary cruisers waging a *guerre de course* in local waters, but she proved unseaworthy and was then being broken up in Halifax.[42] Gordon had maintained a professional interest in current naval affairs, and he soon broadened his mandate to put together the first truly Canadian-derived strategic assessment of the Dominion's naval defences. Regrettably, records do not exist to establish to what degree he was influenced by contemporary writers such as Britain's Colomb brothers or the French *Jeune École*, all of which were just then being published. However, elements of each of these, along with an understanding of new technologies, are clearly apparent in his proposal. Equally, he surely was responding to the popularity of Prime Minister Sir John A. Macdonald's "National Policy," considered Canada's first national grand strategy, designed to stimulate the post-Confederation economy through the pursuit of three pillars: tariffs to protect central Canadian manufacturing; immigration to consolidate claims to the Western interior; and the massive expansion of physical infrastructure, most famously through the building of the transcontinental Canadian Pacific Railway, but including also harbour development and "the subsidization of fast steamship services to Europe and Asia to facilitate the export of Canadian products."[43] Against all these imperatives, in November 1888 Gordon crafted a well-argued letter submitted directly to Minister of Marine and Fisheries Charles Hibbert Tupper (son of the future prime minister). Appreciating that the recent stillborn attempt at a naval force suffered as much from a lack of imagination as equipment obsolescence, and realizing the potential of the torpedo-boat forces at the heart of French strategic thinking, Gordon laid out a plan to reorganize the Fisheries Protection Service to become the nucleus of a naval force. The cornerstone of this reorganization was the acquisition of a pair of *Rattlesnake*-class torpedo-gunboats that could serve primarily as a deterrent to marauding enemy cruisers, while also being small enough to navigate the pre-Seaway St. Lawrence and Welland Canals to reach the Lakes in the event of an emergency.[44] Considering the rudimentary bureaucratic resources at hand at the time (the 35-page handwritten document underscores that he clearly

was his own "staff"), it is a rather amazing piece of staff work. A typed transcript is reproduced at Appendix A.

The seed of the message fell upon fertile soil. Tupper authorized the construction of three new iron-hulled fisheries cruisers, which, while not of the *Rattlesnake* class, had "ram bows, resembling some contemporary gunboats," and were built in a Great Lakes shipyard: *Petrel* to be stationed for fisheries patrol on the Great Lakes, *Curlew* for the same on the east coast, and *Constance* to be assigned to the Canadian Customs Preventive Service in the Gulf of St. Lawrence.[45] They entered service in 1892, however, just a year before Gordon's premature death to consumption. That also was at the start of the confusing political period following Macdonald's own death in 1891 and the rapid succession in five years of four other aging prime ministers, whose ambition was focused on the consolidation of the main thrusts of the National Policy. Without a champion, and losing a strong government mandate, the further development of the naval scheme was neglected.[46]

Yet somehow, the institutional memory survived. When Liberal prime minister Sir Wilfrid Laurier determined a decade later to take steps toward Canada's naval defence, Gordon's proposal experienced an unacknowledged resurrection, to be realized with the drafting of a Naval Militia Bill in 1904 (which was never tabled), coincident with the purchase of a ship based on the *Rattlesnake* class, built in the UK, commissioned as the Canadian Government Ship *Canada*, and proudly advertised as "the nucleus of a Canadian naval militia."[47] And that thinking was very much still alive when the year 1909 opened to become a watershed in Canadian naval strategic thinking, witnessing its rapid progression through three major stages in the period of half a year. This was precipitated when Conservative opposition member Sir George Foster tabled a motion before Parliament early in the year that Canada should look to "the suitable protection of her exposed coast line and great seaports."[48] In preparation for the debate, Rear-Admiral Charles Kingsmill, recently retired from the Royal Navy to take charge of the reorganized Canadian Marine Service, prepared a preliminary report basically updating Gordon's plan for the use of the existing Fisheries establishment to begin naval training at Halifax. Reproduced in this volume as Appendix B, it proposed a modestly paced buildup fully compliant with Laurier's limited approach to developing a naval policy: "The men trained in the first year would be available to man a destroyer or a Scout [small cruiser] next year, and so on until we had sufficient officers and men well trained to man our proposed defence which should, in my opinion, be confined to Destroyers and Scouts for many a long day."[49]

Before the Foster resolution could be discussed in the Canadian Parliament, however, the Dreadnought Crisis erupted in mid-March 1909, over the degree to which the Royal Navy should maintain its lead over Germany in battleship production. Sensing an opportunity to advance the gradual approach of his established domestic policy, Laurier shifted the course of the debate on March 29, 1909, to gain unanimous consent for "the speedy organization of a Canadian naval service."[50] Kingsmill responded to the changed circumstances by quickly but only slightly redrafting his earlier plan, to provide for a more rapid implementation with slightly larger vessels while still adhering to the principle of local coastal defence. He submitted his new plan (reproduced as Appendix C) on April 19 "with a great deal of diffidence," maintaining that "[we] should at once commence building [ocean-going] destroyers and cruisers … [so] that fisheries protection and training go hand in hand…".[51]

Armed with this plan, and confident of the bipartisan support of Parliament (serving as a de facto national grand strategy), Kingsmill proceeded to London that summer with the ministers of Marine and Fisheries and of Militia and Defence to negotiate with imperial authorities for the inclusion of the newly sanctioned Canadian naval force into the defence apparatus of the Empire. They discovered, however, that the mercurial First Sea Lord, Sir John Fisher, was using the opportunity presented by the Dreadnought Crisis to press for a major revamping of the imperial naval defence system. To share in the burden, the colonies were presented two options: make a substantial monetary contribution to assist the Royal Navy or establish a local naval force which, in time of war, could contribute immediately and materially to the requirements of imperial defence. The "fleet unit" Fisher advocated consisted of a dreadnought battlecruiser supported by three cruisers, six destroyers, and three submarines, in Canada's case to be based entirely on the Pacific Coast. It was a clearly offensive ocean-going force, well beyond the defensive coastal forces implied in all previous Admiralty discussions (and at the heart of Canadian aspirations), which now were dismissed as ineffective due to their poor radius of action and limited sea-keeping capabilities. In protracted negotiations, the Canadian delegation convinced Fisher to drop the battlecruiser from their establishment and allow the forces to be divided between both coasts, resulting in a scaled-down but still modern and capable cruiser-destroyer squadron on each coast (the original Admiralty proposal and a summary of the subsequent Canadian compromise are reproduced as Appendix D).[52] The determination of the Laurier government to adhere to the agreement was reflected in the tenders subsequently issued for four *Bristol*-class light cruisers and six River-class destroyers, all the most current types and to be built in Canada. The government's expectation for what the Dominion should acquire for its seaward defence had expanded dramatically through 1909 in reaction to changing geopolitical circumstances, but the prospects were promising that "[t]he proposed operational fleet was a reasonable compromise between Admiralty operational interests and Canadian political interests."[53] In the interim, the Laurier government accepted the loan of two aging but impressive protected cruisers as training vessels – the 11,000-ton *Niobe* and 3,440-ton *Rainbow*.[54] The bipartisan consensus soon collapsed, however, and when the Liberals lost the September 1911 general election to Robert Borden's Conservatives, the tenders were cancelled, the nascent fleet atrophied, and the RCN did not, as a result, make a significant contribution to the Great War at sea.

The next occasion for a strategic evaluation came immediately after that war, in 1919–1920, when Viscount Jellicoe of Scapa was charged to advise the Dominion governments of the Empire on their postwar naval requirements. Perhaps flushed from Canada's major contribution to the recent Allied victory, Prime Minister Borden suggested that "[i]t might be possible for the Canadian Government to … take over a fleet unit consisting, let us say, of a battleship, certain large and small cruisers, with the necessary quota of destroyers and submarines."[55] Kingsmill's staff struck a naval committee under the direction of Commodore Walter Hose to produce a series of "Occasional Papers" as a planning basis for discussions with the Jellicoe Commission, the most important of these being the second, entitled "Proposals for Canadian Naval Expansion." Reproduced as Appendix E, it is interesting for advocating a moderate scope and pace, clearly reflecting Kingsmill's long experience as head of the Navy (Hose had been with the RCN for nearly as long as Kingsmill, having transferred from the Royal Navy in 1911 to command *Rainbow*, and was equally familiar with its troubled past). The key paragraph under the subtitle heading "Permanent Policy Necessary" expressed a sentiment that remains applicable a century later:[56]

> At the same time, it is most necessary that a definite policy extending over a period of years should be inaugurated. By this is meant that a certain sized Naval Service should be aimed at in say 15 or 20 years, the whole scheme being sealed by a special act of Parliament. The effect of such a policy would greatly tend to economy in the prevention of hurried and ill-considered annual programmes, and it would give stability to the whole service, as those joining (especially officers, who make the navy their life's career) would fully understand what prospects were before them. It is unnecessary to dilate here on the enormous advantage which would accrue if it were possible to find a policy on which all political parties could agree. It is not too much to say that a navy founded on the above principles, even though of very small size, would be far more efficient than a numerically larger navy constructed on some haphazard principle.

The scheme harkened back to Kingsmill's original spring 1909 argument for a gradual, albeit now more ambitious, acquisition program. It envisioned the creation of a 46-ship navy, over two seven-year building periods (1920–1927 and 1927–1934), to consist finally of seven cruisers, 12 destroyers, 18 anti-submarine patrol craft, three submarines, and three tenders, all to be built in Canada and to be crewed by an all-Canadian complement of 8,500 officers and ratings. It specifically rejected capital ships as being beyond the resources of Canadian shipyards and the numbers of existing senior Canadian officers to command them. Although this was accepted as one of the options in Lord Jellicoe's report (reproduced as Appendix F), the former First Sea Lord's stronger recommendations largely reflected the composition he had completed and proposed already for India, Australia, and New Zealand, in terms of the old fleet unit notion including battlecruisers and now also aircraft carriers, with the increased crewing to be augmented by newly surplus Royal Navy veterans.[57] Borden's ruminations aside, this was too bold an expansion of a Dominion navy which at war's end consisted of only a few trawler-sized vessels and for which there existed no clearly demonstrable peacetime need, especially as the onset of a postwar recession was heightening concern over the accumulated war debt. Even the scaled-down version of Jellicoe's plan reflecting the premise of Occasional Paper No. 2 was rebuked by Cabinet. Kingsmill resigned in protest as Director of the Naval Service and was replaced by Commodore Walter Hose (the principal author of the Occasional Papers series), who set about a "strategy of survival" that saw him re-establishing the RCN on an even more modest scale to see it through the interwar period by paying off the bulk of the permanent force to fund the establishment of local Royal Canadian Naval Volunteer Reserve (RCNVR) divisions in communities across the country.[58]

Another series of Canadian naval strategic appraisals emerged through 1939–1940, in order to substantiate rearmament as war threatened in Europe and then soon spiralled yet again into global conflict. Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King was a champion of limited engagement and found in the Navy a near-ideal force to maintain that policy. He had allowed modest expansion of the fleet through the 1930s, with the acquisition of a half-dozen River-class destroyers, and the first "Canadian" Chief of the Naval Staff (CNS), Rear-Admiral Percy Nelles (he had joined as a cadet in 1908 and succeeded Hose in 1934), dared to capitalize upon this pattern with a statement in January 1939 of the "Objectives of the Canadian Naval Service"[59] (reproduced as Appendix G). In any future conflict, he explained, the RCN's primary responsibility would be coast defence, for which cruisers were the best forces to act against surface raiders, although their cost and personnel and maintenance requirements placed them beyond Canada's means. There existed a perfect alternative, however, in the form of the new class of "pocket cruisers" then being commissioned by the Royal Navy – the Tribal class of fleet

destroyers – and Nelles proposed that a flotilla of six of them on each coast would provide "reasonable Naval defence." Underlying his thinking, to be sure, was the determination that, if war was inevitable, it also was wise to look to the distant future and insure against a recurrence of postwar retrenchment "by acquiring warships too valuable to scrap."[60] If somewhat opportunistic, the general thrust nonetheless struck a chord with the government. The minister of National Defence signalled concurrence in acknowledging before Parliament in May 1939 that "the ultimate objective that the navy has set for Canada is to build up a force of eighteen destroyers" – by implication, the six Rivers already in service, plus 12 Tribals.[61]

It might seem odd to modern eyes that the next strategic naval appreciation, drafted in the fall of 1940, would be titled "Canada's Post-War Navy"[62] (reproduced as Appendix H), but this must be assessed in the context of its time. Certainly, there was the underpinning determination of the naval staff that the RCN emerge from this war in much better shape than the previous. But contrary to our foreknowledge that that event still was five years in the future, this document appeared in the dark days of the fall of 1940. Hitler had conquered the continent, and the *Kriegsmarine* had gained access to forward French and Norwegian bases for its fleet of powerful battleships and surface raiders (the U-boat threat to the North Atlantic lifeline had not yet materialized). At the same time, the United States was neutral, and the removal of Britain from the war, either by invasion or a separate peace, was not an unreasonable proposition. Planning for the joint defence of the Americas under that scenario was beginning to be developed through the auspices of the just-established Permanent Joint Board on Defence (PJBD). There continued, therefore, to be a plausible need in the near term for a strong coast defence navy, with the RCN as potentially the lead empire force against an unrestrained German high seas fleet – whether belligerent or neutral – or the too-paternalistic hemispheric protection offered by the United States Navy (an early recognition of Orvik's "defence against help" thesis). The analysis, therefore, was peppered with the classic Mahanian language of imperial defence of the trade routes, maintaining that the core of the fleet should be four cruisers and 18 destroyers (now all Tribals), split equally between the coasts. Happily, this scenario was entirely consistent with Mackenzie King's view of the purpose for a Canadian naval force, and the November 1940 paper remained the basis of government-approved naval planning for the next couple of years, modified only to accommodate the arising additional wartime requirement for anti-submarine forces.

The high-water mark of Canadian naval strategic thinking arose in the spring of 1943, by which time a number of factors had coalesced to precipitate what one scholar has termed "The Golden Age of Canadian Naval Planning."[63] Firstly, Allied fortunes had improved considerably, victory in Europe was a reasonable expectation, and focus was expected to shift against Japan, where the vast oceanic reaches of the Pacific theatre and the large enemy surface fleet ordained that future planning should be guided by the Mahanian maxims practised by all of the protagonists (with adaptations, as discussed in Part 2, by modern thinkers such as Bernard Brodie). Secondly, the mobilization of the Canadian economy had reached the state where finally there existed the manpower and industrial base to sustain a larger and more complex fleet establishment. Thirdly, the naval staff had benefited from an expanded and better-organized Naval Service Headquarters (NSHQ), which, with wartime recruitment, had come to include quite a number of university-educated reserve officers capable of producing insightful planning. One such person was Lieutenant-Commander G.F. (Geoffrey) Todd, RCNVR, assigned to the plans section of the Canadian naval staff, and who became its acting head in mid-1943 (see more below). Perhaps the most critical factor, however, was that, coincidentally

from mid-1943, the RCN was gaining unprecedented admittance to broader bureaucratic networks. Through the last two years of the war, the Canadian government constituted its first-ever strategic planning cell, in the form of the Post-Hostilities Planning (PHP) Committee, chaired by the formidable Hume Wrong from the Department of External Affairs and comprising representatives from the major departments, as well as from each of the three services. The foreign policy establishment was undergoing a fundamental shift of direction, and the "mandarins" at External were looking to build upon the outsized Canadian contributions to the war effort in developing a policy of commitment to collective security as the basis for the postwar international order (besides Wrong as chair, also contributing to the committee were Lester Pearson, John Holmes, and Escott Reid). Todd, as the lead representative from the RCN, was astute enough to recognize their increasing influence and to appeal to their new mantras of "middle powers" and the "functional principle" in his analyses. And it worked: where the Army and the Air Force sometimes presented less-than-coherent recommendations, Wrong invariably was impressed by the naval submissions.[64]

As noted, the work of the PHP Committee ensued over nearly two years, beginning in the summer of 1943. Through that time, Todd and the Naval Plans Division prepared a number of analyses; however, as representative of their groundbreaking work, this Reader will look only to the example of their first major submission, prepared to guide the efforts of the senior naval staff at the Quebec Conference in August 1943: an "Appreciation of RCN Ship Requirements for the War Against Japan and for the Post-War Navy" (reproduced as Appendix I).[65] As we have seen previously with Andrew Gordon in regard to the likes of *la Jeune École*, it is impossible to determine how deeply Todd was read into Mahan and Brodie's more recent contributions, but he must have been to some extent, as their influences are apparent in even a quick skim of the "appreciation." In its essence, apart from the depth and clarity of its analysis, this July 1943 proposal was not terribly different from those put forward in January 1939 and November 1940. Where it differed was in expanding the Canadian objectives for its fleet beyond local coast defence and pointing to greater strategic ends, with Todd arguing for a large surface fleet "[as] essential for the maintenance of Canadian prestige … [to] take a direct and not insignificant part in this phase of the war," which was projected to entail surface fleet actions "to challenge Japanese command of these seas and to secure bases along the avenues of approach to the … main assaults." Discounting anti-submarine forces as peripheral to this aspect of the Pacific war, he also specifically precluded following the British and Americans in the acquisition of battleships as being "beyond the resources of the RCN," and while he left the matter open as to the procurement of aircraft carriers ("It may supersede the battleship as queen of the seas"), he recommended a squadron of four cruisers, supported by flotillas of fleet destroyers, as adequate to the purpose. His further comments that "it certainly is not fitting that the second Navy of the Empire should be a mere spectator on such a vital occasion" and "[t]o obtain the prestige and recognition of status [as a growing power in world affairs] which it thus seeks, it is essential that Canada should have as strong a Navy as possible" surely appealed to the diplomats at External, who would come to accept that Canadian intervention in postwar crises implied military force with global reach, which in those days only a navy could provide.

Over the course of 1944 and 1945, as the Canadian government debated the size of its commitment to the war against Japan – and by extension, that of its postwar forces – the only major change to Todd's original proposal was the evolution of the cruiser squadron into two full carrier task forces. These would constitute the postwar structure of what the naval staff was envisioning in July 1945 as the "Continuing Royal Canadian Navy," comprising two light fleet

carriers, four light cruisers, and 18 fleet destroyers, split equally into a task force on each of the east and west coasts. As Alec Douglas has so aptly put it, "By 1945 [the RCN] had most of the capabilities of a well-balanced modern fleet and ambitions to match."[66]

Before these ambitions could be fully realized, the atomic bombing of Japan brought the war to an unexpected end. Where a protracted Pacific campaign had promised an orderly transition to a large, balanced, and capable postwar structure, fleet planning suddenly was thrown into flux. The future of the postwar RCN was far from assured, not least from the fact that Prime Minister Mackenzie King did not share the interventionist inclinations of the mandarins at External and instead steered a return to pre-war isolationism. In the first flush of demobilization, until Canada's postwar needs could be determined, the initial planning figure approved by Cabinet was for a 10,000-man "Interim Force" naval establishment (the Army and RCAF had proportionate limitations). Barely sufficient to crew a single carrier, one cruiser, and a handful of destroyers, the "good workable little fleet," as it was styled, was effectively a truncated single-carrier task force split between the two coasts, which even then the RCN struggled to keep in commission.[67]

It was not until early 1947, with the signs all pointing toward the Soviet Union being the major adversary, that the naval staff finally felt confident to produce an analysis to guide the "Planning of [the] Post-War Navy."[68] Reproduced as Appendix J, it assessed that "the optimum Naval potential of Russia lies in the field of the submarine weapon," predicting that the next war would likely be a replay of the recent Battle of the Atlantic. It therefore is significant in two respects: firstly, it marks the point at which it was determined that the primary postwar purpose of the RCN would be as an anti-submarine force; and, secondly, it laid the requirement for the design and construction of what would become the *St. Laurent*–class destroyer-escort:[69]

> Modern developments in submarines have made the bulk of present day surface escorts virtually obsolete. The escort of the future does not yet exist. It will be necessary, however, for it to have greater speed, better sea-keeping qualities, and be of such construction as to promote rapid construction in an emergency.

These recommendations, however, did not come to pass beyond internal naval planning for another year and a half, until after Mackenzie King retired in October 1948 to be succeeded by his former minister of External Affairs, Louis St-Laurent. St-Laurent had expounded on his foreign policy notions in his famous "Gray Lecture" in January 1947,[70] and, with Lester Pearson taking his place at External, this now became Canada's de facto national grand strategy. They immediately set about changing the isolationist direction of Canada's foreign policy by resurrecting the interventionist approach envisioned by the Post-Hostilities Planning Committee. This was witnessed most demonstrably by their push to establish the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which came into being on April 4, 1949 (it is noteworthy that St-Laurent's cabinet approved the construction of the first of the new destroyer-escorts two weeks before that, on March 26). They buoyed their foreign policy by dropping the Interim Force recruiting limits and identifying that Canada's initial commitment to the alliance would be the aircraft carrier task force based principally in Halifax, given that neither the Army nor the RCAF had the forces at hand to constitute what eventually would be, respectively, a brigade and a fighter wing for basing on the continent.[71]

Still, it was not until the summer of 1950, following the unexpected North Korean invasion of the south, that Canadian rearmament was stepped up and the government directed the three

services to provide their plans to meet an "Accelerated Defence Programme." The Navy's response, "Recommendations for the Increase in Strength of the R.C.N.," submitted on August 17, 1950, and reproduced as Appendix K,[72] cannot truthfully be categorized as a "strategy" but is included in this collection for the strategic implications that sprang from it. To begin, it is a marker for the Navy's dramatic expansion throughout the ensuing decade, starting with the re-commissioning of wartime vessels in reserve, to be replaced with the newly constructed destroyer-escorts as they were completed.[73] In determining the commitments to meet the naval threat, the document identified that:

> The R.C.N. has three vital tasks in the Naval defence of Canada, namely:
> a) the provision of seaward defences for the important harbours;
> b) minesweeping the approaches of these harbours; and
> c) anti-submarine warfare.

More to the thrust of this Reader, in noting that the RCN program "can well be construed as a sign of good faith in our Naval commitments to NATO," it is from this point, early in the Cold War, that the composition of the Navy (and, for that matter, also the Canadian Army and the RCAF in their own program responses) shifted decisively from being ordained by national objectives, and instead became contingent upon what one scholar aptly has described as "a strategy of commitments,"[74] with force levels and doctrine determined by NATO force planning goals. The effect of this for the Navy was a move away from a balanced general-purpose fleet, to one of "specialization" in anti-submarine warfare (ASW), with the consequence of limiting naval options for the government in response to other crisis situations.[75] Fred Crickard put it more bluntly: "Canadian naval policy during the Cold War [was] driven primarily by the [ASW] fleet-in-being," and to underscore the strategic danger, he quoted his British partner in sailor-scholarship, Richard Hill: "if a medium power emphasizes its alliance commitment to the extent of saying its forces are a 'contribution' and that only, it is very likely to get a force structure that is not suited to its national needs."[76] As a corollary to all this, Dan Middlemiss has analyzed the role that economic considerations have played in the development of the postwar Canadian navy, with the conclusion that they have been underappreciated: "… the interaction among political, military, and economic considerations in the development of the modern Canadian navy has been complex and has varied with time and circumstance. But if one overriding conclusion stands out, it is this: for the Canadian navy, what politics has proposed, economics has disposed."[77]

The Navy implicitly understood the limitations of a specialized commitment to anti-submarine warfare and was able to manage a balance of capabilities for as long as an aircraft carrier and "big gun" destroyers such as the Tribals remained elements of the fleet and offered capabilities beyond the narrow ASW focus (the best examples being maintaining an air-to-ground role for the fighters embarked in the carrier and quickly repurposing those vessels for a sealift role to dispatch the peacekeeping contingents first to the Sinai in 1957 and then Cyprus in 1964, and separately the reputation gained by the destroyers as "train-busters" in Korea 1950–1953). However, by the late 1950s, the days of both these vessel types clearly were numbered, with the carrier and all wartime construction (including the Tribals) expected to be paid off without replacement by the late 1960s. The fleet thereafter was to be constituted entirely of variants of the modern destroyer-escorts, albeit buttressed by a new fleet replenishment type to extend their at-sea endurance.

Even within the boundaries of the strategy of commitments, modifications to Canadian naval thinking did occur. As Isabel Campbell observes in her article quoted above, and as Peter Haydon also notes in his chronicle of this era as the preliminary stage in "The Evolution of the Canadian Naval Task Group,"[78] typically these adaptations came in concert with changes to NATO strategy, which the naval staff in Ottawa did not hesitate to use to their advantage. The first major opportunity came following the NATO response to the Soviet detonation of a hydrogen (thermonuclear) bomb. Promulgated on November 22, 1954, MC 48 most often is remembered as "the first official NATO document to explicitly discuss the use of nuclear weapons, and it first introduced the concept of massive retaliation."[79] But it also was based on the assumption that after the opening 30-day nuclear exchange, the war would settle into a more traditional format. For Canada, this would be the reinforcement and resupply of Western Europe, forgoing any option for drawn-out mobilization and forecasting a protracted "come as you are" third Battle of the Atlantic. Within a year, the RCN had refined its "Requirements for a Re-Appraisal of Current War Plans"[80] as demanding a fleet structure that resurrected the long-standing desire for a second carrier (*Bonaventure* then about to commission, while retaining *Magnificent*), supported by 25 destroyer escorts (the 14 *St. Laurent* class building and on order, while retaining the converted seven older wartime Tribals and four Intermediate destroyers) and 25 other ocean and coastal escorts (the converted *Prestonian*s and their projected replacement).[81]

Predictably, such a much-expanded force proved controversial to the other services, served more to entrench air staff opposition to RCN carrier operations, and clearly never came to be implemented.[82] Facing this resistance, the RCN appreciated that it had to provide better rationale for its aspirations. In January 1956, Vice-Admiral Harry DeWolf, in one of his earliest acts upon becoming Chief of the Naval Staff, established a Naval Warfare Study Group "to address the myriad of strategic, organizational, and technological challenges [presented by …] the concept of massive retaliation, the possibility of surprise attack, the implementation of the SOSUS underwater sound surveillance system, and the organizational issues associated with a quick transition from peace to war."[83] This committee was an innovative concept, the first of its kind by the Canadian naval staff to undertake a comprehensive appraisal of a strategic problem. Quite aside from any results, doing so demonstrated the Navy's increasing confidence and competence, in having the capacity to bring together a variety of experienced talents resident across the naval staff – in this initial instance, under the leadership of Captain Duncan Raymond, Assistant Chief of the Naval Staff (Plans), and including representatives variously from the Plans and Operations, Intelligence, Naval Aviation, and Engineering divisions.[84]

The Naval Warfare Study Group deliberated for the next several months, producing several draft iterations that demonstrate the intensity of the debates within the RCN as to its force rationale with regard to national as well as NATO requirements, covering both peace and wartime roles and, hence, platform structure. Regrettably, the existing files do not contain a complete version of the final report, although sufficient records do exist to piece together its broad conclusions, reproduced in Appendix L.[85] The committee had quickly determined that two recent revolutionary technological advancements demanded a fundamental reassessment of Canadian naval actions in the event of general war. The first was the new ability of Soviet submarines to fire cruise missiles against targets on the North American mainland from a "danger zone" some 200 miles offshore, precluding much warning time after launch. The second was the recent implementation of the SOSUS system mentioned in the paragraph

above, which promised to greatly increase the odds of detecting and countering the Soviet submarine threat prior to missile launch. The Working Group encapsulated this thinking in its conclusion that, in the opening phase of war, rather than dispatching forces to support operations ashore on the European continent:

> … the primary task of the Canadian maritime forces will be [the] provision of warning of the approach of enemy submarines to the Canadian coasts and the location and destruction of such submarines before they can reach a position from which they can attack important land targets in Canada and the United States with guided missiles.

The Naval Board considered the draft on June 15 and "directed a long series of minor re-wordings."[86] With those incorporated, DeWolf forwarded the final report to his colleague, the Chief of the Air Staff, which, with further revisions, would form the basis for the joint RCN and RCAF concept of maritime operations that appeared in April 1957 (a progressive development in itself). Appreciating as well that this conclusion was at odds with extant NATO strategy, concurrently, the naval staff undertook discussions with SACLANT staff to incorporate the new Canadian planning factors into NATO strategy.[87]

The RCN nonetheless continued to be plagued by the problem of specialization and how "to adopt a more flexible, general purpose naval capability while retaining a strong ASW capability."[88] A better-known, or perhaps more infamous, investigation came in 1961 when the Chief of the Naval Staff (now Vice-Admiral Herbert Rayner) struck an "Ad Hoc Committee on Naval Objectives" chaired by Rear-Admiral Jeffry Vanstone Brock and hence remembered more by its short title, "The Brock Report" (excerpts are reproduced as Appendix M).[89] Historians have tended to dismiss it as being overly ambitious and out of touch with reality, probably due as much as anything to the off-putting inflated self-opinion of its author. However, it is possible also to see it as being quite visionary, in recommending the modernization and expansion of the RCN into a "Three-Ocean Navy," mentioning the Arctic Ocean for the first time, noting the need for nuclear-powered attack submarines to patrol it, and advocating for the development of novel vessel types such as the "heliporter" frigate, large enough to carry eight to ten helicopters to deliver an embarked company-sized force of soldiers to a contested shore. Other than a brief and now-dated article written in a different context (albeit still recommended as being of great value to readers), no proper detailed study of the Brock Report has been published.[90] But at a full 130 pages, and given its wide distribution within the department (Brock purposely drafted the bulk of it as "unclassified" to enable this), it demands attention as the Navy's first-ever comprehensive assessment of its place in the Canadian security framework and the first one truly worthy of being labelled a "strategic plan" (the numbers below in parentheses are page references for quotes from the Report, reproduced in the Appendix). Starting from base principles, and fulfilling its assessed need "to devote considerable attention to a re-examination of our Canadian defence and external policies before formulating more detailed proposals" (ix), it then provides readers with a précis of naval strategy and how that applies to Canada, followed by a consideration of technological advances as well as the "changing international scene," before describing the proposed force structure to enable a response. Appearing at a time when the accepted NATO strategy was still rapid escalation to "massive retaliation" (MC 14/3 "Flexible Response" would not appear until 1967), the Brock Report was prescient in its analysis. One historian has noted that it was "rather ahead of conventional thought, [in saying] the navy must handle not just general nuclear war but the whole range through conventional conflict to brushfire wars and police action."[91] Arguing, in

consequence, that the Navy should return to a balanced general-purpose structure, the Report proposed a sweeping reorganization of the Canadian fleet:

- it accepted that the carrier should be paid off at the end of its service life in the mid-1970s;
- by then, its air defence capabilities would be replaced by general-purpose frigates (GPFs) equipped with guided anti-air missile systems;
- the GPFs, the existing destroyer-escorts, and any new construction should be converted to embark anti-submarine helicopters;
- that an immediate acquisition of modern conventional submarines be followed with nuclear-propelled vessels, stating that "the submarine may be looked upon as the capital ship of the future" (82) (the accompanying images show, respectively, an American *Barbel* and *Skipjack* submarine);
- that the new-concept heliporters mentioned above were "seen as a successor to *Bonaventure* and the Prestonian class frigates … [to] provide troop lift and support facilities, and have the capability of training junior officers" (84);
- that an additional pair of fleet replenishment ships and a submarine depot ship should be built to provide afloat logistics;
- that the Navy should "re-enter the Arctic for the purpose of mastering the environment and re-asserting Canadian sovereignty [with] … an initial … two Arctic Patrol Vessels" (85, 107); and finally,
- that research and development should continue into "unconventional craft" such as hovercraft and hydrofoils (86).

The committee arguably was correct in its assessment of the Canadian security environment, and it conducted its deliberations with input from the other services and in the context of the background chatter already permeating Canadian Forces Headquarters about "integration." The Report was read with interest at the Chiefs of Staff Committee and received a nod of approval from the influential Canadian defence research scientist Dr. R.J. Sutherland, who identified that "this report should prove of the greatest value.… The general concept of developing greater versatility without making an abrupt shift seems to be extremely sound."[92] But in the "uncertainty that attended the Diefenbaker and first Pearson [minority] governments, no decisions were taken on naval procurement."[93] What Brock had put forward was too aspirational for any contemporary government, with "a fleet concept … that was beyond the capability of the naval budget or Canadian industry to produce.… [And] the greatest failing … was its omission of a coherent personnel policy to 'man' the new fleet."[94] Neither did it survive the test when Lester Pearson became prime minister in 1963 and made Paul Hellyer his defence minister. Even with the logic of their plan to create a "rapid response force" through the unification of the Canadian Armed Forces, pointing to a combined (nowadays "joint") Canadian variant of a US Marine Corps force structure, Hellyer "was not ready to accept at face value any previous defence estimates or plans."[95] His rejection of Brock's report was just one of the irritants in their acrimonious relationship that resulted in the minister firing the flag officer in the course of the so-called revolt of the admirals against unification. Nor was there consensus within the naval staff. Through the years leading up to unification, in the absence of firm direction from CNS Rayner as to how to proceed otherwise, internal bickering among groups of staff officers advocating for their particular projects (new and more aircraft carriers, nuclear submarines, the GPF) created a situation in which they were played off against one another, making the Navy "its own worst enemy" and resulting in none of the programs advancing.[96]

Whatever the merit of any of the string of naval "reports" produced through the convulsive decade of the 1960s, even with many of them giving more than a nod to integrated-joint-combined forces, the step too far of unification instead became a cost-cutting exercise to fund the social programs of the growing Canadian welfare state. With the carrier scrapped along with all the remnants of the wartime gun destroyers, Maritime Command (MARCOM) – as it now was styled – lost any semblance of a balanced force structure and was condemned to provide, as best it could within the "strategy of commitments," its niche capability NATO role of anti-submarine warfare. It was not until 1972 that the now-familiar unified structure of National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ) finally was settled, with the operational MARCOM headquartered in Halifax and the "naval staff" in Ottawa reconstituted as CMDO (Chief of Maritime Doctrine and Operations). Still, the chastened naval planners did manage a rapid and inspired adaptation to the circumstances, producing a "Maritime Policy Review" in May of that year (reproduced as Appendix N).[97] Very much reflecting the "ends-ways-means" recognizable to present-day strategy developers, albeit without using those terms, it benefited as well from flowing directly from the recent government White Paper on Defence, *Defence in the 70s* (a national grand strategy in all but name). It was advertised as having "been undertaken by a joint military-civilian group … with assistance from representatives of the Privy Council Office and the Treasury Board Secretariat," the new "whole of government" offices established by the Trudeau government. The Deputy Minister and Chief of Defence Staff promptly recommended it to the minister "as the basis for future planning of Maritime activities within the Department and as the basis also of submissions on new or replacement equipment which will require Cabinet or Treasury Board approval in the future." Ticking all those boxes, one should expect it to have favourably shaped the rebuilding of the Canadian fleet with a return to the balanced force structure recommended in the Policy Review. However, as Dan Middlemiss observes:[98]

> Indeed, for the navy the [Pierre] Trudeau era amounted to 'constraint as usual.' … [Significantly], the intra-budgetary trade-off between personnel and capital expenditures continued unabated. Personnel expenditures … increased abruptly to 65 per cent of MARCOM budget in 1977. Capital expenditures experienced a more rapid decline … to only 8 per cent in 1975, a post-war low.… Operations and maintenance expenditures … decreased substantially … in response to the dramatic increase in fuel costs caused by the 1973 OPEC crisis.

The 1972 policy review recommended the acquisition of general-purpose capabilities in four broad areas (the numbers in parentheses indicate the chapter / page in the document):

- expanded surface and sub-surface surveillance capabilities (2 / 11);
- the "Maritime Defence of North America" (4 / 41);
- the protection of the transatlantic sea lanes to Europe for "NATO Maritime defence" (5 / 54); and,
- general support for "Peacekeeping and Unforeseen Maritime Contingencies" (6 / 59).

However, in the subsequent department-wide Defence Structure Review (DSR) of 1975, the MARCOM programs were determined to be lower in priority than the acquisition programs required for Mobile Command (Leopard tanks for the Army brigade in Europe) and Air Command (CF-18 fighter aircraft and CP-140 Aurora long-range patrol aircraft, although notably, the MARCOM review supported the latter as a replacement for the Argus[99]).

The final recommendation of the Maritime Policy Review was "that the Department of National Defence undertake technical studies, including studies of cost-effectiveness, and, following their completion, make recommendations to the Cabinet, as to the number, types and mix of surface ships and submarines which should be procured or maintained in service during the period 1972 to 1985."[100] As an exception to the comment in the paragraph above, this objective – although it did not see immediate acquisition results – was pursued determinedly to result in the submission of a Memorandum to Cabinet in November 1977 on "Maritime Surface Ship Requirements"[101] (reproduced as Appendix O). Although not a strategy document in itself, it is a noteworthy statement of strategic principles as endorsed by the highest level of political approval. In seeking approval "to conduct a project definition for the first portion of a ship acquisition program," Cabinet agreed that Canada must "continue to maintain a combat capable maritime surface fleet … of 24 fully combat capable surface vessels [to] meet Canada's requirement for participation in collective defence" (p. 0009). Notable here, in this direction, is the continued deference to the strategy of commitments. And as an aside, the "vessels" eventually would become known as the Canadian Patrol Frigate (CPF) or *Halifax* class, the last of which would be delivered just shy of two decades later.

We have seen in Part 2 how Canadian staff officers in SACLANT were instrumental in the development of NATO's Concept of Maritime Operations (CONMAROPS). Coincident with that work, naval officers at home in Canada were performing a parallel tactical development with strategic implications: the systematizing of the task group concept. Peter Haydon has described this process in his insightful article, "The Evolution of the Canadian Naval Task Group."[102] It had been NATO practice over the decades to split up various national squadrons to be combined into mixed multinational groups specialized for a certain purpose (such as anti-submarine warfare). By the 1970s, however, "changes in technology … and the nature of war itself … required some new thinking," so one aspect of CONMAROPS was that:

> SACLANT began to change the concept for assigning national forces to operational tasks. Rather than continuing to use the previous ad hoc method of assigning individual ships to tasks, ships were assigned increasingly to tasks on the basis of national task groups.… The advantages were many. A national task group came fully trained, ready for its task, and more importantly was self-sufficient.[103]

The Canadian naval staff were easily converted, having come to appreciate that, for example, although the RCN had made a significant contribution to the Korean War, the potential for gaining any political influence from that had been diminished by the destroyers being split up into British and American task groups.[104] The new concept not only could make the Navy more attractive to its political masters, but it also provided the rationale for the revitalization of the Canadian fleet with acquisition programs that would allow for balanced, self-supporting national task groups. These programs included, specifically, the modernization of the *Iroquois*-class DDH 280s to take on better command and control and area air defence capabilities (the Tribal Update and Modernization Project, or TRUMP), the construction of the *Halifax*-class Canadian Patrol Frigates optimized for ASW, and an eventual replacement for the existing *Protecteur*-class replenishment ships. Thus, the task group concept became the organizing principle for the Canadian Navy for the last decade of the Cold War. In the meantime, it served "the rust-bucket navy" well in adapting to remain a key element of the US Navy's overarching Maritime Strategy being implemented throughout that period.[105] And the task group concept was the rationale for the force that Canada deployed to the Persian Gulf to join the coalition

effort in response to Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait in 1990–1991, a contribution that, in consequence, was accorded outsized recognition. The great irony is that, with the completion of the TRUMP refits and the introduction of the CPFs, the Navy had, by the mid-1990s (that is, after the end of the Cold War), finally achieved the quest begun in the mid-1950s for a force structure of balanced capabilities.

Indeed, this push was a factor in expanded naval capabilities being a significant dimension of the Mulroney government's 1987 Defence White Paper, *Challenge and Commitment*. The document contained bold statements confirming the TRUMP and CPF projects, as well as the revitalization of the naval reserve through assigning it the distinct role of mine countermeasures, but it is known more for calling for a fleet of 10–12 nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSN).[106] When the SSN project was cancelled in the belt-tightening spring 1989 budget, the Navy immediately undertook a "Fleet Mix Study"[107] to determine how to make good the lost capability difference within the new financial framework. The Study is reproduced as Appendix P, but its introductory paragraph is pertinent here:

> 1. (S) This paper reviews policy and strategic considerations affecting Canada's maritime force development over the past 14 years. It then considers the current situation and the implication on the future maritime force structure of the three ocean strategy outlined in the current White Paper. The 15 year force development plan is then examined and the importance of the nuclear propelled submarines as a component of a balanced maritime capability for Canada is explored. The impact of not pursuing nuclear propulsion is discussed and the paper concludes that a restructuring of the Maritime portion of the Canadian Forces Development Plan (Provisional) is required given that nuclear propulsion is no longer acceptable, Finally, the paper identifies an alternative maritime force structure that would satisfy the requirement that is derived from policy.

Again, while not properly a strategic assessment as such, the study is instructive for reviewing the general conditions a Canadian fleet was required to address. Working through a variety of options, it concluded that the cancellation of the SSNs could be compensated for through the acquisition of a dozen conventional submarines (SSKs), along with an additional eight frigates (on top of the dozen CPFs already under construction, as well as the four Tribals being modernized), for a total of 24 surface warships. In short order, however, further financial constrictions not only cancelled the additional frigates but also deferred the submarine acquisition indefinitely.

A coincidental effort, undertaken in the shadow of the same funding pressures, was a study to assess if any efficiencies could be gained by combining the government fleets. Dan Middlemiss has summarized the attempts, beginning in the early 1960s, "to merge the CCG [Canadian Coast Guard], or at least parts of it, under navy auspices,"[108] which finally was achieved in September 2025, with the CCG officially becoming a Special Operating Agency within DND. One of the most exhaustive examinations of the issue was undertaken in 1990, published in October of that year as "All the Ships that Sail: A Study of Canada's Fleets."[109] More commonly short-titled the Osbaldeston Report (for its author, Gordon F. Osbaldeston, recently retired as Clerk of the Privy Council), extracts are reproduced as Appendix Q. After reviewing a range of alternatives for managing government fleets, Osbaldeston concluded that "[t]he full consolidation or 'single fleet' option, while theoretically possible is not a viable option … [with]

no evidence that the benefits are sufficient to justify the costs in both human and financial terms."[110] The main issue was the differing roles and cultures of the two fleets, as well as the danger that, in merging them, "either the civilian component would become excessively militarized, or … the military component's combat effectiveness would be compromised."[111] While much has changed in government operations and even naval culture over the years to temper these concerns, Osbaldeston's findings are a cautionary tale with many points for consideration to ensure success in the present effort.

The Osbaldeston Report appeared just as the Canadian naval task group arrived in theatre to begin operations. The Gulf War deployment of 1990–1991 came at an opportune time for the Canadian Navy (and for most forces of other nations, for that matter), demonstrating as it did the continuing need for viable naval and military forces even after the fall of the Berlin Wall, to police the crises that soon enough would come to define the "new world order." Still, that need was not so obvious to governments seeking a "peace dividend" following the successful conclusion of the Cold War. The record of the 1990s can be chronicled by the search for a naval strategy to enable survival in this cost-cutting environment. The lead example for western navies, perhaps surprisingly, was the United States Navy, itself not immune from the prevailing trend. The USN's "From the Sea" series[112] became the guide for Britain, Australia, and Canada. In the Canadian case, it witnessed a chain of documents drafted through the 1990s, all sponsored by successive Commanders of Maritime Command (or Chiefs of the Maritime Staff, as they became known after 1997) seeking to find the right "voice" to respond to the sometimes confusing prescriptions from government and NDHQ policy staffs. In sequence, they were *The Maritime Command Vision: Charting the Course to Navy 2008* (Vice-Admiral Peter Cairns, 1993 [principal author Captain(N) David Bindernagel]); *The Naval Vision: Charting the Course for Canada's Maritime Forces into the 21st Century* (Vice-Admiral Peter Cairns, 1994, following the promulgation of the White Paper [principal author then-Captain(N) Eric Lerhe]); and *Adjusting Course: A Naval Strategy for Canada* (Vice-Admiral Gary Garnett, 1997 [principal authors then-Captain(N) Dan McNeil and Lieutenant-Commander Doug Maclean]). Other than to note that they constitute an intellectually compelling series of documents deserving of further detailed study, they will not be addressed here, as none of them gained any traction. Still, they are attached as appendices R, S, and T.[113]

This culminated with the development of *Leadmark: The Navy's Strategy for 2020*[114] (short title, *Leadmark 2020*), in which the author of this monograph had some personal part as the lead writer for the team. Accepting the inherent "biases of their own aspirations" warning that was noted in the introduction to this Reader, *Leadmark 2020* is discussed at some length here, primarily because it caught the traction that had eluded the previous attempts and has been independently assessed against concurrent allied efforts as being "successful."[115] Principal among the reasons for its wide acceptance is that it was developed not as an insular in-service project but with a broad range of inputs. To begin, enabled by the newfound "magic" of email, it enjoyed loose coordination with allied staffs, specifically Britain, where Eric Grove was rewriting *BR 1806: The Fundamentals of British Maritime Doctrine*,[116] and Australia, where James Goldrick was engaged in codifying *Australian Maritime Doctrine*.[117] These exchanges of ideas were enhanced within the CAF through personal interaction with the Land Staff Concept Development team at Fort Frontenac in Kingston (there were no similar contacts with the air staff, an equivalent of the Air Warfare Centre in Trenton having not yet been established). Secondly, starting from a base of the practical experience of professional officers, the draft document was developed consciously with academic pretensions, so that it was rigorously

tested against historical experience as well as the evolving concepts of "medium power naval strategy" just then being developed by leading thinkers in that emerging field, such as Richard Hill, Geoffrey Till, Eric Grove, and Canada's own Peter Haydon (these and more are listed in *Leadmark 2020*'s three-page "Select Bibliography," pages 172–174). Thirdly, progressive drafts of the document were circulated for comment and were "seminared" extensively with the Canadian academic community, with the defence centres at the Dalhousie and Calgary universities each sponsoring multi-day conferences to that effect.

Many of the concepts were new to the Canadian Navy (and for that matter, the academic community) and demanded elaboration, so the final document (not unlike the Brock Report) struggled to encompass it all, and with an additional "marketing" chapter on "Future Naval Capability Requirements," it swelled to just under 200 pages (a summary version was developed in tandem but at a still-too-long 50 pages). Attention is drawn to several core concepts that remain pertinent to present deliberations (the numbers in parentheses are the pages in the document, reproduced as Appendix U):

- A theoretical discussion of "the elements of successful sea power as they apply to a medium-sized nation" (28) led off with Ken Booth's conception of the "use of the sea as the unity underlying a trinity of roles – military, diplomatic and policing [constabulary] – which inter-relate across the spectrum of conflict" (30–41); arguably, "Booth's Triangle" remains a useful construct to this day;[118]
- Eric Grove's "Typology for Navies" was described (43–45) as not derived on a simple order-of-battle quotient but rather informed by state intention to employ it. It was noted for placing Canada in the "Rank 3: Medium Global Force Projection Navy" grouping (with Australia and the Netherlands), defined as "navies that may not possess the full range of capabilities, but have a credible capacity in certain of them and consistently demonstrate a determination to exercise them at some distance from home waters, in cooperation with other Force Projection Navies." The USN was alone in the first rank, with Britain and France as Rank 2;
- Condensing the book-length analyses of Richard Hill and Peter Haydon[119] to a three-page summary, it identified six "Principles of Medium Power Naval Strategy." Space, regrettably, does not allow for a full discussion here, but most should be self-evident from their sub-heading titles (46–48):
    - Influence Events at a Distance
    - Freedom of the Seas
    - Joint Enabler
    - Wide Range of Operations
    - Versatile and Capable
    - Alliances / Coalitions
    - Interoperability
    - Indigenous Capacity [the term then meaning "build and sustain in Canada"];
- The task group concept was highlighted and defined as "the task-tailored mix of capabilities brought together in a variety of surface, sub-surface and aerial platforms [for a specified mission]," with discussion of its defining characteristics (117); and
- Finally, it concluded with "… a clear and concise strategy that establishes the Leadmark to which Canada's navy should steer on its course into the 21st century" (119) (note that the "ends-ways-means" mantra had not yet become fashionable in CAF usage but can be discerned with a careful reading):

> *The Canadian navy will continue its development as a highly adaptable and flexible force, ready to provide the government with a wide range of relevant policy options across a continuum of domestic and international contingencies up to mid-level military operations*. [Ends]
>
> *The navy will generate combat capable forces that are responsive, rapidly deployable, sustainable, versatile, lethal and survivable*. [Ways] *Canada's naval forces, from individual units to complete Task Groups, will be tactically self-sufficient and be able to join or integrate into a joint, US or multinational force, anywhere in the world. The navy will enhance the capability to deploy Vanguard elements for crisis response and to support the rapid deployment of the Land and Air Main Contingency Forces*. [Means]

Although admittedly "aspirational," unlike its Brock Report predecessor of four decades before, all that academic rigour and coordinating efforts with like-minded forces amazingly paid off. This synthesis found an audience in government circles, and *Leadmark 2020* was able to gain the departmental approval needed for Vice-Admiral Greg Maddison to publish it in June 2001 for wide external as well as internal promulgation.[120]

As will be recalled, within a couple of months of that date came the 9/11 terror attacks. That the Canadian naval response rolled out precisely as prescribed was ignored in the immediate post-operation analysis, the staff instead getting caught up in the moment and being charged to develop a correspondingly "new" strategy to meet the "everything had changed" circumstances. However, the resultant *Securing Canada's Ocean Frontiers*[121] that appeared in 2005, in truth, mostly reaffirmed the principles of *Leadmark 2020* (see its pages 9–12), along with offering a nod to kickstarting an interest in the Arctic (22 and *passim*) and providing still-relevant sections on "emerging naval missions" (19–29), some of which have become reality, while others remain aspirational:

- Coordination of Government Maritime Operations
- National Maritime Presence
- Forward Security
- Maritime Interdiction
- Task Group Command
- Sea-Based Joint Operations
- Sea-Based Logistics Support

A further listing of "strategic imperatives" (30–31), while perhaps a statement of the obvious, bear repeating as similarly having continued relevance to the present pursuit of a renewed Canadian naval strategy:

- Must be relevant to Canadians
- Must be Able to Act
- Must have the Right Capabilities
- Must have Critical Mass

A term that became popular at about that time was reference to the years of the Chrétien ministry as a "decade of darkness" due to its underfunding of the military.[122] This author proposes similarly to style the period after 2005 as the "decade of churn": the installation of General Rick Hillier as Chief of Defence Staff precipitated a throwback to a true understanding of integration, and serious attention was given to concepts of "jointness" (not all of them

"jarmy" – one especially interesting notion being his "big honking ship" [i.e., amphibiosity]). All of that was lost, however, in the Harper government's need for retrenchment to resolve the 2008 financial crisis and the focus on Afghanistan. Thus, Hillier's so-called "transformation" of the Canadian Armed Forces was not the major impetus for the change of the Navy that it might have been.[123]

A more direct factor suggesting a shift in strategic thinking was the USN's promulgation in 2007 of its *Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower* (CS 21).[124] Synthesized by Geoffrey Till as "a radically different approach to thinking about maritime operations which gave prominence to the notion of navies not competing but cooperating with one another to defend an international seabased trading system on which everyone's peace and prosperity ultimately depended,"[125] this was widely interpreted as signalling an American appreciation of a loosely organized collection of coalitions banding together in pursuit of sustaining the rules-based order of international relations. In Canada, it rationalized the drawdown of fleet availability to accommodate the modernization of the *Halifax*-class frigates and the consequent decline in capacity to deploy national task groups. Successive commanders of the RCN embarked on a replay of the 1990s' quest for a new and inspiring document with the right voice to rise above the churn and garner departmental buy-in to sustain fleet renewal. Alas, although *Horizon 2050* and its near-kin *Leadmark 2050*[126] were well-crafted strategic communications documents embodying that language to reflect the Navy's promise, neither achieved the right tone for departmental sign-off and official public release (like many digital documents, the latter did find its way into unofficial distribution). And meanwhile, as noted in the opening to this monograph, the paying off without immediate replacement of all the *Iroquois*-class command and air defence destroyers – as well as both tankers – and failure to achieve a reliable operational status for either the *Victoria*-class attack submarines or the CH-148 Cyclone maritime helicopters meant the hollowing out of the task group concept. With the main premises of *Leadmark 2020* no longer pertaining, the Canadian Navy, by the middle of the 2010s, had arguably fallen to Rank 5 or 6 in Groves's typology, no longer capable of carrying out high-level independent operations over oceanic distances.

* * *

That brings us to the present and concludes this survey. Clearly, the Navy's existing strategic guidance is outdated, and the world being in the throes of a major shift in geopolitics makes it an opportune time to embark upon the development of a refreshed Canadian naval strategy. The capstone documents surveyed here provide signposts to guide such an undertaking. They run the gamut of style, format, and intent. Rarely were they developed with any appreciation of the classic teachings of the naval strategy canon, the only one to consciously do so being *Leadmark 2020*, constructed against the premises of the medium-power naval theory that was emerging in the aftermath of the Cold War. Many were not "strategies" at all but rather force planning documents, although with sufficient strategic assessment content to warrant inclusion here. Most did not achieve their purpose, being either too ambitious or, more frequently, out of step with government ambitions. As noted in the introduction, a sure predictor of failure was the lack of alignment with an overarching national grand strategy.

The process got off to a promising start with Gordon's 1888 proposal that was developed in consideration of the Macdonald government's National Policy, but the post-Confederation structures of government were immature, and the plan could not be sustained beyond force of

habit following the deaths of its prime movers. Thereafter, only on three other occasions were the attempts made within the scope of a recognizable national grand strategy: in 1909, 1943, and 2001. But even those tended not to survive for long: in the former two instances, governments changed, and with them, the national grand strategy, the navy's scheme lacking the flexibility to adapt to the circumstances; and in the latter case, the Navy itself failed to follow through on its strategy, erroneously believing that the strategic geopolitical setting had fundamentally shifted, but with no firm government indications to that effect. If one might discern common grounds for failure, it would seem to be the fact that a consistent Canadian government "strategy" has been to spend as little as possible on military and especially naval capabilities.

The challenge to the drafters of any new naval strategy is to address that political mindset. Any refreshed document must be developed in alignment with national ambitions and shaped to embrace the tenets of Canada's self-ascribed status as a medium power. And it should have inherent flexibility and be adaptable to changing circumstances so that it can prove durable into the foreseeable future.

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- *Defence in the 70s: White Paper on Defence*. Ottawa, 1971. https://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2012/dn-nd/D3-6-1971-eng.pdf.
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- *Strong, Secure, Engaged: Canada's Defence Policy*. Ottawa, 2017. https://publications.gc.ca/site/eng/9.835971/publication.html.
- *Our North, Strong and Free*. Ottawa, April 8, 2024. https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/corporate/reports-publications/north-strong-free-2024.html.

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Appendices: List of Capstone Documents

Documents found in the separate, accompanying appendix section: ***TBD***

	Date	Event / Document	Reference
A	06 Nov 1888	Gordon to Tupper (letter)	Gordon to C.H. Tupper, November 6, 1888, LAC, RG 25, A-1, vol. 105
B	01 Feb 1909	"Memorandum on Coast Defence" (Kingsmill)	Kingsmill to Brodeur, LAC, MG 27 II C4, vol. 2, file 17
C	19 Apr 1909	"Defence of Coasts – Generally" (Kingsmill)	Kingsmill to Brodeur, April 19, 1909, LAC, RG 24, D1, NS 1017-1-1
D	1909 (Aug)	"Admiralty Memorandum on Naval Defence"	Brodeur Papers *Confidential Papers Laid Before the Imperial Conference 1909*
E	1919 (July)	"Occasional Paper No 2: Proposals for Canadian Naval Expansion"	LAC, RG 24, vol. 5696, NS 1017-31-2/4
F	1919 (Nov)	Jellicoe Report (Published) [excerpt vol. 1, i-18]	DHH Library
G	17 Jan 1939	"Objective of the Naval Service" (Nelles)	LAC, RG 24, vol. 3844, NSS 1017-10-34
H	Nov 1940	"Canada's Post-War Navy" (Houghton)	LAC, RG 24, vol. 3844, NSS 1017-10-34
I	29 Jul 1943	"Appreciation of RCN Ship Requirements for the War Against Japan and for the Post-War Navy" (Todd)	LAC, RG 24, vol. 3844, NSS 1017-10-34
J	14 Mar 47	"Planning of Post-War Navy" (Lay)	LAC, RG 24, acc. 83-84/167, box 455, file 1650-26, pt. 3
K	17 Aug 50	"Accelerated Defence Programme: Recommendations for the Increase in Strength of the R.C.N."	CNS to MND [later Memo to Cabinet Defence Cmttee] LAC, RG 24, acc. 83-84/167, box 455, file 1650-26, pt. 3
L	15 June 1956	Naval Warfare Study Group: Final Report [extracts]	DHH 2010/1 [photocopies of: LAC, RG 24, 97-98/260, vol. 28, file 1279-155, vol. 2]
M	1961	"Ad Hoc Working Group on Naval Objectives" (Brock Report)	DHH 2002-13, box 4, folder 3, file 2
N	16 Nov 1972	"Maritime Policy Review"	CDS Sharp & DM Cloutier ATIP Release / Haydon Collection
O	22 Dec 1977	"Maritime Surface Ship Requirements"	545-77RD (Cab Doc) ATIP Release / Haydon Collection
P	1989	"Fleet Mix Alternative Study"	ATIP Release / Haydon Collection

Q	1990	*All the Ships that Sail* [Osbaldeston Report]	https://navalmarinearchive.com/research/navies/rcn_source_guide_06.html
R	1993	*Maritime Command Vision* [Cairns]	https://navalmarinearchive.com/research/navies/rcn_source_guide_06.html
S	1994	*Naval Vision* [Cairns]	https://navalmarinearchive.com/research/navies/rcn_source_guide_06.html
T	1997	*Adjusting Course* [Garnett]	https://navalmarinearchive.com/research/navies/rcn_source_guide_06.html
U	2001	*Leadmark: The Navy's Strategy for 2020* [excerpt Chapter 6]	https://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2012/dn-nd/DB3-22-2001-eng.pdf
V	2005	*Securing Canada's Ocean Frontiers*	https://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2008/nd-dn/D2-164-2005E.pdf
W	2013	*Horizon 2050* [Maddison]	https://navalmarinearchive.com/research/navies/rcn_source_guide_06.html
X	2019	*Leadmark 2050* [Norman]	https://www.navalassoc.ca/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/Leadmark-2050-13-May-2016.pdf

Notes

[1] *Leadmark: The Navy's Strategy for 2020* (June 2001) [hereafter *Leadmark 2020*]; *Securing Canada's Ocean Frontiers: Charting the Course from Leadmark* (May 2005); *Horizon 2050: A Strategic Maritime Concept for the Canadian Forces* (2013, not promulgated); and *Leadmark 2050: Canada in a New Maritime World* (2019, not promulgated). Greater discussion and full bibliographical information are provided in the detailed discussion in Part 3 below.

[2] For concise narrative discussions of these various ship classes and aircraft types, see Richard H. Gimblett and Karl Gagnon, *Guardians of the North: Canadian Warships and Maritime Aircraft, 1910-2025* (Toronto: Dundurn, 2025).

[3] A powerful discussion of this trend arrived as this Introduction was being crafted: Timothy Garton Ash, "Greenland and the Need for a New Internationalism," January 18, 2026, https://open.substack.com/pub/timothygartonash/p/greenland-and-the-need-for-a-new?r=1g4myu&utm_medium=ios&shareImageVariant=overlay. Just two days later, Prime Minister Mark Carney made the points explicit in his speech to the World Economic Forum at Davos, Switzerland, on January 20, 2026: "For decades, countries like Canada prospered under what we called the rules-based international order.… This bargain no longer works. Let me be direct: we are in the midst of a rupture, not a transition.… To help solve global problems, we are pursuing variable geometry – different coalitions for different issues, based on values and interests." See Prime Minister's Office, January 20, 2026, https://www.pm.gc.ca/en/news/speeches/2026/01/20/principled-and-pragmatic-canadas-path-prime-minister-carney-addresses.

[4] *Canada in Extremis: Rebalancing the Canadian Armed Forces and Rebuilding the Canadian Navy* (Naval Association of Canada, May 2024), 10. This point was emphasized in the American *2026 National Defense Strategy*, 10 (and also 3, albeit there with a menacing undertone). US Department of War [*sic*], January 23, 2026, https://media.defense.gov/2026/Jan/23/2003864773/-1/-1/0/2026-NATIONAL-DEFENSE-STRATEGY.PDF.

[5] *Leadmark 2020*, 46.

[6] Author Gimblett recalls that, when appointed in 1999 as a core member of the team charged with developing the original *Leadmark 2020*, both of the elements noted in this paragraph were in play: firstly, that the effort was itself the latest in a string of attempts, through the decade, to develop a strategic document; but also that he had had limited professional exposure to any of the literature on naval strategy, other than a general awareness of the historical works of Mahan and Corbett, and his first months "on the job" thus consisted of a self-directed reading course into the subject. Much of that exposure to the literature is reflected in this monograph, noting that studies especially on the nature of strategy have proliferated since then. Additionally informing this work is his observation of the Navy's subsequent strategic development processes, initially as a contractor embedded in the process and then from a distance as the Command Historian, until his retirement from public service in 2018.

[7] See the discussion by Professor Barney Rubel of the US Naval War College in his review of Sebastian Bruns and Sarandis Papadopoulos, eds., *Conceptualizing Maritime & Naval Strategy: Festschrift for Captain Peter M. Swartz, United States Navy (Ret.)* (Baden-Baden, Germany: Nomos, 2020), in *Naval War College Review* 74, no. 4 (2021): Article 11.

[8] As noted most recently and authoritatively by Brian Santarpia, "Canada's Need for a Grand Strategy," in *Starshell* 104 (Fall 2025): 24–28, https://www.navalassoc.ca/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/Starshell-Fall-2025-MR.pdf.

[9] See the discussion at this US Army War College site, accessed May 9, 2023: https://www.reddit.com/r/WarCollege/comments/uah34s/doctrine_vs_strategy_vs_tactics/.

[10] Cited in footnote 3 above.

[11] Hew Strachan, "The Lost Meaning of Strategy," *Survival* 47, no. 3 (October 2005): 34, as quoted in Brad Gladman, *Good Strategy and Bad: A Primer on the Creation of a Royal Canadian Air Force Service Strategy* (Defence Research and Development Canada Scientific Letter, DRDC-RDCC-2021-205, July 2021), 2.
[12] Lawrence Freedman, *Strategy: A History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), ix.
[13] Canada, Department of National Defence, *Shaping the Future of Canadian Defence: A Strategy for 2020* [short title *Strategy 2020*] (June 1999 [Deputy Minister Jim Judd and Chief of Defence Staff General Maurice Baril]).
[14] *Leadmark 2020*, 20.
[15] Arthur F. Lykke, Jr., "Defining Military Strategy," *Military Review* (January–February 1997): 185–186.
[16] Most recently, and perhaps infamously, as the driving mechanism of the second Trump administration's *National Security Strategy* (one does not have to agree with the content of the document to note its adherence to the ends-ways-means formula): *National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, DC: The White House, November 2025), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/2025-National-Security-Strategy.pdf.
[17] Lykke, "Defining Military Strategy," 184.
[18] Brad Gladman, *Good Strategy and Bad: A Primer on the Creation of a Royal Canadian Air Force Service Strategy* (Defence Research and Development Canada Scientific Letter, DRDC-RDCC-2021-205, July 2021).
[19] Gladman, *Good Strategy and Bad*, 2.
[20] Gladman, *Good Strategy and Bad*, 1, 4.
[21] Gladman, *Good Strategy and Bad*, 9.
[22] Originally developed for my presentation, "The Historical Evolution of Canadian Naval Strategic Thinking" (paper presented to the Kingston Consortium on International Security [KCIS], Kingston, ON, November 19, 2025 [TBP]), upon which Part 3 of this monograph has been revised and greatly expanded. This is inspired by, and is a slight contraction of, the definition developed by the RCN in its recent *Trident: Royal Canadian Navy Strategic Doctrine* (p. 11):

> If one thinks of strategy as comprising the ends, ways, and means, then the political purposes for which governments deploy their naval asset represent the ends, naval platforms are the means, and strategic and operational doctrines describe the ways. Taken together, the ends, the ways and the means provide the best plan for the use of naval power as an effective instrument of strategic policy.

[23] Freedman, *Strategy: A History*, 108–122 [the subsection is 115–120].
[24] Edward Mead Earle, ed., *Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to Hitler* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1943 [reprinted 1971]); Peter Paret, ed., *Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986). This is especially distressing to the Canadian situation, as these books in succession were issued as standard texts to cadets at the Canadian Military Colleges.
[25] D.M. Schurman, *The Education of a Navy: The Development of British Naval Strategic Thought* (London: Cassell, 1965).
[26] For example, not included are the works that were influential upon the interwar continental European navies, such as French strategist Raoul Castex's *Strategic Theories* (selections translated and edited, with an introduction, by Eugenia C. Kiesling) (Maryland, MD: US Naval Institute Press, 1994 [originally published 1931–1939]). Curious readers are directed to Michael Shurking, "Admiral Raoul Castex: The Naval Strategist for Non-Hegemons," March 13, 2024, accessed January 29, 2026, https://warontherocks.com/2024/03/admiral-raoul-castex-the-naval-strategist-for-non-hegemons/.
[27] D.N. Mainguy, "The Evolution of NATO Maritime Strategy," in *NATO: A Maritime Alliance* [Proceedings of a Conference held in Halifax, NS, April 6, 1989], ed. Robert N. Huebert, Susan J. Rolston, and Fred W. Crickard (Halifax: Dalhousie University, Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, 1989), 49–51; Paul T. Mitchell, "Strategic Symbiosis: Bureaucratic Versus Geostrategic Factors in the Development of the United States Navy's Maritime Strategy" (unpublished PhD dissertation, Queen's University, 1995), https://recherche-collection-search.bac-

lac.gc.ca/eng/Home/Result?DataSource=Library|Theses&Author=Paul%20T.%20Mitchell&DataSourceSel=Library&ST=SAH&.

[28] See this author's chapter, "The Navy Paradigm: 'Information Superiority and Operational Independence'," in Allan English, Richard Gimblett, and Howard G. Coombs, *Networked Operations and Transformation: Context and Canadian Contributions* (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2007), 28-60.

[29] In the interests of space (word count), this part is drafted with a presumption that readers will have a working knowledge of Canadian maritime and naval history. Anyone new to the topics (or wishing for a refresher) are recommended to consult a pair of comprehensive single-volume histories written in very "accessible" language: Victor Suthren's engaging *The Island of Canada: How Three Oceans Shaped Our Nation*; and Marc Milner's authoritative *Canada's Navy: The First Century* (full citations given in the Bibliography). A brief but pertinent history from the RCN's own perspective is at *Leadmark 2020*, Chapter 4: "Sternmark to 2020," 52–70, setting the framework for the strategic analysis in that document.

[30] William Johnston et al., "Prologue: Canada and Sea Power," in *The Seabound Coast: The Official History of the Royal Canadian Navy, Volume I – 1867-1939* (Toronto: Dundurn, 2010), xv–xlii.

[31] William E. Utley, "The Phips Expedition of 1690: Or, How NOT to Try to Capture Quebec," New England Historical Society, last modified 2025, accessed January 25, 2026, https://newenglandhistoricalsociety.com/the-phips-expedition-of-1690/.

[32] James H. Marsh, "Pierre Le Moyne d'Iberville et d'Ardillières," *Canadian Encyclopedia*, accessed January 25, 2026, https://thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/pierre-le-moyne-diberville-et-dardillieres. See also Bernard Pothier, "Pierre Le Moyne d'Iberville et d'Ardillières," *Dictionary of Canadian Biography, Volume II (1701-1740)*, accessed January 25, 2026, https://www.biographi.ca/en/bio/le_moyne_d_iberville_et_d_ardillieres_pierre_2E.html.

[33] For a fuller account, see Suthren, *The Island of Canada*, 85–91.

[34] Bruce Buchan, "Pandours, Partisans, and Petite Guerre: The Two Dimensions of Enlightenment Discourse on War," *Intellectual History Review* 23, no. 3 (2013), https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/17496977.2012.723338. Since this is the only at-sea instance of this form of warfare in this narrative, *la petite guerre* has not been included in "The Naval Canon" of Part 2 above. One notes, however, the affiliation with *guerre de course* and the consequent premonitions of *la Jeune École*, which are described therein.

[35] Suthren, *The Island of Canada*, has a full chapter on the subject, which is recommended reading: "10: Booty and Adventure: The Canadian Privateers" (163–177). Another good summary is Marc Milner and Glenn Leonard, *New Brunswick and the Navy: Four Hundred Years* (Fredericton: Goose Lane, 2010).

[36] Faye Margaret Kert, *Prize and Prejudice: Privateering and Naval Prize in Atlantic Canada in the War of 1812* (St. John's, NL: International Maritime Economic History Association, Research in Maritime History No. 11, 1997), 3.

[37] Johnston et al., *The Seabound Coast*, xvii, xix.

[38] Corbett's *The Seven Years War* (London: Longman, Green and Co, 1907) remains one of the best accounts of the naval dimensions of the conflict.

[39] Andrew Lambert, *The Challenge: Britain Against America in the Naval War of 1812* (London: Faber & Faber, 2012).

[40] As described in Roger Sarty, "The Army Origins of the Royal Canadian Navy: Canada's Maritime Defences, 1855-1918," *The Northern Mariner* 34, no. 4 (Winter 2020): 341–378, https://tnm.journals.yorku.ca/index.php/default/article/view/41.

[41] Morley K. Thomas, "Andrew Robertson Gordon," *Dictionary of Canadian Biography, Volume XII (1891-1900)*, accessed January 28, 2026, https://www.biographi.ca/en/bio/gordon_andrew_robertson_12E.html. Note – this entry is very good on his Meteorological Service endeavours and the Hudson Bay expedition, but it mentions his command of the FPS only in passing and notes nothing at all of the naval strategic recommendations made in the text here.

[42] Johnston et al., *The Seabound Coast*, 8–10.

[43] Robert Craig Brown, "National Policy," *Canadian Encyclopedia*, accessed January 28, 2026, https://thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/national-policy; "National Policy," Wikipedia, accessed January 28, 2026, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Policy.
[44] Andrew Gordon to C.H. Tupper, November 6, 1888, Library and Archives Canada (LAC), Record Group (RG) 25, A-1, vol. 105 [reproduced as Appendix A]. The official history, Johnston et al., *The Seabound Coast*, has a detailed discussion, 31–37.

Readers interested in researching this topic further should be aware of the concurrent efforts being undertaken within the Department of Militia and Defence by Gordon's fellow ex-RNR colleague Colin Campbell, all of it informed by the inquiries of the Carnarvon Commission (1879-1882), that factored in the establishment of the Fisheries Protection Service; see Johnston et al., *The Seabound Coast*, 21-24.
[45] Charles D. Maginley and Bernard Collin, *The Ships of Canada's Marine Services* (St. Catharines: Vanwell, 2001), 86.
[46] Notably, all three vessels were commanded by Royal Naval Reserve (RNR) officers and flew commissioning pennants to confirm their status, and Militia plans were made to arm them with 12-pounder guns.
[47] See Gimblett and Gagnon, *Guardians of the North*, Chapter 1: "The Proto-Navy: CGS/HMCS *Canada*," 6–10.
[48] Foster had been Minister of Marine and Fisheries when Gordon first joined the department in the early 1880s and held senior ministries thereafter. He most certainly was aware of Gordon's scheme.
[49] Kingsmill to Brodeur, "Memorandum on Coast Defence," February 1, 1909, LAC, MG 27 II, C4 [L.P. Brodeur Papers], vol. 2, file 17 [reproduced as Appendix B]. Notably dropped by Kingsmill was reference to Gordon's original assessment of the need for the up-armed FPS vessels to be moved to the Lakes, the threat of conflict there now being substantially diminished due to much better relations with the Americans. See Roger Sarty, "Canada and the Great Rapprochement, 1902-1914," in *The North Atlantic Triangle in a Changing World*, ed. B.J.C. McKercher and Lawrence Aronsen (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996), 12–47.
[50] House of Commons *Debates*, March 29, 1909 (col. 3565). The events of 1909 are covered in Gimblett, "Reassessing the Dreadnought Crisis of 1909 and the Origins of the Royal Canadian Navy," *The Northern Mariner / Le Marin du nord* 4, no. 1 (January 1994): 35–53, and developed further (and more exhaustively) in the official history, Johnston et al., *The Seabound Coast*, 131–135 and *passim*.
[51] Kingsmill to Brodeur, "Defence of Coasts -Generally," April 19, 1909, LAC, RG 24, D1, NS 1017-1-1 [reproduced as Appendix C].
[52] *Admiralty Memorandum* (July 20, 1909) and *Canada: Summary of Result of Meetings* (August 1909), LAC MG 27 II C4, vol. 2, file 20, reel H-1917 (Brodeur Papers) [reproduced as Appendix D]. For a discussion of the change in strategic direction, see Nicholas Lambert, "Economy or Empire? The Fleet Unit Concept and the Quest of Collective Security in the Pacific, 1909-1914," in *Far Flung Lines: Studies in Imperial Defence in Honour of Donald Mackenzie Schurman*, ed. Greg Kennedy and Keith Neilson (London: Frank Cass, 1996), 44–83. While not directly pertinent to this monograph, it is interesting to note that Kingsmill had studied recently under Julian Corbett in the Captains' War Course at Greenwich in 1904, and they had met again in July 1908 on the occasion of the Quebec Tercentenary, aboard the just-commissioned battlecruiser HMS *Indomitable*, meaning he was familiar with the technical aspects of the new vessel; see Johnston et al., *The Seabound Coast*, 125–127.
[53] Mark Tunnicliffe, "The Fleet We Never Had," *Canadian Naval Review* 2, no. 1 (Spring 2006): 20, https://www.navalreview.ca/wp-content/uploads/CNR_pdf_full/cnr_vol2_1.pdf.
[54] See Gimblett and Gagnon, *Guardians of the North*, Chapter 2: "The Beginning: *Rainbow* and *Niobe*," 12–17.
[55] Borden to Lord Milner, April 18, 1919, as quoted in James Eayrs, *In Defence of Canada, Volume I: From the Great War to the Great Depression* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1980), 151.
[56] "Occasional Paper No. 2: Proposals for Canadian Naval Expansion," July 3, 1919, LAC, RG 24, vol. 5696, NSS 1017-31-2 [reproduced as Appendix E].
[57] *Report of Admiral of the Fleet Viscount Jellicoe of Scapa on Naval Mission to the Dominion of Canada (November - December 1919)* (3 vols) (His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1919) [excerpt vol. 1, i–18],

passim [reproduced as Appendix F]. The best general analysis of the Jellicoe Mission is Ian S. Yeates, "Admiral Jellicoe Goes to Sea: The Naval Mission and the Ambition for an "Imperial Royal Navy," *The Northern Mariner / Le Marin Du Nord* 33, no. 1 (2023): 43–80, https://doi.org/10.25071/2561-5467.1082.

[58] See Barbara Winters, "The Reserve Preserve: How the RCNVR Saved the Navy," in *Citizen Sailors: Chronicles of Canada's Naval Reserve, 1910-2010*, ed. Richard H. Gimblett and Michael L. Hadley (Toronto: Dundurn, 2010), 35–52.

[59] "Objectives of the Canadian Naval Service," January 17, 1939, LAC, RG 24, vol. 3844, NSS 1017-10-34 [reproduced as Appendix G].

[60] Michael Whitby, "Instruments of Security: The Royal Canadian Navy's Procurement of the Tribal-Class Destroyers, 1938-1943," *The Northern Mariner / Le Marin du nord* 2, no. 3 (July 1992): 3. See also Gimblett and Gagnon, *Guardians of the North*, Chapter 10: "The Mighty Tribals," 55–59.

[61] House of Commons *Debates*, May 16, 1939, 4129.

[62] "Canada's Post-War Navy," November 11, 1940, LAC, RG 24, vol. 3844, NHS 1650-1, vol. 2 [reproduced as Appendix H].

[63] R.H. Caldwell, "The Golden Age of the [NSHQ] Naval Plans Division, April - December 1943," February 3, 1997, unpublished Directorate of History and Heritage (DHH) Naval History Narrative, DHH 2000/5, Douglas-Sarty-Whitby Collection, box 10, file 168.

[64] R.H. Caldwell, "The Government's Planning Dilemma and the Canadian Naval Service in 1943-44," March 18, 1997, unpublished DHH Naval History Narrative, *passim*, especially Part I, pp. 18–21, 36–37, 45 n. 84, and Part II, pp. 2–3. On the workings of the Committee generally, see also Don Munton and Don Page, "Planning in the East Block: The Post-Hostilities Problems Committees in Canada 1943–5," *Contemporary International History* 32, no. 4 (December 1977), https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/002070207703200401.

[65] Director of Plans [Todd] to ACNS, "Appreciation of R.C.N. Requirements for the War Against Japan and for the Post-War Navy," July 29, 1943, LAC, RG 24, vol. 3844, NSS 1017-10-34 [reproduced as Appendix I]. For an incisive look at the RCN's "blue water navy" aspirations at this moment, see Roger Sarty, "The Ghosts of Fisher and Jellicoe: The Royal Canadian Navy and the Quebec Conferences," in *The Second Quebec Conference Revisited. Waging War, Formulating Peace: Canada, Great Britain and the United States in 1944-1945*, ed. David B. Woolner (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998). See also Gimblett and Gagnon, *Guardians of the North*, Chapter 22: "The Last Cruisers," 122–127.

[66] Alec Douglas, "Conflict and Innovation in the Royal Canadian Navy, 1939-1945," in *Naval Warfare in the Twentieth Century*, ed. Gerald Jordan (London: Croom Helm, 1977), 210.

[67] Jan Drent, "A Good Workable Little Fleet'," in *A Nation's Navy: In Quest of Canadian Naval Identity*, ed. Michael Hadley, Rob Huebert, and Fred W. Crickard (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1996), 205–220.

[68] Director of Naval Plans and Intelligence (Capt H.N. Lay) to Deputy [*sic* Vice] Chief of Naval Staff (A/Cmdre H.L. Houghton), "Planning of [the] Post-War Navy," March 14, 1947, LAC, RG 24, acc. 83-84/167, box 455, NSS 1650-26, vol. 3 [reproduced as Appendix J]. The use of the phrase "Post-War" in the title even at this date points to the existence of continuity in Canadian naval strategic processes, in that Houghton was the drafter of the November 1940 assessment, and Lay had been in charge of the Plans division in early 1943.

[69] See Gimblett and Gagnon, *Guardians of the North*, Chapter 25: "The Cadillacs: St. Laurent-Class Destroyers and Successors," 142–150.

[70] Louis St-Laurent [Secretary of State for External Affairs], "Speech… Inaugurating the Gray Foundation Lectureship at Toronto University," January 13, 1947, https://n2t.net/ark:/69429/m0x639z93n5k.

[71] This designation of the Navy's carrier task force was primarily due to its being in place and mostly operationally ready (neither the Army nor the RCAF had sufficient operational units). Additionally, Pearson seems to have retained a good impression of the Navy's wartime capabilities but was quite unaware of how badly the fleet had declined with demobilization, because even earlier that year, in late February 1949, he had taken the lead in the dispatch of the destroyer HMCS *Crescent* to China to participate in what today would be described as a coalition endeavour, to support the Commonwealth diplomatic community in civil war-torn China (the episode did not turn out well). See Richard H.

Gimblett, "Canadian Gunboat: HMCS *Crescent* and the Chinese Civil War, 1949," in *Canadian Gunboat Diplomacy: The Canadian Navy and Foreign Policy*, ed. Ann Griffiths, Peter Haydon, and Richard Gimblett (Halifax: Dalhousie University, Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, 2000), 77–94.

[72] CNS to MND, "Accelerated Defence Programme: Recommendations for the Increase in Strength of the R.C.N.," August 17, 1950, LAC, RG 24, acc. 83-84/167, box 455, NSS 1650-26, vol. 3 [reproduced as Appendix K].

[73] The RCN would achieve its greatest peacetime strength in time for its golden anniversary in 1960: a total of 62 ships, comprising an aircraft carrier, destroyers and destroyer-escorts, frigates, minesweepers, and miscellaneous craft. The RCN graphically illustrated the scale of the fleet in 1960 with a hand-drawn poster created to mark the occasion, showing every vessel then in service, reproduced in Gimblett and Gagnon, *Guardians of the North*, xii.

[74] Douglas L. Bland, *Chiefs of Defence: Government and the Unified Command of the Canadian Armed Forces* (Toronto: Canadian Institute for Strategic Studies, 1995), 214–224.

[75] This is not to suggest that it was entirely top-down direction from NATO. Canadian historian Isabel Campbell has demonstrated that, within these parameters, the RCN was able to influence NATO strategy to take national interests into consideration. See her "Canadian Insights into NATO Maritime Strategy, 1949-70: The Role of National and Service Interests," *The Northern Mariner / Le marin du nord* 25, no. 3 (July 2015): 239–264, https://tnm.journals.yorku.ca/index.php/default/article/view/236/221.

[76] Fred W. Crickard, "Strategy, the Fleet-in-Being, and the Strategic Culture of the Officer Corps," in *A Nation's Navy: In Quest of Canadian Naval Identity*, ed. Michael Hadley, Rob Huebert, and Fred W. Crickard (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1996), 57, 59.

[77] Dan W. Middlemiss, "Economic Considerations in the Development of the Canadian Navy Since 1945," in *RCN in Transition, 1910-1985*, ed. W.A.B. Douglas (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1988), 278.

[78] Campbell, "Canadian Insights into NATO Maritime Strategy," *op. cit.*, and Haydon, "The Evolution of the Canadian Naval Task Group," in *Canadian Gunboat Diplomacy: The Canadian Navy and Foreign Policy*, ed. Ann Griffiths, Peter Haydon, and Richard Gimblett (Halifax: Dalhousie University, Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, 2000), 95–112.

[79] "Strategic Concepts," NATO: Text and Resources, last modified July 18, 2022, https://www.nato.int/en/about-us/official-texts-and-resources/strategic-concepts.

[80] "The Requirements for a Re-Appraisal of Current War Plans," November 28, 1955, NSTS 11650-26, DHH Raymont Collection 73/1223, file 147, referenced in Haydon, "The Evolution of the Canadian Naval Task Group," 109.

[81] For details of the various classes listed, see the pertinent chapters in Gimblett and Gagnon, *Guardians of the North*, *passim*.

[82] The often-bitter decade-long postwar struggle between the naval and air staffs over the control of fixed-wing maritime aviation has not received adequate attention by historians; an overview is provided by John Orr, "Canadian Naval Aviation: A Cautionary Tale," *Canadian Naval Review* 21, no. 1 (2025): 2–4, https://www.navalreview.ca/past-issues-2020-to-2023/.

[83] Isabel Campbell, "A Transformation in Thinking: The RCN's Naval Warfare Study Group of 1956," in *People, Policy and Programmes: Proceedings of the 7th Maritime Command (MARCOM) Historical Conference (2005)*, ed. Richard H. Gimblett and Richard O. Mayne (Ottawa: Canadian Naval Heritage Team, 2008), 171. The Sound Underwater Surveillance System (SOSUS) was only then coming into existence as a network of passive hydrophones linked via undersea cable to a shore facility where the received signals could be analyzed and submarine probability areas passed to ASW forces. See Gimblett, "Canada and SOSUS," *Canadian Encyclopedia*, last modified December 9, 2021, https://thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/canada-and-sosus. Campbell notes as well (172) the important concurrent step "to ease the quick transition from peace to war" of the RCN obtaining Chiefs of Staff Committee approval for the new appointments of Maritime Commanders Atlantic and Pacific, giving the coastal naval commanders operational control over the shore-based maritime air assets of the RCAF.

[84] Campbell, "A Transformation in Thinking," provides a fuller listing and biographical details at 173.

[85] "Naval Warfare Study Group: Final Report," DHH 2010/1, RCN Committees, Meetings & Conferences: The Naval Warfare Study Group (1956), declassified photocopies of LAC, RG 24, 97-98/260, vol. 28, file 1279-155, vol. 2. Noting the file does not contain a complete copy of the Final Report, the documents included as the appendix to this monograph comprise the initial terms of reference approved by the Naval Board on January 5, 1956; the preamble to the Draft Final Report presented to the Naval Board on June 15, 1956, which includes a summary of its conclusions; and the list of revisions subsequently required by the Naval Board [no date] [extracts reproduced as Appendix L].
[86] Campbell, "A Transformation in Thinking," 179–180.
[87] Campbell, "Canadian Insights into NATO Maritime Strategy," 255-257.
[88] Sharon Hobson, *The Composition of Canada's Naval Fleet, 1946-85* (Halifax: Dalhousie University, Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, 1986), 32.
[89] "Ad Hoc Working Group on Naval Objectives" ("The Brock Report" [1961]), DHH 2002-13, box 4, folder 3, file 2 [reproduced as Appendix M].
[90] Douglas Bland, "Continuity in Canadian Naval Policy 1961-1987," *Canadian Defence Quarterly* 19, no. 2 (April 1989): 29–32, https://navalmarinearchive.com/research/navies/pdf/bland_april_1989.pdf. Valuable contextual discussion is provided as well in Richard Oliver Mayne, "The Annapolis Riddle: Advocacy, Ship Design and the Canadian Navy's Force Structure Crisis, 1957-1965" (unpublished PhD dissertation, Queen's University, 2008), 84–90 and *passim*.
[91] Tony German, *The Sea Is at Our Gates: The History of the Canadian Navy* (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1990), 276.
[92] Quoted in Mayne, "The Annapolis Riddle," 89.
[93] Bland, "Continuity in Canadian Naval Policy 1961-1987," 31.
[94] Peter Haydon, "Vice-Admiral Herbert S. Rayner: The Last Chief of the Canadian Naval Staff," in *The Admirals: Canada's Senior Leadership in the Twentieth Century*, ed. Michael Whitby, Richard H. Gimblett, and Peter Haydon (Toronto: Dundurn, 2006), 259–260.
[95] Bland, "Continuity in Canadian Naval Policy 1961-1987," 31.
[96] Naval Constructor Rear-Admiral S. Mathwin Davis, as quoted in Richard Mayne, "Its Own Worst Enemy: Ship Advocacy in the RCN, 1963-1964," *Canadian Naval Review* 2, no. 3 (Fall 2009): 28, https://www.cntha.ca/static/documents/papers/vol2num3art5.pdf.
[97] "Maritime Policy Review," May 16, 1972, 1150-110/M21 (ATIP release, courtesy Peter Haydon fonds) [reproduced as Appendix N].
[98] Middlemiss, "Economic Considerations in the Development of the Canadian Navy," 267–268.
[99] See the discussion of the Aurora acquisition project in Gimblett and Gagnon, *Guardians of the North*, Chapter 57.
[100] "Maritime Policy Review," May 16, 1972, 83.
[101] Memorandum to Cabinet, "Maritime Surface Ship Requirements," November 3, 1977, 545-77MC (ATIP release 98-A-00017, courtesy Peter Haydon Collection), beginning p. 21 [reproduced as Appendix O].
[102] Haydon, "The Evolution of the Canadian Naval Task Group," 95–129.
[103] Haydon, "The Evolution of the Canadian Naval Task Group," 120.
[104] Fred W. Crickard and Richard H. Gimblett, "The Navy as an Instrument of Middle Power Foreign Policy: Canada in Korea 1950 and the Persian Gulf 1990," in *Maritime Forces in Global Security: Comparative Views of Maritime Strategy as We Approach the 21st Century*, ed. Ann L. Griffiths and Peter T. Haydon (Halifax: Dalhousie University, Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, 1995), 327–342.
[105] *The Maritime Strategy* (Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, 1984), reproduced in John B. Hattendorf and Peter M. Swartz, *U.S. Naval Strategy in the 1980s: Selected Documents* (Newport, RI: Naval War College Newport Papers No. 33, 2008), "Document Two," 45–104.
[106] *Challenge and Commitment: A Defence Policy for Canada* (Ottawa, 1987), 49–55. See also Gimblett and Gagnon, *Guardians of the North*, chapters on the *Halifax*, *Kingston*, and *Victoria* classes.
[107] "Fleet Mix Alternative Study 1989" [no date, no file number] (ATIP release, courtesy Peter Haydon fonds) [reproduced as Appendix P].
[108] Dan Middlemiss, "The DND-CCG Merger: Back to the Future?," *Canadian Naval Review* 21, no. 3 (February 2026): 29–30.

[109] "All the Ships that Sail: A Study of Canada's Fleets" [short title, The Osbaldeston Report], October 15, 1990, Treasury Board of Canada [reproduced as Appendix Q].
[110] Osbaldeston Report, 58.
[111] Middlemiss, "The DND-CCG Merger," 29.
[112] *From the Sea: Preparing the Naval Service for the 21st Century* (Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, 1992); *Forward… From the Sea* (Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, 1994).
[113] In sequence: *The Maritime Command Vision: Charting the Course to Navy 2008* (1993) [reproduced as Appendix R]; *The Naval Vision: Charting the Course for Canada's Maritime Forces into the 21st Century* (1994) [reproduced as Appendix S]; and *Adjusting Course: A Naval Strategy for Canada* (1997) [reproduced as Appendix T]; all listed at https://navalmarinearchive.com/research/navies/rcn_source_guide_06.html.
[114] *Leadmark: The Navy's Strategy for 2020* (June 2001) [hereafter *Leadmark 2020*], https://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2012/dn-nd/DB3-22-2001-eng.pdf [reproduced as Appendix U].
[115] Aaron P. Jackson, *Keystone Doctrine Development in Five Commonwealth Navies: A Comparative Perspective* (Sea Power Centre – Australia: Papers in Australian Maritime Affairs No. 33, 2010), Chapter 2: "Canada," *passim*, https://seapower.navy.gov.au/publications-and-research/keystone-doctrine-development-five-commonwealth-navies-comparative-perspective.
[116] Great Britain, Directorate of Naval Staff Duties, *The Fundamentals of British Maritime Doctrine (BR 1806, 2nd edition)* (London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1999).
[117] Australia, Chief of Navy, *Australian Maritime Doctrine: RAN Doctrine 1 (1st edition)* (Canberra ACT: RAN Sea Power Centre, 2000).
[118] K. Booth, *Navies and Foreign Policy* (London: Croom Helm, 1977), 15–16ff.
[119] Richard Hill, *Maritime Strategy for Medium Powers* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1986), 218–227; Peter T. Haydon, *Sea Power and Maritime Strategy in the 21st Century: A "Medium" Power Perspective* (Halifax: Dalhousie University, Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, Maritime Security Occasional Paper No. 10, 2000), 119–128.
[120] The only three terms that the Assistant Deputy Minister (Policy) shop review had the Navy remove were "amphibiosity," "ballistic missile defence," and "build in Canada," all of which have since proven to be prescient and have had a subsequent re-look.
[121] *Securing Canada's Ocean Frontiers: Charting the Course from Leadmark* (May 2005), https://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2008/nd-dn/D2-164-2005E.pdf.
[122] A contemporary exploration of this theme with much resonance to the conclusion of this study is Joel K. Sokolsky, "Realism Canadian Style: National Security Policy and the Chretien Legacy," *Policy Matters* 5, no.2 (2004), at: https://irpp.org/research-studies/policy-matters-vol5-no2/
[123] Daniel Gosselin, "Hellyer's Ghosts: Unification of the Canadian Forces Is 40 Years Old – Part One," *Canadian Military Journal* 9, no. 2 (2009): 6–15, https://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/vo9/no2/03-gosselin-eng.asp#n3.
[124] *Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower* (Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, 2007).
[125] Geoffrey Till, "The Accidental Dialectic: The Real World and the Making of Maritime Strategy Since 1945," in *Conceptualizing Maritime & Naval Strategy: Festschrift for Captain Peter M. Swartz, United States Navy (ret.)*, ed. Sebastian Bruns and Sarandis Papadopoulos (Nomos, The Kiel Seapower Series, 2020), 19.
[126] *Horizon 2050: A Strategic Maritime Concept for the Canadian Forces* (2013), not promulgated; *Leadmark 2050: Canada in a New Maritime World* (2019), not officially promulgated but available at https://www.navalassoc.ca/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/Leadmark-2050-13-May-2016.pdf.